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ESSAYS IN LABOR AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS
SEBASTIAN CAMARERO GARCIA
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, 2020
ABSTRACT
This doctoral thesis contains three essays on labor and public economics with a focus
on investigating the effects of labor market policies on entrepreneurship and public
policies on inequality of opportunity. In particular, it analyzes the role of both policy
variables of the unemployment insurance (UI), the potential UI benefit duration (i.e.
how long an individual is eligible to receive benefits) and the level of UI benefits (i.e.
how much support one gets during unemployment), on self-employment. Moreover,
this dissertation investigates the role of learning intensity on Inequality of Educational
Opportunity (IEOp). Thereby, the reader should note that the three chapters of this
dissertation can be read independently.
Chapter 1 is titled “Unemployment Benefit Duration and Startup Success” and
coauthored with Martin Murmann. The first chapter analyzes how the potential benefit
duration (PBD) of the unemployment insurance (UI) affects the actual unemployment
duration of founders, their motivation for starting up and ultimately their subsequent
performance, i.e. startup success. Despite the importance of business creation for the
economy and even though a relevant share of new firms is started out of unemployment1,
research has focused on analyzing the effect of UI policy on re-employment outcomes.
To fill this gap, we create a novel representative dataset on founders in Germany that
links established administrative social insurance data with representative survey data that
are sampled from the universe of all startups in Germany. Exploiting reform-based and
age-based exogenous variation in potential benefit duration (PBD) within the German UI
system (in a time period when UI benefit levels as second policy variable remained fixed),
this chapter derives causal estimates of PBD on three sets of outcomes. First, we find that
longer PBD causally increases actual unemployment duration of those becoming self-
employed. The UI duration elasticity for previously unemployed founders (0.6) is higher
in comparison to common estimates of the UI duration elasticity for those becoming re-
employed (0.15). Second, with increasing unemployment benefit duration, the founders’
outcomes in terms of self-assessed motivation change: the share of necessity- relative to
opportunity-driven startups increases. Third, longer PBD also affects objective measures
of startup success: sales and employment growth over the initial years after starting up
become inferior.
1In Germany about 25% of all startups every year, in Spain on which I focus in Chapter 2 even up to 50% of all
startups are created out of unemployment every year.
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Chapter 1 develops an extended search model that shows how these net causal effects
can be rationalized by a mix of composition and individual-level duration effects. The
model illustrates that there may be policy conclusions to learn from the empirical results:
for instance, targeted early retraining for unemployed individuals could help them to
improve their potential to get re-employed instead of being pushed into self-employment
at the end of their unemployment benefit spell. Moreover, this chapter suggests that the
fiscal externality of UI on startup success should be considered for the (optimal) design
of the UI system, because in the current literature this channel is mostly neglected and
only the transition from unemployment to re-employment is taken into account.
Chapter 2 is titled “Unemployment Benefits and the Transition into Self-Employment”
and is coauthored with Michelle Hansch. The second chapter complements the first one
by analyzing the role of the second policy variable of unemployment insurance (UI), the
benefit levels, on self-employment. In other words, this chapter focuses on a setting in
which the potential benefit duration (PBD) schedule is given in order to analyze the effect
of UI benefit levels on the probability to exit from unemployment into self-employment or
employment. To shed light on this issue, we use Spanish administrative social insurance
data including so far inaccessible information on self-employment. Focusing on the
Spanish UI system, we exploit reform-driven variation in UI benefit levels to identify the
causal effect of UI benefits on total employment. Thereby, we cover the full picture by
decomposing the overall effect into the causal effects on transitions from unemployment
to employment, and self-employment. Documenting the evolution of all relevant labor
market status flows in Spain over the business cycle (2005-2017), we consider two
estimation strategies. First, we apply a Difference-in-Differences strategy which exploits
a 2012 reform which led to a reduction in the level of UI benefits for those remaining
unemployed for more than six months. Second, we propose a Regression Discontinuity
Design which relies on the time interval between the UI entry date and the sharp reform
cutoff date. We find the causal effect of reducing UI benefits on post-unemployment
outcomes to differ: it increases employment (job-finding rate) but not self-employment
(startup rate). Unemployed individuals adapt their job search behavior to avoid the drop
in benefits after six months, whereas the decision for self-employment is less affected. We
present novel insights that the UI benefit level duration elasticity is higher for employment
than for self-employment. Our results suggest that the differential role of UI benefits on
post-unemployment outcomes should be considered for the design of UI systems.
Taken together, Chapter 1 and 2 contribute to the literature in labor and public eco-
nomics by providing evidence on the role of both policy variables of the unemployment
insurance (PBD and the level of UI benefits) on the so far neglected post-unemployment
outcome, self-employment. The findings are based on administrative data from Germany
and Spain, and thus policy conclusions are of interest at least for countries with similar
European labor market institutions. The results should motivate empirical work for other
countries and further theoretical work with respect to the potential welfare considerations
(e.g. the optimal design of social insurance considering self-employment, etc.).
xChapter 3 is titled “Inequality of Educational Opportunities and the Role of Learning
Intensity”. The third chapter turns to a topic from the realm of economics of education
which can be considered to constitute a sub-field of both labor and public economics. This
chapter investigates how increasing learning intensity affects inequality of educational
opportunities, and thus indirectly social mobility. For this purpose, I exploit a German
school reform that over the 2000s shortened the duration of secondary school by one year
while maintaining the curriculum unchanged. Thus, this reform considerably increased
the learning intensity because more curricular content had to be taught within a shorter
total time period and lessons originally used for revision were now used to teach new
material. Exploiting quasi-experimental variation due to the staggered introduction of
this reform across the German federal states allows me to identify the causal effect of
increased learning intensity (the ratio of curricular content covered per year) on Inequality
of Educational Opportunity (IEOp). IEOp is estimated to be the share in educational
outcome variance (as measured by the OECD PISA test scores) that can be explained
by predetermined circumstances beyond a student’s control (e.g. the socioeconomic
background).
The findings show that the reform-induced increase in learning intensity causally
aggravated IEOp. This result appears to be driven by differences in parental resources
that gained importance through support opportunities like private tuition adapting to the
intensified educational process. Thus, differential compensation possibilities (depending
on the parental background) appear to be the main mechanism for explaining how higher
learning intensity causally increases IEOp. Moreover, results point to the existence of
subject-dependent curricular flexibilities, with mathematics/science being more inflexible,
that is, more responsive to changes in curricular intensity compared to reading. My
findings suggest that it is important to account for distributional consequences when
evaluating reforms aimed at increasing the efficiency of educational systems. My results
also point to the relevance of taking into account the role of learning intensity when
evaluating educational reforms. Therefore, Chapter 3 shows that learning intensity is
an important aspect in human capital formation that can explain changes in educational
opportunities, and thus ultimately impact social mobility. This should be considered
when thinking about how best to design schooling to reconcile efficiency and equity
considerations.
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Glossary
Gymnasium is the academic track of secondary school education in Germany covering
both lower and upper secondary level (grades 5–13 or 5–12) and providing an in-
depth general education aimed at the general higher education entrance qualification
(Allgemeine Hochschulreife)
Learning Intensity is the ratio of curricular content covered in a given period of time.
In particular, the G-8 reform led to increased learning intensity in such a way that
by the end of grade 9 post-reform, students have received about the same amount
of instruction, and covered the same curriculum as students that had completed
two-thirds of grade 10 pre-reform. Learning intensity, thus, corresponds to the
intensive margin as it reflects the amount of content (curriculum) to be studied in
a constant amount of instruction time, whereas school duration (e.g. number of
years/days) refers to the extensive margin
Plausible Value Following OECD (2009; PISA Data Analysis Manual) in chapter 6:
Instead of directly estimating a student’s ability θ , a probability distribution is
estimated. Thus, instead of obtaining a point estimate, a range of possible values
with an associated probability for each is estimated. Plausible Values are random
draws from this (estimated) distribution
Chapter 1
Unemployment Benefit Duration and Startup Success
1
21.1 Introduction
Business creation plays an important economic role in stimulating productivity, fostering
structural change, and foremost, offering jobs for their founders and additional employees
(Aghion et al. 2009, Dent et al. 2016, Haltiwanger et al. 2013). Self-employment accounts
for 10-15 percent of the labor force in most OECD countries. Thereby, a little known fact
is that each year, one quarter of all new business creations is started out of unemployment.1
Due to the spread of new forms of employment in the digital economy (e.g. Uber drivers),
the relevance of transitions from unemployment to self-employment can be expected to
increase in the near future. Recent research in public economics demonstrates that the
generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) systems in terms of potential benefit duration
(PBD) and benefit levels affects re-employment outcomes of those transitioning from
unemployment to employment. Despite their economic importance, however, transitions
from unemployment to self-employment (business creations) are largely ignored and
little is known about how the design of unemployment insurance affects the behavior
of potential entrepreneurs and the subsequent performance of their firms. Chapter 1
therefore sheds light on this topic by analyzing how the potential UI benefit duration
(PBD) affects the actual unemployment benefit duration (ABD) of those transitioning to
self-employment, their motivation for starting a firm, and the success of their firms in
terms of sales and employment growth.2
The effect of longer potential benefit duration (PBD) on self-employment outcomes
seems a priori unclear. On the one hand, if longer PBD incentivizes longer actual unem-
ployment, losses in financial, social, and human capital might lead to a gradual decrease
in startup quality. For instance, longer unemployment duration could decrease financial
means, increase difficulties to attract external financial capital (due to stigmatization),
lead to losses of business contacts, or a depreciation of skills and knowledge.
On the other hand, a period of unemployment might be used to better prepare for
self-employment, e.g. by acquiring new skills or developing market entry strategies.
Apart from these individual-level duration effects, there are likely to be composition
effects, as individuals with high motivation and ability possibly leave unemployment the
fastest. Thus, with longer unemployment duration, a higher amount of individuals with
low ability and motivation could remain to found a startup. In our study, we identify the
overall causal effect of potential UI benefit duration on startup success and thus the (net)
result of the government’s UI policy. We rationalize which mechanisms could explain
our results with the help of post-hoc analyses and a formalized job search model.
1In Germany, the empirical setting of this chapter, around 25-30 percent of all founders between 2005 to 2015
have been unemployed before starting their firms. According to data from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel and the
ZEW/IAB Start-Up Panel, there were around 200,000 startups each year between 2000 and 2015. This corresponds to
about 50,000-60,000 startups out of unemployment per year.
2Concerning the notation in this chapter: with self-employment, we refer to the labor market status to distinguish
unemployment, employment and self-employment. Within the labor market status of self-employment, the term
founder refers to the person starting a firm which covers both firms with and without employees. The term entrepreneur
is used to focus on a founder who continues to run a firm after starting it. The term startup refers to the act of starting
a firm and is used as a synonym for new firm.
3In this chapter, we construct a dataset that links a representative panel survey of
founders in Germany to administrative data on their own and their employees’ labor
market histories. Thereby, we obtain a representative linked employer-employee dataset
for founders. Due to their high level of detail, German administrative data on labor
market histories have been widely used in research (e.g. von Wachter & Bender 2006,
Dustmann et al. 2009), allowing for a good comparability of our measures with those used
by previous research in the context of transitions to dependent employment. Our data
enable us to consider two types of outcome variables, the founders’ self-assessment as
measured by their motivation to start up (necessity/opportunity driven entrepreneurship),
and their objectively measurable outcomes, such as sales and employment growth during
the first years of business. We focus on startup growth as outcome, since growth potential
in the first years should be more directly influenced by unemployment duration than more
distant outcomes, which ultimately allows a clear attribution of the measured effects.
Early growth is also a predictor of long-term firm success (Sedlácˇek & Sterk 2017).
To identify the causal effects of unemployment benefit duration on startup success,
we exploit exogenous variation through both policy reforms of PBD, and age-specific
cutoffs in the PBD schedule of the German unemployment insurance (UI). Our main
empirical strategy is an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. We instrument PBD (and
actual unemployment benefit duration) with the interaction term “being in the relevant age
cohort” (only those above 45 years were affected by reforms) and “becoming unemployed
after the reform changed maximum PBD”. The reforms of 2006 and 2008 jointly reduced
maximum PBD by at least six months for affected cohorts. Our IV approach entails the
features of both Difference-in-Differences (DiD) and Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD). In general, results remain robust when conducting a RDD to estimate the effect
induced by age cutoffs in the PBD schedule or a DiD approach based on policy reforms.
Our results show a net negative causal effect of longer PBD on startup success. More
specifically, our estimates suggest that longer PBD increases actual unemployment dura-
tion implying an UI elasticity of around 0.6, which is higher than what recent estimates
of 0.15 suggest when focusing on dependent re-employment (see, e.g. Schmieder &
von Wachter 2016). Via this channel, longer PBD significantly increases the likelihood
that individuals start firms out of necessity - compared to a situation in which they start
the firm because of an opportunity motive - by about two percent per additional month
of PBD. Moreover, and particularly when focusing on the non-manufacturing sectors,
we consistently find a negative effect of longer PBD on actual outcomes in terms of
employment and sales growth in the first two years after starting up.
These net causal effects can be driven by individual-level duration, composition
effects, or a mix of both. We explain this with a stylized search model in Section 1.5.
Empirically we find limited evidence for composition effects in observable characteristics
of unemployed founders in response to UI policy changes.
4Hence, our findings suggest that the net effect is mostly driven by an individual-level
duration effect, i.e. that the ability of individuals to succeed as entrepreneurs depreciates
the longer they are unemployed. For instance, access to credits may deteriorate with
longer unemployment duration and thus financially constrain the respective startups’
growth potential. The results therefore indicate that by setting the length of PBD, the
government can affect the quality of firms starting out of unemployment. Through this
channel, changes in PBD may induce considerable fiscal externalities (Lawson 2017)
which affect the cost-benefit analysis of the UI system depending on the startup success
(out of unemployment). This should also be considered when evaluating the value of
insurance for self-employment (compare e.g. Hombert et al. 2020).
Our study makes three major contributions. First, we document how the PBD
in the unemployment insurance affects the actual unemployment duration of future
entrepreneurs. In this context, it is ex-ante unclear whether the positive causal effect
of PBD on actual UI benefit duration – which is usually found for those becoming
re-employed as wage workers – also exists for those starting a business (and whether we
can expect similar effect sizes). This has direct implications for the cost of UI systems
since additional fiscal externalities have to be considered because of the transitions from
unemployment to self-employment.
Second, we provide evidence on how the UI policy affects the motivation of founders,
i.e. whether they start a firm because of a business opportunity or out of necessity (as
a last resort). In this way, our study illustrates how UI policies can serve as a tool to
maximize the share of opportunity-driven startups. These types of startups might have the
highest potential for generating long-term economic value. Our results further suggest
on this score that self-classifications can serve as an important indicator for the future
potential of a startup and are therefore worthy of attention in themselves.
Third, we facilitate an understanding of how the growth potential (success) of startups
in terms of employment generation and sales depends on UI policy. This is important for
decisions on the optimal design of unemployment insurances since it affects their cost-
benefit ratio. There are also implications for the optimal design of active labor market
policies which incentivize unemployed individuals to transition into self-employment,
particularly regarding the question of when such policies should come into practice. Thus,
our results are informative for nascent entrepreneurs, money lenders, and policy makers.
This chapter of my dissertation connects several strands of the literature on en-
trepreneurship and public economics which have so far evolved in parallel to each other.
First, research on entrepreneurship has investigated potential determinants of becoming a
firm founder (e.g. Evans & Leighton 1989b, Berglann et al. 2011, Levine & Rubinstein
2017). Stylized facts suggest that unemployment increases the propensity to become
self-employed (e.g. Evans & Leighton 1989a, 1990, Meager 1992, Blanchflower &
Meyer 1994, Kuhn & Schuetze 2001, von Greiff 2009, Røed & Skogstrøm 2014b,a)
but that previously unemployed founders perform worse in entrepreneurship than those
transitioning from dependent employment (e.g. Andersson & Wadensjö 2007).
5However, the entrepreneurship literature so far has largely ignored significant hetero-
geneity among the unemployed in terms of their motivation to start a business, and their
firms’ subsequent performance. In addition, the issue of necessity- versus opportunity-
driven entrepreneurship has only been discussed in the context of very specific active
labor market policies (e.g. Caliendo & Künn 2011, Caliendo & Kritikos 2010, for the
case of startup subsidies) but not in the more important context of the general UI system.
In studying the effects of PBD on the timing of when unemployed individuals move (or
are pushed) into self-employment (including its subsequent outcomes), we contribute to
the entrepreneurship literature by providing evidence for the potential implications of the
UI system on the success of firms started by unemployed individuals.3
Second, this project also adds to the literature of public economics on the optimal
design of unemployment insurance (UI) by providing evidence for the effect of potential
benefit duration (PBD) on future entrepreneurs. The public economics literature has
discussed several aspects concerning the optimal design of UI policies, i.e. the level of
benefits and their eligible duration (e.g. Hopenhayn & Nicolini 1997, Katz & Meyer
1990a,b, Lalive 2008, Schmieder et al. 2012, 2016, Kolsrud et al. 2018). Its focus has been
on investigating effects on subsequent employment outcomes, those predominantly being
re-employment wages (e.g. Le Barbanchon 2016, Schmieder et al. 2016, Le Barbanchon
et al. 2019, Nekoei & Weber 2017). Results suggest that increases in potential benefit
duration (PBD) lead to increases in actual unemployment duration (ABD). However,
the effects of longer actual unemployment on re-employment wages remain disputed.
For instance, Nekoei & Weber (2017) argue that longer PBD can either induce a delay
in job acceptance (and simply subsidize leisure) or be beneficial by improving job
opportunities (through subsidizing a longer search that results in job matches of higher
quality). While Nekoei & Weber (2017) find that the latter positive effect dominates in
Austria, Schmieder et al. (2016) report negative effects of unemployment duration on
re-employment wages in Germany. We contribute to this debate by providing evidence
of the causal effect of unemployment benefit duration on self-employment outcomes
based on our newly created dataset. Thus, the first chapter of my dissertation ultimately
complements the analysis of UI benefits with respect to post-unemployment outcomes
(Jarosch & Pilossoph 2019).
We proceed as follows: in Section 1.2, we explain our data construction and conduct
a descriptive analysis. Section 1.3 illustrates the institutional background and our identi-
fication strategies for deriving causal effects. In Section 1.4, we present our empirical
estimates which we rationalize in a stylized model in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 provides
our conclusion.
3Though self-employment is a smaller fraction of the total labor force (e.g. 10% in Germany) than employment,
founders can be considered incubators of (re)-employment. Even if only five percent of all the unemployed start a firm,
the employment spillovers are significant: if a startup employs on average two employees after one year (three after
three years), this means that we talk de facto about at least 15 (to 20) percent of the unemployment stock that may
benefit from those startups, which neglects the fact that through new startups individuals may be saved from becoming
unemployed in the first place.
61.2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
1.2.1 Dataset
For this chapter’s empirical analysis, we constructed data that matches the employer
information of the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel with employee register data from the
statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency. In this way, we circumvent the
data limitation that German employer-employee linked administrative social security data
normally put on any information regarding self-employed individuals. Self-employed
individuals in Germany are not obliged to contribute to the public social security system.
In contrast, it is mandatory for regular dependent employees to make social security
contributions.
The IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel is a joint research project from the Institute for Em-
ployment Research of the Federal Employment Agency (IAB), the Leibniz Centre for
European Economic Research (ZEW), and Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating
agency (see Fryges et al. 2010, for details on the sample design of the dataset). This
dataset is a sample taken from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (“MUP”) which contains
basic information on almost the entire universe of firms in Germany, including start-ups.
The information is collected by Creditreform, which conducts credit ratings for basically
all firms in Germany (Bersch et al. 2014). To be more precise, the Start-Up Panel is a
random sample of the MUP providing a representative dataset of young firms from almost
all industries (the primary sector, public sector and energy sector are excluded). Infor-
mation is collected by means of a yearly telephone survey (computer-aided telephone
interviews, CATI). The sample of the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel is stratified by the year of
firm formation and by industry sector. Stratification is controlled for by including dummy
variables for the stratification cells in all regressions. Currently, the IAB/ZEW Start-Up
Panel contains data on more than 21,000 firms founded between 2005 and 2015.4
The linked register data are drawn from the “Integrated Employment Biographies”
provided by the German Federal Employment Agency. These administrative data yield
information on the start and end dates of all employment and unemployment spells in the
founders’ (and the start-ups’ employees’) employment histories, and on their potential
unemployment benefit duration. The data are reported by the social insurance agencies.
They are generated by the employing establishment and collected by the employment
agency. Due to their high level of detail, the data are widely used in scientific research
(e.g. von Wachter & Bender 2006, Dustmann et al. 2009, Schmieder et al. 2016).
We matched the founders’ and the start-ups’ employees employment histories from
the German Federal Employment Agency with the firm-level data of the IAB/ZEW
Start-Up Panel by applying text search algorithm methods. Thus, we obtained the most
representative employer-employee linked dataset for founders in Germany as of this date.
4The first survey wave was conducted in 2008, collecting data on firms founded between 2005 to 2007.
7Our matched dataset covers longitudinal information on approximately 18,000 start-
ups.5 Comparing survey with recorded administrative data, our dataset already reveals
some interesting observations. In the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel survey, about 15% of
interviewees state that at least one founder in the team has been unemployed just before
starting up the new venture. Our linked dataset confirms that almost 76% of founders are
classified identically in the survey and administrative register data when it comes to the
founder’s previous labor market history. Only 20% of founders who have some registered
unemployment spell before becoming self-employed do not reveal that they have been
unemployed in the survey. Instead, less than four percent of founders report to have
started a firm out of unemployment when there is, in fact, no unemployment-related entry
in their social insurance records. In summary, these patterns are in line with differences
between survey and administrative data concerning individual labor market histories that
have been observed in the psychology literature. In fact, feeling ashamed of not having a
job may lead to under-reporting of unemployment (e.g. Chletsos et al. 2013).
The high percentage of identical classifications and further quality checks conducted
on the matching process confirm the quality of our survey data on founders. Moreover,
the conducted robustness checks also confirm the quality of our new dataset which links
the survey data with administrative data (Appendix I.2). In conclusion, the created linked
dataset allows us to derive representative results for founders in Germany and appears to
be the most appropriate resource for this purpose that is currently available.
1.2.2 Descriptive Analysis
For the aim of this study, we focus on the approximately 12,000 cases in which the firm
was started by a single founder (as opposed to a team). The reason for this decision is
that in order to detect the effect of PBD on subsequent firm outcomes, it is important to
identify the unemployment duration effect, which is most clearly possible analyzing a
single founder, i.e. a non-team founder (as opposed to a team of founders).
Moreover, our dataset includes both non-team founders that have and those that do
not have any employees. In the main empirical analysis, we focus on roughly 1,300
firms whose non-team-founders were unemployed directly before starting their firms.
They were between 35 and 65 years of age when entering unemployment, and became
unemployed before some major reforms led to changes in the availability of start-up
subsidies for the unemployed in 2012. We only include individuals for which all required
information on control variables is available and who have collected enough contribution
months to be entitled to receive benefits for the maximum PBD.
5We were able to match labor market histories of about 80% of the founders from the IAB/ZEW Start-up Panel
based on their names, birth date, and additional geographical information. Given that not all founders were necessarily
employed i.e. subject to social insurance in Germany before (e.g. as they have always been self-employed), this
is a very high ratio of matched individuals. Moreover, we were able to match establishment data to about 90% of
those start-ups that self-reported employees subject to registration with the German social insurance based on the
establishments’ names and addresses. Self-reported information is taken from an interview. For more details on the
construction of our dataset, see Appendix I.2.
8Detailed summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1.2: i.e. for our
regression sample of previously unemployed founders (and those of them with above
median unemployment duration) as well as for a reference group of previously employed
founders. The non-team founders are typically male (85%) and of German origin (94%).
They have on average 17 years of experience in the industry in which they start a firm,
and most of them (85%) have never been self-employed before entering unemployment.
The founders are on average 44.44 years old, about 39% enter unemployment when they
are at least 45 years old (and hence belong to the treatment group in the subsequent
causal analysis). In terms of education, 28% of founders achieved university degrees and
13% of them held managerial positions in the 5 years before starting up. Having a PBD
of 12.32 months, on average, the mean actual unemployment duration is 4.79 months
before they enter self-employment.
Figure 1·1 shows the outcomes in terms of employment and sales per year for all
entrepreneurs in the linked dataset. Figure 1·2 compares outcomes of all entrepreneurs in
our sample, distinguishing those who started their business out of unemployment with
those that became entrepreneurs out of regular employment (marked as not unemployed
in Figure 1·2)6. The results show large differences between the two groups in terms
of full-time equivalent (FTE) employment and sales. Having been unemployed before
starting a firm is associated with inferior outcomes when becoming an entrepreneur, both
in terms of the levels but also the growth trajectory of subsequent firm outcomes. Those
who survive seven years as self-employed (self-employment (SE)), entering SE out of
employment, can on average increase their sales by more than 100,000 Euro per year.
Instead, founders who were previously unemployed and survive seven years, on average,
only experience concave-shaped sales growth: they achieve an average increase in sales
per year from about 150,000 to 300,000 Euro after seven years. Similarly, they only
manage to increase FTE employment from about 0.5 to 1.5 employees (compared to an
increase from 1 to 2 FTE employees in the other group).
Zooming in on those entering self-employment out of unemployment, Figure 1·3
compares outcomes of the previously unemployed entrepreneurs in our sample, split at
the median unemployment duration. The results show that large differences between the
two groups evolve over time in terms of both FTE employment and sales per year. Longer
prior unemployment duration before starting a firm seems therefore to be associated
with inferior outcomes as an entrepreneur. This lower growth potential is not necessarily
visible in the year of foundation but develops over the first years of a firm’s existence.
Our descriptive results indicate that a large part of the outcome differentials between
previously unemployed and not unemployed founders are driven by unemployed founders
with high unemployment duration.
6As explained in Section 1.2.1 and in the figures’ notes, we focus on non-team founders that are 35 to 65 years old.
All firms are included independent of the survival length. Note, that all figures look very similar when we condition on
firms that survive at least three or five years. The respective figures conditioning on survival are available upon request.
They confirm that startup success is relevant (and not biased by survival).
9One interesting feature from our dataset is the fact that we have information on the
motivation of founders for starting up. Founders are asked about their motivation to
start a business only during the first interview of the year in which they enter the panel
survey (to best reflect the initial startup reason) and can only choose one answer category.
Table 1.1 shows how we define the different answer categories into either necessity
driven motivation for starting up or into opportunity driven motivation for becoming
an entrepreneur. In fact, we classify the answer categories “self-determined working”
and the “realisation of business idea” as well as “better earning potential”7 as indicators
for founders that could be defined as being opportunity driven entrepreneurs. Instead,
individuals answering “no suitable employment options” or “escape from unemployment”
as main motives for starting a firm can be defined as belonging to the category of necessity
driven or pushed entrepreneurs.8
Figure 1·4 compares outcomes of all non-team founders in our sample, split by their
self-reported motivation: being an opportunity or a necessity/pushed driven founder.
The graphs reveal that those founders reporting an opportunity-driven motivation for
starting their business experience faster growth in sales and full-time equivalent (FTE).
This suggests that the motivation appears to be a good predictor for subsequent start-up
success and that the notion of different types of entrepreneurs defined along the lines of
their motivation describes observed differences adequately.
Finally, Figure 1·5 compares outcomes of the previously unemployed founders in
our sample, split by their self-reported motivation. It reveals considerable differences
between the two groups in terms of FTE employment and sales. Starting a business out
of unemployment with a necessity motivation is associated with worse outcomes over the
self-employment spell compared to those launching a firm (out of unemployment) being
motivated by opportunity considerations.
Conducting OLS regressions of the actual benefit duration on being classified as
necessity (pushed) entrepreneur, sales and FTE employment (one and two years after
having started the business) shows that the graphically observed correlations are quite
robust. The relationships revealed in the descriptive analysis (as discussed in the five
figures above) remain significant in the OLS regressions even after controlling for
individual labor market experience, education, gender, nationality, and year as well as
industry fixed effects (Table 1.3). In fact, simple regression analysis suggests that one
month more of actual unemployment duration is associated with a 1.7 percentage point
increase in pushed founders (five percentage in relative terms given an original basis of
about 35 % necessity entrepreneurs). Moreover, one month of actual benefit duration is
significantly correlated with a decrease in sales and FTE employment (Table 1.3).
7We tested all results by excluding founders who self-reported this motivation category. However, all results
remain robust and thus we decided to maintain the classification as indicated in the main text.
8Figure I·1 in Appendix I.1 shows that necessity driven founders start up more often just before UI benefits expire,
and thus appear to be pushed into self-employment. Table 1.2 shows that one third of previously unemployed non-team
founders indicate to have been pushed into self-employment.
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These OLS results are reconfirmed in Table 1.4 when focusing on startups in the
non-manufacturing sectors (75% of our sample) . Non-manufacturing sectors offer easier
market entry possibilities due to lower initial investment requirements and, thus, are most
relevant for the entry of founders transitioning from unemployment to self-employment.
In other words, Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show that there is a statistically significant relationship
between actual unemployment duration and subsequent self-employment outcomes.
In conclusion, the descriptive analysis already reveals that there appear to be sig-
nificant differences for firm outcomes depending on the labor market history of the
founder. In particular, starting a business out of unemployment is associated with worse
outcomes in terms of sales and employment when compared to startups from founders
who have been previously employed (not unemployed). Moreover, given previous un-
employment history, longer unemployment duration seems to be correlated with worse
self-assessment (more necessity in contrast to opportunity driven motivation for starting
up) and subsequently worse firm outcomes.
1.3 Institutions and Empirical Strategy
The goal of this first chapter in my doctoral thesis is to find out whether potential benefit
duration (PBD) causally affects the actual unemployment duration for the founders that
start up out of unemployment and whether in consequence actual unemployment duration
causally affects the motivation for starting a business as well as the subsequent firm
outcomes. The main identification challenges lie in the fact that we need to exploit
exogenous variation in PBD to learn how the length of eligible benefit duration causally
affects actual unemployment duration (ABD), and hence how in general ABD affects
outcome variables of interest. Otherwise, we face endogeneity problems. In theory, there
may be, for instance, strategic behavior in becoming unemployed under the better PBD
scheme conditions. Moreover, PBD (or actual unemployment duration) may be correlated
with characteristics of unemployed people (e.g. previous working experience) that, in
fact, explain the observed outcome. To solve these identification issues, we exploit policy
reform and age-cutoff based exogenous variation in the PBD schedule within the German
UI system.
We conduct an instrumental variables (IV) approach as main estimation strategy
and check the robustness of our results by further conducting a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) and a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach. This allows us to derive the
net causal effect of PBD on the actual UI duration elasticity of founders, the motivation
to become self-employed, and on objective measures of startup success. To begin with,
we explain the main institutional features the identification strategies rely upon.
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1.3.1 Institutional Background: German UI System and Reforms
In general, individuals in Germany who lose a job without fault of their own are entitled
to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits (“Arbeitlosengeld I”) if they satisfy certain
eligibility constraints. These require UI benefit claimants to have paid social insurance
contributions for at least 12 months within the last two years (3 years before February
2006). The replacement rate has not changed since 1995 and is fixed at 60 percent of
previous after-tax (net) earnings (67 percent if a person has dependent children). After
exhausting UI benefits, one can get social security benefits tied to the existential minimum
(“Arbeitslosengeld II”) which is subject to annual means testing.9
The potential benefit duration (PBD) depends, first, on an individual’s age at the start
of the unemployment spell, and second, on the number of months worked in jobs covered
by social insurance (contribution months) within a defined time period before claiming UI
benefits (coverage constraint: 7 years before February 2006 and 5 years afterwards). For
all workers satisfying the eligibility constraints, the PBD is 6 months, which corresponds
to the 12 months of contributions paid before the UI spell starts (Table 1.5). Then, for
each four additional contribution months before starting an UI spell, the PBD increases
by two months. However, workers younger than 45 years can only reach a maximum
PBD of 12 months, which corresponds to 24 months of contributions, i.e. they can not
get more than 12 months PBD if they have collected more than 24 contribution months.
This maximum PBD cutoff increases with the age. For instance, before February 2006,
30 months of contribution led to 15 months of PBD for workers equal or older than 45
years at the start of their UI spell. As Table 1.5 illustrates, workers older or equal to
57 years could reach with 64 months of contributions the maximum PBD of 32 months.
Thus, they could acquire 20 months more PBD compared to a worker younger than 45
years who had also contributed 64 months just before entering UI in the same month.
While the PBD rules have been stable for workers that enter UI at an age younger
than 45 years, the maximum PBD cutoffs have changed for the age groups over 45
years in February 2006 and a second time in January 2008. Each reform affected
those individuals entering UI in the months after its implementation, whereas already
unemployed individuals were still treated according to the rules in place in the month
when they entered UI. Table 1.6 summarizes the eligibility criteria and changes over the
different reforms10. The reform of 2006 led to a considerable reduction in the maximum
PBD for all age groups above 45 years. The reform of 2008 led to a comparatively small
increase in maximum PBD for some age groups above 50 years. In total, the net reform
effect comparing the time period before February 2006 to that one after January 2008 can
be characterized by a reduction in PBD for all age cohorts entering the UI system at an
age older or equal to 45. The net effect is a reduction of at least six months (Table 1.6).
9In line with our data, the analysis focuses on 2005-2015. Thus, we describe the German UI system as it exists
since 2005. Appendix I.3.1 gives more details on the labor market reforms in the early 2000s.
10For an overview of reforms in the German UI benefit before the time period studied in this chapter, see Schmieder
et al. (2012). For the time period studied we refer to e.g. Price (2019) and Appendix I.3.1.
12
1.3.2 Main Empirical Strategy: Instrumental Variables (IV)
The identifying variation that we exploit in our three empirical estimation models stems
from the age-dependent discontinuities in potential benefit duration (PBD) (Table 1.5)
and from two reforms of the maximum PBD in 2006 and 2008 (Table 1.6).11
Our main empirical estimation models follow the instrumental variable (IV) approach
of Le Barbanchon et al. (2019). The idea is to exploit the fact that the PBD in the German
UI system depends on age-cut offs and that there have been reforms that only changed
the PBD but not UI benefit levels. Thus, instrumenting PBD (or actual unemployment
benefit duration) by an interaction of the reform and the age-cutoff is a useful instrument.
It should satisfy the exclusion restriction because the differences in outcomes among
individuals are unlikely to be explained by just small differentials in age (under or over
the age cutoff) and the time when becoming unemployed (before or after the reform).
We estimate IV models of the form:
yit = α+β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗PBDit +δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (1.1)
yit = α+β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗ABDit +δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (1.2)
where for each founder i in month t: y is the outcome variable which can be moti-
vation for starting a firm, sales or employment growth in the first and second year after
foundation (i.e. yearly sales in Euro and yearly number of full-time equivalent (FTE)
employees, both variables measured in logarithmic terms). Moreover, α is a constant
and X is a vector of firm- and founder-specific control variables (education, managerial
experience, self-employment experience, industry experience, gender, being subsidized,
industry-fixed effects). Finally, we control for macroeconomic conditions and trends in
the unemployment or self-employment rate by taking into account year-fixed effects.12
The potential benefit duration (PBDit) and the actual benefit duration (ABDit) are
instrumented by the instrumental variables:
- IV06=After(02/2006)*Treated(age≥45) which reflects the effect of a decrease in PBD
by at least 6 months and/or
- IV08=After(01/2008)*Treated(50≤age≤54) which reflects the effect of an increase in
PBD by at least 3 months.
11Startup Subsidies do not depend on age and though there was a change in the scheme of startup subsidies in
2006, first, we also use the 2008 reform as source of variation when relying on reform-based variation in PBD, and
second, the age discontinuities we exploit exist at each point in time. Thus, our source of variation is not correlated
with any changes occurring for the startup subsidies for the unemployed (cf. Appendix I.3.2). Moreover, we control in
all regressions for the KfW-funding variable which is a proxy for most other forms of startup subsidies in Germany.
Note that the purpose of this first chapter of my dissertation is to understand the role of the general UI PBD framework
on the unemployed that exit into self-employment and not on rare active labor market policies. However, as most of
these subsidies can be interpreted as an extension of PBD, learning about the general PBD effect on those who start a
firm out-of-unemployment is important.
12We tested taking out observations from January 2006 so that the year effects fully capture the after-reform dummy.
Conducting this approach does not alter our results.
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This leads to the instrumental variable (IV) first-stage models:
PBDit = α+β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗ IV 06 (+γ ∗ IV 08)+δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (1.3)
ABDit = α+β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗ IV 06 (+γ ∗ IV 08)+δ ∗Xit + yeart + εit (1.4)
The first-stage models may be regarded as tests about the strength of our instrumental
variable (IV). As the instrumental variable should be correlated with the variable of
interest, PBD (ABD), the F-Statistic of Equation (1.1) (Equation (1.2)) should be larger
than 10 in order to avoid weak IV issues. In fact, our instruments turn out to be very strong,
with Equation (1.1) yielding high F-statistics with values above 100 and always at least
10 in any specification (compare Table 1.9 to Table 1.16). In other words, the first-stage
model (Equation (1.3)) proves that our instrument is a strong predictor of the instrumented
variable of interest (PBDit). Moreover, one would expect that the corresponding F-statistic
of Equation (1.2) will be smaller because the IV should be correlated in the first place
with the policy variable that changed through the reforms, PBD, and only in second order
with the actual benefit duration (ABD). However, we also instrument the ABD in order
to understand how changes of PBD may affect subsequent outcomes of unemployed
individuals that transfer from unemployment to self-employment and that are induced by
changes in ABD initiated through the original change in PBD. Thereby, our IV estimator
has the interpretation of a (local) average treatment effect of PBD/ABD on our outcomes
- which is similar to the IV approach of Schmieder et al. (2016) that is used for estimating
the wage effect.
Our IV approach exploits both reform-based and age cutoffs-based exogenous varia-
tion in order to estimate the causal effect of PBD on ABD, the motivation for starting a
business, and on startup success. For robustness checks, we also conduct a regression
discontinuity design (RDD) estimation that only exploits the age-cutoffs in the PBD
schedule to derive the causal local average treatment effect (see Section 1.4.2). Finally, a
difference-in-difference (DiD) strategy that only relies on the reforms in the PBD sched-
ule allows us to estimate the causal treatment effect (see Section 1.4.2). Thus, our IV
estimation approach has more external validity as compared to the two other estimation
approaches because our IV strategy exploits the underlying exogenous variation in the
explanatory variable used by both other strategies and thus entails them.
14
1.4 Results
In this section, we focus on the net causal effect of potential benefit duration (PBD) on
actual unemployment benefit duration (ABD) and on the net causal effect of PBD/ABD on
the motivation for starting up (out of unemployment) and on subsequent firm outcomes.
1.4.1 Main Results: Instrumental Variables (IV)
First, we estimate instrumental variable models as explained in the methods Section 1.3.
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 as well as Tables 1.11 and 1.12 show our main results that use
the policy reform of 2006 as an instrument for longer potential benefit duration (PBD).
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 show our OLS baseline results. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 as well as
Tables 1.15 and 1.16 show results of using both instrumental variables for the reforms of
2006, and 2008 (cf. Section 1.3.2). Note that we repeat all main results focusing only on
non-manufacturing sectors. The reason is that the non-manufacturing sectors might be
of particular relevance for market entry by unemployed individuals because entry into
these sectors usually requires comparably low initial investment. Hence, focusing on
non-manufacturing sectors may allow us to abstract from investment-driven unobserved
heterogeneity. Importantly, all our results remain consistent and robust. Most findings
are even more precisely estimated in the restricted sample (still 75% of our sample).
To begin with, for the case where we only conduct simple OLS regression with
potential benefit duration (PBD) as the main explanatory variable, results on actual
benefit duration (ABD), the motivation for starting a business and subsequent firm
outcomes are shown in Table 1.7. In all regressions, we control for education, previous
labor market experience, individual characteristics (gender, nationality), industry, and
year-fixed effects. More highly educated individuals tend to be less likely to start a
business out of self-reported necessity. Previous managerial experience contributes to
better performance in terms of sales and employment growth. Being female or foreigner
does not have any differential effect concerning actual unemployment duration or the
motivation for starting a business. If at all, these two characteristics may be associated
with lower sales growth. Moreover, a funding dummy for subsidies from the Federal
Employment Agency and from the KfW control for any potential concerns related to
startup subsidies (Appendix I.3.2).
The OLS results translate into a duration elasticity of about 0.5, as a one month
increase in PBD increases ABD by 0.47 months. Moreover, one month of additional PBD
increases the probability of starting a business out of necessity by about two percentage
points. Finally, more PBD appears to imply less sales and full-time equivalent (FTE)
employment growth in the first two years after starting the business. The results are
confirmed and are measured more precisely when focusing on the non-manufacturing
sectors (see Table 1.8).
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However, to establish causality, we apply the instrumental variables (IV) approach
as explained in the previous methods (Section 1.3.2). The causal IV estimates suggest
that longer potential benefit duration (PBD) leads to longer actual unemployment benefit
duration (ABD) before individuals transfer from unemployment to self-employment (see
Table 1.9). This has been shown so far only with respect to re-employment. Via this
channel, longer PBD increases the probability that individuals start a company out of
necessity reasons (and not because they perceive a business opportunity). Moreover,
longer PBD decreases firm performance in terms of employment and sales over the first
years in business. The F-statistic is well above 10 in all versions of the IV models and
hence indicates a good predictive power of the instrument (cf. Table 1.9). A one month
increase in the PBD leads to a 0.6 month increase in the actual unemployment duration
(column two of Table 1.9). In the second stage, this increase in ABD leads to a 1.5 percent
higher probability to start a firm out of necessity . Given that the average probability to
start a firm out of necessity is around 35 percent, this corresponds to a relative increase
of five percent, which is economically significant (column three of Table 1.9). Turning to
the effects on more objective outcomes, we find that only the effect on sales after two
years remains of statistical significance. A one month increase in the PBD leads to 7.2%
lower sales in the second year. Focusing on the non-manufacturing sectors, Table 1.10
shows that the negative effects of about one percentage point on FTE employment are
statistically significant after the second year. Moreover, in the latter sample, the other
effects get even stronger. In summary, our IV results confirm the initial OLS results.
Finally, our results are reconfirmed when using both IVs, that is IV 06 for the 2006
reform, which decreased PBD by at least six months, and IV 08 for the 2008 reform that
increased PBD by three months. In fact, the results for changes in PBD on our outcomes
of interest in Table 1.13 are very similar to those in Table 1.9 which are only based on
IV 06. The same is true when we focus on the non-manufacturing sectors. Table 1.14
based on two instrumental variables shows very similar results to the ones based only
on IV 06 (Table 1.10). We repeat the IV estimation instrumenting actual unemployment
duration (ABD). The findings are shown in Tables 1.11 and 1.15 for IV06 as well as for
IV06 and IV08 combined. They are in line with the described results for potential benefit
duration. Similarly, Tables 1.12 and 1.16 show IV regressions based on actual benefit
duration focusing on the non-manufacturing sector, and also confirm our main results.
1.4.2 Robustness Checks: Two Further Estimation Strategies
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
The RDD exploits age-dependent discontinuities in the potential benefit duration (PBD)
estimating the equation:
yi = α1(agei ≥ c)+ f (agei,β )+ f (agei,γ)×1(agei ≥ c)+X ′i δ + εi (1.5)
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where yi is the outcome variable of interest, i.e. actual unemployment duration and
subsequent performance as an entrepreneur. Xi is a set of individual-specific covariates,
and ε an error term. The dummy variable, 1(agei ≥ c), reveals whether individuals
benefit from extended PBD because they become unemployed at an age above the age-
cutoff associated with higher maximum PBD. Individual age is the forcing variable for
which we control with the β coefficient reflecting its direct effect on yi and with the γ
term reflecting its indirect effect on yi via the the interaction with the sharp age-cutoffs.
Consequently, α measures the pure discontinuity effect, i.e. the RDD estimate of interest,
namely how PBD affects the outcomes of those who start a firm out of unemployment.
In the RDD, we focus on the period from 2008 onward, an age range from 45 until
54 years, and an age-cutoff at 50 years. Below an age of 50 years, the maximum PBD is
12 months. Above an age of 50 years, the maximum PBD is 15 months. This allows us
to exploit an exogenous increase in the PBD of three months. Thereby, the identification
assumption requires that there is no precise manipulation of the running variable around
the cutoff (workers do not plan to become strategically unemployed just after an age
threshold is reached to exploit higher PBD).13 By restricting the regression sample to
individuals who only become unemployed after January 2008, we see that they all face
the same maximum PBD schedule as shown in columns (6) and (7) in Table 1.5 or 1.6.
As in the time period studied no other major labor market reforms occured and startup
subsidies remained unchanged (cf. Appendix I.3.2), the only relevant difference in the
PBD is driven by age-cutoffs. This can be tested by conducting a McCrary density test
investigating whether there is bunching around the age-cutoff in the unemployment rate
of workers becoming unemployed when aged between 45 and 54 years. Figure I·2 shows
that the Mc-Crary test is passed, which is evidence suggesting that the identification
assumptions of our RDD strategy are satisfied.
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Results
This regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach has been already exploited to study
earlier reforms of maximum potential benefit duration (PBD) in the German UI system
by Schmieder et al. (2012, 2016). These authors show that the RDD approach is credible
for the time period studied (1987-2004). We take this empirical approach to investigate
a more recent period (2003-2011). Moreover, we exploit the reformed age-dependent
maximum PBD schedules with respect to a sample of individuals that is excluded in
existing studies due to the data limitations that this dissertation chapter surpasses, i.e. we
focus on those who transfer from unemployment to self-employment (not employment).
Results of the RDD are summarized in Figure I·2, I·3, I·4 and Table I.1. First, results
of a McCrary density test do not indicate significant discontinuity in the distribution of
individuals entering unemployment around the cutoff (Figure I·2).
13Le Barbanchon (2016) shows that this RDD approach works in the context of analyzing a French reform that
increased PBD for certain unemployed individuals. Nekoei & Weber (2017) conduct a similar RDD estimating the
effect of UI generosity on unemployment duration and re-employment wages in Austria.
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Second, Figure I·3 shows that our data construction process has been successful,
because in line with the age-dependent rules on the maximal PBD, as explained in
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6, in the years since 2008, one would expect there to be an increase
of around three months at the age of 50 for individuals who have contributed at least 30
months to social security. Indeed, our sample shows that the PBD increases, even though
only by around 2.1 instead of 3 months (first panel in Figure I·3). Furthermore, our
RDD strategy reveals that an increase of 2.1 months in potential unemployment benefit
duration translates into a significant increase in actual unemployment duration of about
1.2 months. Thus, our RDD estimation approach suggests that the duration elasticity
for unemployed persons that eventually start a business is around 0.6 (second panel in
Figure I·3).
Unfortunately, the number of observations that can be used for the RDD is limited.
Since information on sales is missing for a significant number of observations and
sales are more volatile compared to employment outcomes, we are only able to derive
meaningful RDD results for employment after one year and after two years (Figure I·4).
The RDD results suggest that an increase of about 2.1 months decreases full-time
equivalent (FTE) employment by about 12 percentage points in the first year and about
25 percentage points in the second year. This means that an increase of one month in
PBD leads to a reduction in employment by about 6 percentage points in the first year
and 12.5 percentage points in the second year after founding the firm.
In summary, the RDD results are consistent with those of the IV approach. Longer
PBD leads to an increase in actual unemployment duration (ABD), which then leads to a
decrease in subsequent startup success as measured in terms of FTE employment growth.
Differences-in-Differences (DID) Approach
The DiD approach exploits the reform-induced changes in the potential benefit duration
(PBD) (similar to Cottier et al. 2019) estimating the equation:
yit = α+β ∗Treatedit + γ ∗A f tert +δ ∗ (Treated ∗A f ter)it +Xit + εit (1.6)
where α is a constant, Xit is a vector of person-specific controls (gender, nationality,
education, managerial skills), and ε an error term for each individual i in month t. The δ
term indicates the causal reform effect of PBD on our outcomes of interest y, the actual
benefit duration, the motivation for starting up, and the subsequent firm outcomes.
In the DiD setting, we exploit the 2006 reform. Thus, A f tert = 1 is a dummy
indicating if an individual becomes unemployed after February 2006. The Treatment-
Group consists of workers entering an UI spell at an age equal to or higher than 45 years,
whereas the Control-Group consists of those younger than 45 when claiming UI benefits.
The reform effect measures the treatment of reducing PBD (and thus ABD) by at least 3
months.
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Differences-in-Differences (DiD) Results
Our results for the differences-in-differences (DiD) strategy are summarized in Table I.2.
Our DiD results capture the causal effect of potential benefit duration (PBD) on actual
unemployment duration (ABD) and consequently of the decrease of unemployment
duration on the motivation for starting up, as well as subsequent firm outcomes.
The first column of Table I.2 shows that a reduction of at least three months in
PBD significantly reduces actual unemployment duration by around 3.6 months. This
reconfirms that there is a positive causal relationship between potential and actual benefit
duration, and not only with respect to re-employment. Our findings suggest that the
translation from potential into actual unemployment duration may be stronger with
respect to reductions than increases in the PBD. The results for other outcomes are not
statistically significant in the DiD setting when considering all sectors (columns 5/6 in
Table I.2). Focusing again on the non-manufacturing sector as robustness check, Table I.3
reconfirms our findings. As before, the effects now appear to be measured more precisely.
In conclusion, the DiD results support our main findings that reducing PBD leads to a
statistically significant reduction in actual unemployment duration and to statistically
significantly higher sales growth after two years of business activity.
1.4.3 Discussion of Results and Mechanisms
Our empirical results based on three different estimation methods (IV, RDD, DiD)
suggest a number of conclusions. First, longer PBD increases actual UI duration for those
unemployed individuals who start a firm. Hence, our results document that what prior
literature has established for individuals transitioning from unemployment to employment
(e.g Schmieder & von Wachter 2016) also holds for individuals transitioning from
unemployment to self-employment. In terms of size, our estimated duration elasticity
is slightly above 0.614 and thus a bit higher than what recent estimates focusing on
transitions from unemployment to paid employment and on increases in PBD suggest.15
However, our UI duration elasticity estimate corresponds to the median of 0.53 which can
be calculated based on the estimates of 18 studies that estimate the UI duration elasticity
with respect to employment (cf. Appendix, Table 2 in Doris et al. 2018).16
14For the OLS regression, we find a duration elasticity of about 0.48; for the IV strategy, we get a duration elasticity
of around 0.67; for the RDD strategy, we find a duration elasticity of around 0.6; and for the DiD strategy, we find
a duration elasticity of around 1. Note that differences in results across the different estimation strategies are to be
expected: the RDD measures the local average treatment effect, whereas the DiD derives the average treatment effect.
Our IV strategy constitutes a compromise of RDD and DiD. Thus, our IV results are expected to be between RDD and
DiD. Finally, the fact that IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates shows that measurement error which would lead
to downward bias is limited in our data set.
15Le Barbanchon et al. (2019) find 0.3 for France, Nekoei & Weber (2017) find 0.016 for Austria or Schmieder
et al. (2016) 0.15 for Germany (in the period before 2004), but they all focus only on transitions from unemployment
insurance into employment. However, for a decrease in UI generosity Doris et al. (2018) find larger effects. Furthermore,
they provide an overview of studies with higher estimates.
16Moreover, Farber et al. (2015) suggest that the extensive margin of UI extensions is rather negligible.
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Second, longer PBD (via longer actual unemployment duration (ABD)) increases
the fraction of pushed entrepreneurs. More unemployed individuals seem to literally
escape unemployment by becoming self-employed out of self-reported necessity instead
of an opportunity-driven motivation. Finally, we find overall consistent but not always
statistically precisely measured evidence that longer PBD/ABD reduces the subsequent
success of firms that are started out of unemployment (in terms of sales/employment
growth).
The estimated (causal) effects of longer PBD on startup motivation and success can be
driven by different mechanisms. On the one hand, longer PBD can be expected to change
the behavior of unemployed individuals, thereby leading to a different composition of
founders that decide to start a firm out of unemployment (composition effect). On the
other hand, by incentivizing longer actual unemployment duration (ABD), longer PBD
could alter the success potential at the individual level (individual-level duration effect).
For instance, longer actual unemployment duration may lead to losses of financial, social,
and human capital, e.g. through losses of professional contacts, stigmatization effects, or
depreciation of skills and knowledge.
We attempt to assess the potential influence of both mechanisms by analyzing changes
in the composition of our sample of previously unemployed founders over time. We repeat
this exercise analyzing changes in the composition of a reference group of previously not
unemployed founders over time. Thereby, we focus on comparing both groups across
two points in time, before and after the UI reform of 2006 (our main source of exogenous
variation in PBD). In Table 1.17, we provide t-tests for before/after reform comparisons
of our main explanatory variables and an additionally added broader indicator of founder
quality: the average daily wage in employment within five years before starting up
(capped at the social security contribution ceiling). We add this measure to assess the
potential influence of unobserved factors that we do not control for in our models.
Looking at all unemployed founders in our regression sample that are in the age-based
treatment group (two left panels), we observe almost no significant changes in composi-
tion before or after the reform. Consistent with the reform and our estimation results, the
average ABD of treated founders increases significantly. Moreover, significantly more
founders receive subsidies by the Federal Employment Agency in the period after the
reform (we control for these subsidies in our regressions). Most notably, the (statistically)
insignificant but sizable increase in average founders’ pre-unemployment wages after
the reform is in line with a composition mechanism of "better" founders due to lower
PBD. The fact that we find smaller effect sizes for the reference group of previously
not unemployed founders (right panels of Table 1.17) points towards the possibility of
composition effects induced by the reform on the pool of unemployed founders. Hence,
composition effects could be one mechanism behind our results but do not seem to be
their main driver.
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As a further test, we re-estimate our main OLS and IV models without any con-
trol variables (see Tables I.4 and I.5 as well as Tables I.6 and I.7). This allows us to
assess whether including covariates, which should substantially reduce the impact of
composition effects, affect our point estimates for changes in PBD. When estimated
without control variables, all point estimates for changes in PBD or ABD remain very
similar. Hence, the test does not suggest strong reform-induced composition changes
in unemployed founders as a driver of our results. This assessment is supported by the
summary statistics in Table 1.2. Differences in human capital between unemployed
founders and the reference group of previously employed founders seem more sizeable
than the small differences between all unemployed founders and unemployed founders
with above median unemployment duration. Hence, it is unlikely that these differences
over the unemployment duration explain our regression results.
In summary, our data indicate the existence of both composition and individual-
level duration effects that are induced by the UI policy reforms. Of the two, our data
rather suggest reform-induced individual-level duration effects to be the main mechanism
explaining the estimated results on startup success. For instance, access to credits may
deteriorate with longer unemployment duration and financially constrain the growth
potential of firms started out of unemployment (in line with recent findings of e.g.
Caliendo et al. 2019). However, future research should investigate the mechanisms in
more details and quantify the relative importance of composition versus individual-level
duration effects.
1.5 Stylized Theoretical Model
In the following, we present a stylized model to rationalize the empirical findings
that we observed in the previous Section 1.4. We conclude this section by discussing
policy options in the model (Section 1.5.2), implications in terms of fiscal externalities
(Section 1.5.3) and general policy implications of our findings (Section 1.5.4).
1.5.1 The Framework
We consider workers who become unemployed in period t = 0 as risk-neutral, provided
they stay in unemployment receiving UI benefits for duration d.17 In each time period
(month), they get unemployment benefits bt until the maximal potential unemployment
benefit duration PBD is reached (cf. Section 1.3.1). Focusing on the case of a two-layer
UI system, this means that benefits can be defined as bt = b¯ for t ≤ PBD, where b¯ is
the constant UI benefit level which the unemployed individual receives for the entire UI
spell (until exhausting benefits at the potential benefit duration PBD). The UI benefits
depend on the previous wage; they constitute the replacement rate fraction of the average
monthly wage income over the six months before entering unemployment.
17The model is in continuous time and the horizon lasts for each worker until retirement time T .
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Then, bt = b˜ < b¯ for t > PBD, where b˜ can be interpreted as Germany’s existential
minimum assistance “Arbeitslosengeld II” that is independent of previous contribution
months and lower than the wage-dependent UI benefits (b¯). Without loss of generality,
this amount is the same for all eligible claimants.18
We assume that each individual has a latent entrepreneurial ability θ ∼ G(θ), where
G() is a normal density function. Then in each time period, an unemployed individual
has to decide whether to search for employment or to start a firm, i.e. to become self-
employed. Let V eu be the value function of an unemployed individual searching for
employment, and V seu that of an unemployed individual starting a business. Then, the
decision of an unemployed individual is characterized by her value function:
V ut = max{V eu,t ,V seu,t} (1.7)
Value of Searching for Employment out of Unemployment Ignoring savings (workers
live hand-to-mouth), the value of searching for employment when the individual is
unemployed can be characterized by:
V eu,t = bt−ψt(st)+
β
{
pt [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
V et+1(wt+1)dF(wt+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(1.8)
The unemployed individual receives consumption flow utility from benefits cu,t = bt19,
but faces search costsψt , which, in line with the literature (e.g. Schmieder & von Wachter
2016), we assume to be a differentiable, increasing and convex function of search effort st .
With probability pt = p(st ,θ) that depends on search effort and (entrepreneurial) ability,
the unemployed worker receives a job offer for period t+1. Note that in this setting, the
individual’s optimal behaviour is characterized by a reservation wage φt above which any
wage offer wt ≥ φt is accepted.20
Thus, with probability 1−F(φt) the offer is accepted and she becomes re-employed,
receiving the corresponding expected value of being employed V et+1 (see Equation (1.9)).
However, with probability F(φt), the offer is too low and is rejected. In this case and
if the worker receives no offer (with probability 1− pt), she remains unemployed in
the next month and receives the next period value of being in unemployment, V ut+1
(Equation (1.7)). As usual, β is the discount factor of future period returns.21
18Note that the replacement rate for UI benefits (b¯) is 60% for single individuals and 67% for individuals with
dependent children. When receiving the existential minimum (b˜), the additional amount received per child on top of
the basic minimum approximately corresponds to the general child allowances every parent receives from the German
federal state (“Kindergeld”). Thus, the relative drop in income when exhausting UI benefits does not vary much per
person independent of the family structure and we abstract from this issue for the purpose of this chapter.
19Note that cu,t = bt + yu where yu could be income from other sources that, if assumed to remain constant over
the UI spell and exogenously given, would not alter our qualitative conclusions (e.g. support from family members).
20Note that the cumulative distribution function F() may depend on the duration of unemployment, for instance,
due to depreciation in human capital or (statistical) discrimination or stigma effects, as explained by Jarosch &
Pilossoph (2019) and experimental evidence suggests (Oberholzer-Gee 2008).
21One could introduce myopic behavior of agents by changing the discount factor. We abstract from this complica-
tion, as we have no empirical evidence for irrational behavior driving our results.
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The two-layer UI system implies through the parameter bt that if an individual stays
unemployed, surpassing the potential benefit duration (PBD), the outside option will
decline to the existential minimum (from bt = b¯ to bt = b˜ < b¯). Thus, a drop in the value
function (V eu,t) is to be expected in the month of the unemployment spell when the PBD
is reached.
The Value of Being in Employment is then characterized by:
V et = (wt− τ)+β{λtV ut+1+(1−λt)V et+1} (1.9)
An employed worker receives consumption flow utility ce,t =wt−τ , i.e. consumption
based on net wage.22 Variable λt is an exogenous separation rate that may vary depending
on macroeconomic conditions over time. Then, with probability λt , the worker may lose
her job and become unemployed again, but with probability 1−λt the worker remains
employed. As a simplifying restriction, we ignore the option of moving from employment
to self-employment but focus on flows from unemployment to self-employment, as this
resembles our available empirical setting and is the relevant labor market flow we study.
Value of entering Self-Employment out of Unemployment The value for an unem-
ployed individual to become self-employed out of unemployment is characterized by:
V seu,t = bt−ψset (st ,θ)+
β
{
pt [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
V set+1(pit+1)dF(pit+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(1.10)
An unemployed individual evaluating whether to become self-employed faces a
similar value function as in the case of searching for employment Equation (1.8). Again,
she reveives a consumption flow utility in the form of unemployment benefits bt and
faces search costs ψset (st). These search costs could be different and more dependent
on the individual than in the case of searching for employment, since an individual has
to develop an idea, do market research, or find capital instead of writing applications in
a more standardized process of looking for paid employment. Furthermore, becoming
self-employed is more dependent on one’s own skills θ . The higher the entrepreneurial
ability, the smaller are market-entry search costs. The individual unemployed still
faces a reservation wage φt above which potential profits from self-employment would
be accepted. However, if potential profit is too low, the individual may remain in
unemployment to look for employment. Otherwise, if profits as self-employed are higher
than the reservation wage pit ≥ φt , she will prefer to start up.
22Taxes could be also designed to be proportional taxes (1− t) without changing the qualitative results.
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Value of Being in Self-Employment The value of being in self-employment can be
characterized by the following value function:
V seut = pit(θ)+ subt +β{γ(θ)V ut+1+(1− γ(θ))V set+1} (1.11)
A self-employed person earns profits pit(θ) (net of a startup cost) and may get a
subsidy subt . Thereby, the returns pit(θ) are assumed to be increasing in entrepreneurial
skills (∂pit()∂θ > 0) reflecting that, for instance, the quality of successful business ideas may
increase with θ . Similarly, the probability that the startup fails, γ(θ), is assumed to be
decreasing in entrepreneurial ability, ∂γ()∂θ < 0, reflecting e.g. that better business ideas are
less likely to produce failure. Thus, with probability (1− γ(θ)) the startup survives and
with probability γ(θ), the founder has to return to unemployment, V ut+1 Equation (1.7).
The Effect of Unemployment Duration on Value Functions The unemployed workers
decision problem Equation (1.7) is to maximize expected utility between the value of
moving from unemployment to employment and the value of becoming self-employed
out of unemployment. See Appendix I.4 for the derivation of results.
First, the value function of moving from unemployment to employment can be
characterized by Equation (1.8) where V et+1 is characterized by Equation (1.9). It is
important to note that given a fixed level of (entrepreneurial) ability θ , the value function
V eu,t features negative duration dependence
∂V eut
∂d |θ < 0. There are two main sources for
UI duration dependence: the search effort may vary over the unemployment duration
and over time the benefit levels are decreasing (at least once reaching PBD with the drop
to the existential minimum).23 The accepted job offer’s value depends on both search
effort determining the job offer arrival rate p(st ,θ) and on the re-employment wage.24
We derive the optimal search intensity and reservation wage paths in order to observe
how these variables react to an increase in d = PBD. We find that the reservation wage is
positively correlated to the unemployment duration, i.e. ∂φt∂d > 0. The search intensity
reacts negatively to an increase in potential unemployment duration, i.e. ∂ st∂d < 0. This
implies that an individual will prefer to stay longer unemployed when PBD is increased.
Negative UI duration dependence has been shown to be an empirically robust finding
regarding re-employment outcomes, even if there is not yet a consensus concerning
the welfare implications for post-unemployment wages (e.g. Schmieder et al. 2016,
Schmieder & von Wachter 2016, Nekoei & Weber 2017).
23Nekoei & Weber (2017) show that a directed search model incorporates these two sources of duration dependence
and includes the random search McCall-style model that we presented as a special case. Moreover, they reveal that
selectivity may be positively, and duration dependence negatively affecting re-employment wages.
24Note that there have been different theories proposed to explain this finding. They include, for instance, first, that
human capital or job-specific skills may decay over the non-employment spell. Second, statistical discrimination has
been suggested for explaining this finding because it implies that less able persons remain longer unemployed. Third
stock-flow matching could also explain duration dependence as it implies that those entering unemployment and not
quickly finding a match become increasingly dependent on the inflow of new posted vacancies (and flow variables are
quantitatively smaller than stock variables).
24
Second, the value function of moving from unemployment to self-employment
can be characterized by Equation (1.10) where V set+1 is characterized by Equation (1.11).
Holding entrepreneurial ability fixed, this value function is also dependent on unem-
ployment duration d, that is ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ < 0, but in absolute terms, it is smaller than
∂V eut
∂d ,
ie. ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ <
∂V seut
∂d |θ < 0. We derive this by exploiting the definitions of V eu,t and V seu,t .
By assuming that the value of leaving unemployment in the next period depends on
average on the present value of the reservation wage, we can write V eu,t+1 =
1
ρ φt . In
the case of self-employment, the latter definition has to be extended in the following
way: V set+1 =
1−γ(θ)
ρ φt , because one can only become self-employed with a probability
of [1− γ(θ)].
Deriving the optimal reservation wage and search intensity paths, we show that the
optimal search intensity for business opportunities is less dependent on unemployment
duration d. Thus, the negative unemployment duration dependence for becoming self-
employed is smaller than in the case of searching for employment. This reflects the
idea that self-employment can be interpreted as an alternative professional activity more
dependent on one’s own skills than on the labor market conditions and is thus approxi-
mately independent of unemployment duration (compare Appendix I.4). Moreover, the
search process for self-employment is different from the search for regular employment.
Now it is possible to rationalize our empirical results by analyzing qualitatively how
the value functions for becoming employed V eut (Equation (1.8)) and self-employed V
se
ut
(Equation (1.10)) evolve with unemployment duration d and how this influences an
unemployed individual’s decision, given her entrepreneurial ability. Figure 1·6 illustrates
that the unemployed individual will prefer to find a job provided that the value function
for searching employment V eut is above the value function for becoming self-employed
V seut . Vice versa she prefers to start a business when Vseut > Veut|θ . The red line depicts
∂V eut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line shows
∂V eut
∂d |θ <
∂Vseut
∂d |θ < 0. Moreover, the vertical black line
marks the PBD; at this point of unemployment duration, the red line drops by x = b¯− b˜
because UI benefits b¯ drop to the existential minimum b˜ (compare Appendix I.3). Thus,
the stylized model suggests that potential benefit duration can determine the composition
of the self-employed who transition from unemployment. This becomes apparent when
analyzing how unemployed individuals behave in this model.
First of all, holding everything fixed but changing entrepreneurial ability, we can
observe the following. As Figure 1·7 illustrates, some high ability individuals may always
decide to become self-employed once unemployed, i.e. once having to search for a new
post-unemployment labor market status. Instead, Figure 1·8 shows that certain low-skilled
unemployed persons would never decide to become self-employed, but rather search for
employment. Note, that we are thinking about individuals that have been employees and
after falling into unemployment start to consider self-employment as an alternative to
re-employment. Thus, they may only start to think about their entrepreneurial ability
once they become unemployed.
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As Figure 1·9 illustrates, our model explains how the government can influence the
composition of unemployed individuals that decide to become self-employed out of
unemployment via setting the length of potential benefit duration (PBD). The longer one
is unemployed before moving to self-employment, the lower her θ and thus the lower
subsequent firm performance appears to be (i.e. the composition changes). Moreover,
if we considered negative individual-level duration effects to be the main response to a
longer actual unemployment duration (that was induced through longer PBD), we would
reach similar qualitative conclusions. In other words, composition and individual-level
duration effects or a mixture of both, would be in line with the empirical evidence i.e.
that PBD positively affects actual benefit duration and through the latter negatively affects
the motivation to become self-employed as well as subsequent startup success.
Finally, as Figure 1·10 shows, our model can also rationalize our results for the case
that unemployment duration would not additionally harm potential self-employment
outcomes i.e. in the case of zero UI duration dependence for self-employment outcomes.
In this case, the empirical result of the subsequent startup success declining over the
unemployment duration of a founder may also be rationalized with a horizontal value
function V seu that is independent of d. To summarize, Figure 1·11 demonstrates that the
government can change startup success by setting the PBD.
1.5.2 Further Policy Options in the Model
Early Re-training for Employment Figure 1·12 shows that, given the same maximal
PBD, early re-training can reduce the rate at which V eu declines with actual unemployment
duration. Thus, for a fixed PBD, retraining may improve welfare, maintaining consump-
tion smoothing and general matching considerations for unemployment to employment
transitions. This could reduce the number of necessity founders via slowing the negative
UI duration dependence in V eu that is itself causally influenced by PBD.
Targeted Subsidies for Self-Employment As Figure 1·13 illustrates, targeted subsidies
to unemployed workers that may have revealed some entrepreneurial skills, e.g. by a busi-
ness plan, would increase V su , thus, the post-unemployment startup success probability. In
that way, they could ease the decision of unemployed individuals with promising ideas to
stop searching for employment, while focusing on preparing their startup. Consequently,
this could reduce their time in unemployment (hence the fiscal externality).25
25Early training for self-employment (relaxing the assumption of entrepreneurial types, such that some skills may
be trained through external support) could increase V su . Thus, the post-unemployment startup success probability could
be increased, e.g. by coaching them in setting up better business plans.
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1.5.3 Implications for Fiscal Externality
Thinking about optimal UI benefit duration, one has to consider the social costs of
changing the potential benefit duration which is the so called fiscal externality it creates
(Lawson 2017). That is, in the spirit of the Baily-Chetty framework (e.g. Chetty 2009,
Kroft & Notowidigdo 2016), optimal UI benefit duration should balance the welfare
benefits of additional insurance created that helps to smooth overall consumption with
the social cost of extending PBD. The latter is captured by the fiscal externality (the
effect on government budget).
To illustrate the role of taking self-employment out of unemployment into account,
let us consider an example. In her last pre-unemployment job, a worker earns wage w
and pays taxes τ .26 The worker enters unemployment in time period T0. In line with
our results, extending the potential benefit duration PBD would induce longer actual
unemployment of (T−T0) periods. In time period T , the unemployed individual becomes
self-employed. If the person becomes a necessity entrepreneur who actually does not
want to become self-employed but only becomes self-employed to escape unemployment,
her profits pis could be lower than the pre-unemployment wage w (as proxy for the
hypothetical re-employment wage) during her self-employment spell (lasting from period
T +1 until time period S). If in addition the necessity entrepreneur failed at time S and
would drop back into unemployment from time S+1 onward, this would produce costs
of forgone tax revenues τpis and the benefits paid during unemployment (b). Formalizing
the example of a necessity entrepreneur, we get a formula for the fiscal externality:
FiscalExternality = (τw+b)(T −T0)+
S
∑
s=T+1
τ(w−pis)+ ∑
s=S+1
(τpis+b)Ds (1.12)
The first term is the standard duration effect, which imposes a negative fiscal ex-
ternality in the case of limited UI duration. In fact, longer non-employment duration
implies that the government forgoes potential tax revenue (τw) and in addition has to pay
for the unemployment insurance expenditures b over the non-employment spell of the
unemployed worker. By increasing PBD, this effect would increase the negative fiscal
externality, not only for those who then become employed (Schmieder et al. 2016), but
as we showed also for those who start a business out of unemployment, because in both
cases the PBD is positively linked to actual unemployment length.
The second term takes into account the effect of the unemployment insurance on
self-employment performance for the government budget. In the given example, when
the profits as self-employed are below pre-unemployment wages (pis < w) [as proxy
for hypothetical re-employment wage], the negative fiscal externality would increase.27
26Without loss of generality, we just consider proportional taxes and follow Lawson (2017) in assuming that the
fiscal externality of social security programs works through labor income taxes.
27Note that this case is plausible even at low income levels. Regular wages are usually bound by minimum wages,
whereas the corresponding earnings from self-employment have no lower bound.
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However, in theory this term could also decrease the overall negative fiscal externality: if
pis > w. This might be the case for opportunity entrepreneurs who have a good business
plan and may be better off compared to pre-unemployment wages or other re-employment
options.28
The last term expresses the extra cost if the self-employed fails and subsequently
has to return to unemployment. In that case a second-order duration effect consisting
of forgone tax revenue and potential benefit payments could further increase the fiscal
externality.
In summary, taking the effect of longer potential benefit duration (PBD) on self-
employment performance into account may change the overall fiscal externality of
the unemployment insurance. This in turn could alter optimal UI considerations. For
instance, if PBD pushed many unemployed individuals into necessity entrepreneurship
and this caused the negative fiscal externality to grow, as in the given example, this
may imply a decrease of optimal PBD. Given that the optimal UI literature usually only
considers the transition from unemployment into paid employment (ignoring transitions
into self-employment), if at all, only the first standard duration term in Equation (1.12)
applies. Thus, it is important to consider the impact of PBD on self-employment and the
associated fiscal externality when it comes to the optimal design of the unemployment
insurance.
1.5.4 Policy Implications
First, our results could have implications for the design of optimal UI policy. The previous
Section 1.5.3 shows that the potential UI benefit duration (PBD) may increase the fiscal
externality through its effect on self-employment performance. In abstracting from the
fact that unemployed individuals can also choose to enter self-employment instead of
employment, the literature and politics have neglected this effect. Too much selection
into self-employment due to necessity may imply high social costs. Thus, the general
UI system should design optimal PBD in a way that considers both employment and
self-employment outcomes. Moreover, this could improve our insights into the so-called
value of non-employment that itself is important for the results of many wage bargaining
models (Jäger et al. 2019).
Second, since economic trends induced by digitization may lead to more startups
in the future, thinking about the design of social safety nets, in particular with respect
to unemployment insurance for self-employed individuals, may become increasingly
relevant. In that respect, the results for Germany, with a low overall unemployment rate,
may be considered to be rather lower bound estimates. Thus, this chapter of my doctoral
thesis shifts attention to an important discussion of how one should best design social
safety nets for self-employed individuals.
28In fact, if this positive effect dominated, this would correspond to the positive UI wage effect as suggested by
Nekoei & Weber (2017) for those who start a business instead of finding re-employment.
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Finally, the findings in this first chapter of my dissertation may also be relevant in
the evaluation of active labor market policies (ALMPs). This is because ALMPs can
be interpreted as measures that usually involve extending PBD and providing subsidies
that correspond to UI benefits. Often, those active labor market policies target the long-
term unemployed. In the light of our results, this raises questions as to what extent
current policies for those unemployed individuals are desirable. Our results indicate that
interventions should not be measures of a last resort but instead target the unemployed
individuals early during their unemployment spell. In general, more investment in early
retraining and well-targeted startup subsidies for unemployed individuals who have
sustainable business ideas could improve who decides to start a firm. This could reduce
fiscal externalities and improve social welfare.
1.6 Conclusion
This first chapter of my doctoral thesis addresses the question of how the potential
unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration (PBD) affects the actual unemployment
duration (ABD) before unemployed individuals become self-employed, as well as their
motivations to become self-employed and their outcomes as entrepreneurs. While existing
literature has addressed how UI policies affect the unemployment duration and re-
employment wages of those transitioning to dependent employment, we are the first to
address this issue in the context of transitions to self-employment by creating a new
representative dataset on founders in Germany. Since active labor market policies, which
incentivize mainly long-term unemployed individuals to become self-employed, are
commonly used as policy measures to fight unemployment, understanding the effects of
the design of UI policies on self-employed seems to be highly relevant.
Using instrumental variables methods (RDD and DiD for robustness), we identify
the causal effects of the PBD on entrepreneurial outcomes by exploiting reform and
age-based exogenous variation in PBD within the German UI system. We find that
in a sample of previously unemployed founders, longer PBD leads to longer actual
unemployment duration and, through the latter, increases the propensity that unemployed
individuals are pushed into self-employment (out of necessity), as opposed to starting
a firm because of a business opportunity. Moreover, longer unemployment duration is
associated with worse entrepreneurial performance in terms of both employment growth
and sales.
This net negative (overall) causal relationship can be rationalized by a mix of both
an effect on the composition of startups out of unemployment, and an individual-level
duration effect on the founders over the UI spell. In a stylized formal model, we show how
both mechanisms can explain why the government’s change in PBD causally generates
our observed findings for firms started out of unemployment.
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Extensions of our empirical analyses show little changes to the composition of
unemployed founders over different UI policy regimes and therefore suggest that our
results are at least partly driven by UI duration policy affecting the individual-level
entrepreneurial potential. A consistent explanation for this finding is that individuals’
financial, social, and human capital depreciates in unemployment. However, an exact
empirical derivation of the quantitative importance of the different mechanisms behind
our findings is beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis. Analogously to the literature on
UI policy effects on individuals transitioning to dependent employment (e.g. Schmieder
& von Wachter 2016), additional research, data, and methods are needed to better assess
the contributions of different mechanisms to the overall policy effect. Independent of the
exact mechanism, our results allow us to conclude that there exists a causal effect from
UI policy with respect to PBD via actual unemployment durations to startup motivation
and startup success.
Given the current lack of evidence regarding the role of PBD on startup success
(or self-employment in general), our results are thus of strong relevance from a public
policy perspective. They show that it is important to consider self-employment as a post-
unemployment outcome in typical optimal UI models which are based on the sufficient
statistics approach following the Baily-Chetty model (Chetty 2009, Landais et al. 2018).
Ignoring entrepreneurship out of unemployment likely leads to underestimating fiscal
externalities. For instance, UI policy could trigger firm creations by low performing
necessity entrepreneurs whose tax revenues are comparably low or who may cause extra
costs for society when returning to unemployment. Rather than pushing the long-term
unemployed into self-employment, UI policies might therefore be more profitable when
targeted at early re-training for those who would otherwise become self-employed out
of necessity later. Our results are particularly relevant for all countries with generous
UI benefit duration and countries granting extended UI benefit duration for founders
starting a business out of unemployment. Due to its relatively low unemployment and
self-employment rate levels, our results for Germany may be lower bound estimates for
other countries.29
29Camarero Garcia & Hansch (2020) investigate the role of UI benefit levels on self-employment for the case
of Spain. This working paper, which corresponds to Chapter 2, complements the picture because only the results
of both PBD and UI benefit levels on self-employment reveal the total effect of UI on the transition channel from
unemployment to self-employment.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1·1: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation for All Founders
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (analogous to the definition of
our main estimation sample) in years after foundation. We see the outcomes of startups in terms of sales
per year and full-time equivalent employment based on 5,250 (sales) and 5,850 (employment) startups
established between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset (see Section 1.2). Firms usually stay in the
panel for seven years but can drop out if they fail or refuse to take part in more than two consecutive years.
Thus, less firms are observed in year seven compared to year one after starting up.
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Figure 1·2: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation by Previous Employment Status
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100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Sa
les
 (i
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
 E
ur
o)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Firm age (in years)
not unemployed unemployed
(b) Full-Time Equivalent Employment
0
.5
1
1.5
2
FT
E 
em
plo
ym
en
t s
ize
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Firm age (in years)
not unemployed unemployed
Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (see the definition of
our main estimation sample in Table 1.2) in years after foundation split by the previous labor
market status of the founder (not unemployed or unemployed). We cover startups established
between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset as described in Section 1.2.
32
Figure 1·3: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation split by Median Unemployment Duration
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (see the definition
of our main estimation sample in Table 1.2) with previous unemployment spell in years after
foundation split at the medium (actual) unemployment duration. We cover startups established
between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset as described in Section 1.2.
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Figure 1·4: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation split by Motivation for Starting Up
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(b) Full-Time Equivalent Employment
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (analogous to the defini-
tion of our main estimation sample) in years after foundation split by self-reported motivation, i.e.
opportunity vs. pushed/necessity driven entrepreneurship. We cover approximately 5,050 (sales)
and 5,600 (employment) startups established between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset as
described in Section 1.2. The notion of using, instead of necessity-driven founder, the term pushed
entrepreneur is best understood by checking the spikes of the exit rate from unemployment into
self-employment split by the motivation to start up which is shown in Figure I·1.
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Figure 1·5: Firm Outcomes in Years after Foundation by Motivation for Starting Up out of
Unemployment
(a) Sales in EUR
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Notes: The Figure shows firm outcomes of non-team founders aged 35-65 (see the definition of our
main estimation sample in Table 1.2) with previous unemployment spell in years after foundation
split by self-reported motivation, i.e. opportunity vs. pushed/necessity driven entrepreneurship.
We cover startups established between 2005 and 2011 from our linked dataset as described in
Section 1.2.
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Figure 1·6: Selection into Self-Employment
V
UE−Duration (d)
V eu
V seu
PBD
Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with actual unemployment duration d according to the stylized model as
explained in Section 1.5. The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which
it holds that: 0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration
(PBD). At this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drop by x = b¯− b˜ because UI
benefits b¯ drop to the existential minimum b˜ (compare Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)). In
this example, the unemployed individual would first prefer to search for employment. But once
the red line crosses the blue one: from this unemployment duration (d) onward, the unemployed
individual would prefer starting a business. Note that these results hold as long as depreciation
in entrepreneurial skills is smaller in absolute terms than depreciation in employment skills and
thus as long as the blue line has a less negative slope than the red line. If the value of becoming
self-employed out of unemployment was independent of unemployment duration d, the blue line
would be a horizontal line, and the associated pure selection channel (composition effect) could
also explain our main results, i.e. that longer PBD leads to longer actual unemployment duration
and more pushed startups.
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Figure 1·7: Selection into Self-Employment: High Entrepreneurial Ability
V
UE−Duration (d)
V eu
PBD
V seu
Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with unemployment duration according to the stylized model as explained
in Section 1.5. The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which it holds
that: 0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration: at this
point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by x = b¯− b˜, as UI benefits b¯ drop to the
existential minimum b˜ (Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)). The unemployed individual learns
to have such high entrepreneurial ability that she starts a business.
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Figure 1·8: Selection into Employment: Low Entrepreneurial Ability
V
UE−Duration (d)
V eu
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with unemployment duration according to the stylized model as explained
in Section 1.5. The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which it holds
that: 0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration: at this
point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by x = b¯− b˜, as UI benefits b¯ drop to the
existential minimum b˜ (Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)). The unemployed individual learns
to have such low entrepreneurial ability that she prefers employment.
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Figure 1·9: PBD Rules can influence the Composition of Startups out of Unemployment
V
UE−Duration (d)
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V seu (θL)
Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with unemployment duration according to the stylized model in Section 1.5.
The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The cyan/blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which it holds that:
0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD): at this
point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by x = b¯− b˜, as UI benefits b¯ drop to the
existential minimum b˜ (Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)). In this example, the unemployed
individual with high ability θH would decide to become self-employed after a short UI duration
(cyan line), whereas the other unemployed individual θL would intensify search for employment
before reaching PBD (red line to the left of PBD), when V eut suddenly drops below V
se
ut (blue line
to the right of PBD). Here, the government could induce type H to become self-employed and L
to search for employment.
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Figure 1·10: If there was No Negative UI Duration Dependence concerning potential SE Outcomes
V
UE−Duration (d)
V eu
V seu (θH)
V seu (θL)
PBD
Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with unemployment duration d according to the stylized model as explained
in Section 1.5. The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ = 0. The vertical
black line marks PBD: at this point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by x= b¯− b˜,
as UI benefits b¯ drop to the existential minimum b˜ ( Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)).
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Figure 1·11: PBD Rules can influence the Composition of Startups out of Unemployment (Increase
in PBD)
V
UE−Duration (d)
V eu
PBD2PBD1
V seu (θH)
V seu (θL)
Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with unemployment duration according to the stylized model in Section 1.5.
The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The cyan/blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which it holds that:
0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD): at this
point of unemployment duration the red/blue line drops by x = b¯− b˜, as UI benefits b¯ drop to the
existential minimum b˜ (Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)). In this example, the government
increases PBD (PBD moves to the right). PBD1 represents the initial potential benefit duration.
PBD2 the extended one. At the initial PBD1, the unemployed individual with high ability (θH)
would decide to become self-employed after a short UI duration (cyan line), whereas the other
unemployed individual (θL) would rather accept the next job when reaching PBD1 (red curve
is above dark blue curve at PBD1). This illustrates, that in theory, increasing the potential
benefit duration to PBD2 can change the composition among the unemployed individuals start up.
Now, the value for becoming self-employed would be higher for both high individuals with θH
(opportunity entrepreneurs) and for individuals with θL (necessity entrepreneurs) compared to the
value for transitioning from unemployment to wage employment (at PBD2 the dark blue curve
is now above the red curve). This illustrates how PBD can change the composition of startups
created out of unemployment.
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Figure 1·12: Early Re-training for Wage-Employment
V
UE−Duration (d)
V eu
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V seu (θL)
Notes: The figure illustrates how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-
employed V seut evolve with unemployment duration d according to the stylized model in Section 1.5.
The red line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The cyan/blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which it holds that:
0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ . The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD): at this
point of d the red/blue line drops by x = b¯− b˜, as UI benefits b¯ drop to the existential minimum
b˜ (Equation (1.8), Equation (1.10)). By early retraining, the value function of searching for
employment V eut could be increased, as the green line indicates.
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Figure 1·13: Targeted Subsidies for Self-Employment
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Notes: The figure shows how the value functions for becoming employed V eut and self-employed
V seut evolve with unemployment duration according to the stylized model in Section 1.5. The red
line depicts ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ < 0. The blue line depicts ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ for which it holds that: 0 > ∂V
se
ut
∂d |θ > ∂V
e
ut
∂d |θ .
The vertical black line marks the potential benefit duration (PBD): at this point of unemployment
duration the red/blue line drops by x = b¯− b˜, as UI benefits b¯ drop to the existential minimum b˜
(Equation (1.8) and Equation (1.10)). By providing startup subsidies or special training for future
self-employed, the government could increase V seut , as shown by the green line.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Definition of Necessity/Pushed vs. Opportunity Founders for Regression Sample
Motive to become entrepreneur Opportunity entrepreneur Pushed entrepreneur
Self-determined working 527 0
Realisation of business idea 255 0
Better earning potential 32 0
Tax incentives 3 0
No suitable employment options 0 169
Escape from unemployment 0 260
Forced by former employer 0 10
Total 817 439
Notes: This table is based on information from the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel and shows only our
main regression sample. 1,300 non-team founders with maximal UI potential benefit duration
that have been previously unemployed are considered in this table (see the definition of our main
estimation sample in Table 1.2). Founders are asked about their motivation for starting a firm
during the survey interview that is conducted when they enter the panel for the first time. Note
that the intuition behind using the term pushed entrepreneur can be well understood by checking
the spikes of the exit rate from unemployment into self-employment split by the motivation to
start up, which is shown in Figure I·1. This is corroborated when looking at Table 1.2: Previously
employed founders are much less likely to feel pushed into entrepreneurship (21% vs. 35% for
previously unemployed founders.)
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Regression Sample - for previously Unemployed (above median unemployment duration) or Employed Founders
Regression sample of unemployed founders Founders with > median UE duration Previously not unemployed founders
Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max
Unemployment (UE) Duration (months) 1291 4.79 4.56 0.03 36.17 641 8.02 4.52 3.12 36.17 0
PBD (in months) 1291 12.32 4.25 0.59 37.42 641 13.31 4.62 3.52 37.42 0
Tertiary degree (=1) 1291 0.28 0.45 0 1 641 0.30 0.46 0 1 1610 0.35 0.48 0 1
Founder: self-employed (SE) before (=1) 1291 0.15 0.36 0 1 641 0.16 0.37 0 1 1610 0.23 0.42 0 1
Managerial experience as employee (=1) 1291 0.13 0.33 0 1 641 0.14 0.34 0 1 1610 0.15 0.36 0 1
Female founder (=1) 1291 0.15 0.35 0 1 641 0.15 0.35 0 1 1610 0.13 0.34 0 1
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 1291 0.06 0.23 0 1 641 0.07 0.25 0 1 1610 0.05 0.21 0 1
SE Subsidy by Employment Agency (=1) 1291 0.75 0.43 0 1 641 0.73 0.44 0 1 1610 0.38 0.49 0 1
Industry Experience (in years) 1291 17.22 9.52 1.00 50.00 641 17.00 10.33 1.00 50.00 1610 16.56 9.15 1 54.00
Age of Founder (in years) 1291 44.44 5.93 35.09 65.11 641 45.28 6.20 35.34 65.11 1610 43.93 6.01 35 63.85
Sales in Year 1 1039 173,661 461,647 0 8,123,565 507 134,149 451,385 0 8,123,565 1309 399,872 2,467,627 0 84,370,000
Sales in Year 2 851 231,293 665,161 0 13,640,000 409 212,599 830,844 0 13,640,000 1067 400,055 1,121,272 0 24,180,000
FTE Employment after Year 1 1291 0.61 1.60 0 16.50 641 0.39 1.26 0 13.00 1610 1.02 3.28 0 74.50
FTE Employment after Year 2 1272 0.85 2.08 0 28.25 628 0.54 1.44 0 12.50 1597 1.45 4.26 0 95.75
Pushed/Necessity Motive (=1) 1256 0.35 0.48 0 1 631 0.39 0.49 0 1 1531 0.21 0.41 0 1
Technology-intensive services 1291 0.19 0.39 0 1 641 0.20 0.40 0 1 1610 0.23 0.42 0 1
High-technology manufacturing 1291 0.09 0.28 0 1 641 0.08 0.28 0 1 1610 0.12 0.33 0 1
Skill-intensive services 1291 0.05 0.21 0 1 641 0.05 0.22 0 1 1610 0.08 0.27 0 1
Software supply and consultancy 1291 0.03 0.18 0 1 641 0.03 0.18 0 1 1610 0.06 0.23 0 1
Non-high-tech manufacturing 1291 0.12 0.33 0 1 641 0.11 0.31 0 1 1610 0.12 0.33 0 1
Other business-oriented services 1291 0.07 0.25 0 1 641 0.07 0.25 0 1 1610 0.05 0.22 0 1
Cons.-or. services in creative sect. 1291 0.02 0.15 0 1 641 0.02 0.15 0 1 1610 0.03 0.16 0 1
Consumer-oriented services 1291 0.10 0.30 0 1 641 0.10 0.30 0 1 1610 0.07 0.25 0 1
Construction 1291 0.16 0.36 0 1 641 0.15 0.35 0 1 1610 0.11 0.31 0 1
Retail & wholesale 1291 0.18 0.38 0 1 641 0.19 0.39 0 1 1610 0.14 0.35 0 1
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for non-team founders that have started their business out of unemployment (first panel). In the second panel, our table shows the same
statistics for the sub-sample of these non-team founders that had equal or greater than median unemployment duration before starting up. The table only includes those individuals
that have maximum PBD at the beginning of the unemployment spell, since the empirical strategies require that our main regression sample consists of non-team founders that have
achieved these criteria. Note that out of the around 4,000 non-team founders having unemployment experience before starting up in our data, approximately 1,300 satisfy the criteria
to be included in our main regression sample: they became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were between 35 and 65 years old when becoming unemployed, are eligible to
maximum potential benefit duration, and have information on all included control variables available. Finally, the the right-hand panel of this table shows the same summary statistics
for a reference group of founders who have started their business out of employment, i.e. they have not been previously unemployed.
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Table 1.3: OLS Results: Actual Benefit Duration (ABD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
unemployment (UE) Duration (in months) 0.017∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.027) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.050 -0.663∗∗ -0.029 0.076∗∗ 0.074∗
(0.032) (0.283) (0.168) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was SE before (=1) -0.009 0.031 -0.125 -0.006 -0.018
(0.037) (0.336) (0.211) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) -0.059 0.169 0.618∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.350) (0.164) (0.049) (0.056)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.003∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.014) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.013 -0.993∗∗ -0.361∗ 0.069 0.104∗∗
(0.039) (0.404) (0.210) (0.046) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.033 -1.758∗∗∗ -0.509 -0.015 -0.048
(0.060) (0.673) (0.418) (0.055) (0.054)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.073∗∗ -0.413 -0.289∗ -0.056∗ -0.086∗∗
(0.032) (0.280) (0.168) (0.033) (0.037)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.063 0.122 0.126 0.150 0.158
Mean of dependent variable 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our main outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment benefit duration (ABD) before starting up. We control for
the founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects. We also include dummies
to control for the receipt of subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders
who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all included control variables is available.
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Table 1.4: OLS Results: ABD on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes focusing on Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration (in months) 0.018∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.029) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.069∗ -0.392 0.143 0.059∗ 0.057
(0.036) (0.290) (0.168) (0.035) (0.041)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.009 0.119 -0.262 0.015 0.031
(0.042) (0.343) (0.230) (0.045) (0.051)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) -0.096∗∗ 0.022 0.457∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.381) (0.184) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.002 0.021 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.006 -0.693∗ -0.512∗∗ 0.077 0.096∗
(0.043) (0.413) (0.232) (0.051) (0.056)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) -0.047 -1.820∗∗ -0.843∗ -0.076 -0.080∗
(0.064) (0.724) (0.496) (0.047) (0.047)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.070∗ -0.629∗∗ -0.277 -0.054 -0.069∗
(0.036) (0.309) (0.202) (0.035) (0.040)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.076 0.103 0.145 0.167 0.168
Mean of dependent variable 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our main
outcome variables (motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual unemployment benefit duration (ABD) before starting up in the
non-manufacturing sector (75% of our sample). We control for the founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include year and
industry (of the startup) fixed effects. We also include dummies to control for the receipt of subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank
(Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed,
and for whom information on all included control variables is available.
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Table 1.5: Potential UI Benefit Duration (in months) based on Contributions/Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contribution before Age from 02/2006 Age since Age
Months 02/2006 Rules until 12/2007 Rules 01/2008 Rules
12 6 6 6
18 9 9 9
24 12 12 12
30 15 ≥ 45 15 ≥ 55 15 ≥ 50
36 18 18 ≥ 55 18 ≥ 55
44 22 ≥ 47 18 ≥ 55 22 ≥ 58
48 24 18 ≥ 55 24 ≥ 58
52 26 ≥ 52 18 ≥ 55 24 ≥ 58
64 32 ≥ 57 18 ≥ 55 24 ≥ 58
Notes: The table shows how potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration (PBD)
varies with the number of contribution months (column 1), i.e. the number of months a worker
paid UI contributions that are mandatory for jobs covered by the social security. The rules state
that after having satisfied the minimum eligibility requirement (e.g. at least 12 contributions
within last 24 months) half of the number of contribution months translate into PBD. However,
at some point a maximum PBD is reached and additional contribution months can no longer
increase PBD. This table presents the age rules for maximum PBD, i.e. for which age groups
the indicated PBD is available, since only with increasing age does the maximum PBD increase.
Maximum PBD by age group is also shown in Table 1.6. Columns (2) and (3) show the PBD
regime before February 2006, columns (4) and (5) between February 2006 and December 2007
and columns (6) and (7) since January 2008.
Table 1.6: Maximum Potential UI Benefit Duration (in months) in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age before Reduction from 02/2006 Extension since Net-Effect
02/2006 in months until 12/2007 in months 01/2008 in months
<45 12 0 12 0 12 0
45-46 18 -6 12 0 12 -6
47-49 22 -10 12 0 12 -10
50-51 22 -10 12 +3 15 -7
52-54 26 -14 12 +3 15 -11
55-56 26 -8 18 0 18 -8
57 32 -14 18 0 18 -14
>58 32 -14 18 +6 24 -8
Notes: The table shows how potential unemployment insurance (UI) benefit duration (PBD) varies
by age group and over time for unemployed individuals who had worked for at least the number
of contribution months within the last five years (seven years before 02/2006) necessary to get the
maximum PBD of their age group according to Table 1.5 without intermittent UI spell. This table
shows that the reform of February 2006 represents a considerable decline in PBD for workers
aged above 45 years. In contrast, the reform of January 2008 partially increased PBD again.
However, in total the net effect across both reforms demonstrates that all age groups beyond 45
years suffered a considerable decline in PBD (cf. Section 1.3).
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Table 1.7: OLS Results: Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) on Actual Benefit Duration (ABD), Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.471∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.049∗∗ -0.004 -0.009∗∗
(0.048) (0.003) (0.024) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.386 -0.073∗∗ -0.636∗∗ 0.027 0.079∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.291) (0.032) (0.289) (0.173) (0.034) (0.040)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.116 -0.014 -0.001 -0.095 -0.009 -0.019
(0.338) (0.037) (0.341) (0.213) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) -0.004 -0.069∗ 0.160 0.609∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.038) (0.356) (0.168) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry Experience (in years) -0.013 0.001 0.036∗∗ 0.007 0.001 0.002
(0.015) (0.001) (0.014) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.176 0.013 -1.075∗∗∗ -0.369∗ 0.065 0.100∗
(0.326) (0.039) (0.405) (0.221) (0.047) (0.053)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.299 0.034 -1.853∗∗∗ -0.553 -0.021 -0.056
(0.500) (0.059) (0.674) (0.446) (0.056) (0.057)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.301 0.061∗ -0.401 -0.277 -0.053 -0.080∗∗
(0.292) (0.031) (0.281) (0.171) (0.034) (0.038)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.256 0.077 0.099 0.096 0.133 0.134
Mean of dependent variable 4.785 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our main outcome
variables (ABD, motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ potential benefit duration (ABD) before starting up. We control for the
founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects. We also include dummies to
control for the receipt of subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders
who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all included control variables is available.
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Table 1.8: OLS Results: PBD on ABD, Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.004) (0.026) (0.026) (0.003) (0.004)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.462 -0.092∗∗∗ -0.324 0.225 0.069∗ 0.072∗
(0.335) (0.036) (0.295) (0.168) (0.036) (0.041)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.443 0.015 0.065 -0.250 0.008 0.023
(0.369) (0.042) (0.351) (0.235) (0.046) (0.052)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.052 -0.098∗∗ 0.005 0.430∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.043) (0.383) (0.188) (0.053) (0.061)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.329 0.007 -0.787∗ -0.539∗∗ 0.072 0.090
(0.370) (0.043) (0.415) (0.244) (0.052) (0.057)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.303 -0.040 -1.882∗∗∗ -0.876 -0.081∗ -0.088∗
(0.546) (0.065) (0.723) (0.533) (0.047) (0.049)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.287 0.062∗ -0.597∗ -0.252 -0.049 -0.060
(0.342) (0.036) (0.310) (0.202) (0.036) (0.041)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.266 0.082 0.085 0.116 0.153 0.145
Mean of dependent variable 4.895 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the OLS regression of our main outcome
variables (ABD, motivation for starting up; sales and employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ potential benefit duration (PBD) before starting up in the non-manufacturing
sector (75% of our sample). We control for the founders’ education, their previous work experience, and individual characteristics. Moreover, we include year and industry (of the
startup) fixed effects. We also include dummies to control for the receipt of subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW bank (Appendix I.3.2).
Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, who were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom
information on all included control variables is available.
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Table 1.9: IV Results for Reform 2006: Potential Benefit Duration on Actual Benefit Duration (ABD), Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.661∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.034 -0.072∗ 0.003 -0.006
(0.094) (0.007) (0.052) (0.039) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.313 -0.513∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.689∗∗ 0.048 0.071∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.221) (0.289) (0.032) (0.289) (0.169) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was SE before (=1) -0.025 0.121 -0.022 -0.014 -0.093 -0.012 -0.020
(0.278) (0.345) (0.037) (0.339) (0.210) (0.039) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.301 -0.023 -0.077∗∗ 0.144 0.613∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.348) (0.038) (0.353) (0.165) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.014 -0.017 0.001 0.033∗∗ 0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.002 0.198 0.004 -1.088∗∗∗ -0.366∗ 0.063 0.099∗
(0.274) (0.325) (0.038) (0.402) (0.216) (0.046) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.021 0.207 0.042 -1.897∗∗∗ -0.530 -0.023 -0.057
(0.372) (0.505) (0.058) (0.666) (0.427) (0.055) (0.056)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.398∗ -0.406 0.067∗∗ -0.437 -0.269 -0.056∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.214) (0.294) (0.031) (0.279) (0.167) (0.033) (0.038)
IV_06 -8.743∗∗∗
(0.505)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 299.421 286.66 223.603 220.761 299.421 296.11
N 1291 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.470 0.234 0.083 0.094 0.094 0.130 0.134
Mean of dependent variable 12.324 4.785 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables (ABD,
motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up that is instrumented by IV06 (Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows the
first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of
the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of
non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is
available.
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Table 1.10: IV Results for Reform 2006: PBD on ABD, Motivation of Founder, Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.722∗∗∗ 0.010 0.004 -0.115∗∗ -0.008 -0.018∗∗
(0.109) (0.008) (0.056) (0.051) (0.006) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.434∗ -0.641∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.390 0.269 0.064∗ 0.071∗
(0.248) (0.331) (0.036) (0.296) (0.167) (0.036) (0.041)
Founder was SE before (=1) -0.296 0.517 0.006 0.078 -0.270 0.005 0.019
(0.312) (0.385) (0.042) (0.350) (0.234) (0.044) (0.051)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.137 0.068 -0.105∗∗ -0.000 0.423∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.387) (0.042) (0.377) (0.186) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.011 -0.006 0.001 0.019 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.086 0.312 0.001 -0.818∗∗ -0.533∗∗ 0.069 0.088
(0.313) (0.368) (0.042) (0.412) (0.238) (0.051) (0.056)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) -0.101 0.252 -0.032 -1.922∗∗∗ -0.828 -0.079∗ -0.085∗
(0.395) (0.554) (0.063) (0.708) (0.508) (0.046) (0.048)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.333 -0.389 0.071∗∗ -0.633∗∗ -0.236 -0.049 -0.058
(0.234) (0.341) (0.036) (0.307) (0.198) (0.035) (0.040)
IV_06 -8.401∗∗∗
(0.569)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 217.975 209.815 155.049 153.108 217.975 216.04
N 1022 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.477 0.232 0.083 0.079 0.110 0.153 0.145
Mean of dependent variable 12.327 4.895 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables (ABD,
motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of the sample) that is instrumented
by IV06 (Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual
characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW
(Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and
for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table 1.11: IV Results for Reform 2006: Actual Benefit Duration (ABD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration (in months) 0.022∗∗ 0.060 -0.118∗ 0.005 -0.010
(0.010) (0.095) (0.063) (0.011) (0.012)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.313 -0.063∗∗ -0.662∗∗ -0.030 0.074∗∗ 0.073∗
(0.311) (0.031) (0.287) (0.164) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.067 -0.024 -0.023 -0.129 -0.013 -0.020
(0.357) (0.037) (0.343) (0.208) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.144 -0.076∗∗ 0.146 0.624∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.038) (0.358) (0.162) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry Experience (in years) -0.008 0.001 0.035∗∗ 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.240 -0.001 -1.118∗∗∗ -0.357∗ 0.062 0.101∗
(0.361) (0.038) (0.408) (0.205) (0.047) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.226 0.037 -1.928∗∗∗ -0.489 -0.024 -0.054
(0.505) (0.059) (0.670) (0.400) (0.055) (0.054)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.086 0.075∗∗ -0.423 -0.288∗ -0.054 -0.085∗∗
(0.311) (0.031) (0.281) (0.166) (0.034) (0.037)
IV_06 -5.815∗∗∗
(0.921)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 39.831 23.487 24.016 40.992 41.07
N 1256 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.189 0.075 0.072 0.124 0.120 0.149
Mean of dependent variable 4.828 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables
(motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual benefit duration (ABD) before starting up that is instrumented by IV06 (Section 1.3.2).
Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include
year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our
regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information
on all control variables is available.
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Table 1.12: IV Results for Reform 2006: ABD on Motivation of Founder, Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 (log) FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration (in months) 0.014 0.007 -0.171∗∗ -0.011 -0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.092) (0.077) (0.009) (0.011)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.305 -0.081∗∗ -0.387 0.145 0.057 0.056
(0.357) (0.035) (0.289) (0.163) (0.035) (0.040)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.243 -0.001 0.074 -0.283 0.011 0.030
(0.374) (0.042) (0.346) (0.228) (0.044) (0.050)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.158 -0.105∗∗ -0.001 0.475∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.042) (0.380) (0.183) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.002 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.356 -0.003 -0.823∗∗ -0.485∗∗ 0.072 0.095∗
(0.407) (0.042) (0.419) (0.227) (0.051) (0.055)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.198 -0.035 -1.925∗∗∗ -0.781∗ -0.076∗ -0.078∗
(0.551) (0.063) (0.709) (0.464) (0.046) (0.047)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.084 0.075∗∗ -0.631∗∗ -0.280 -0.053 -0.068∗
(0.367) (0.035) (0.306) (0.201) (0.035) (0.039)
IV_06 -5.987∗∗∗
(1.047)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 32.673 19.62 19.994 34.939 34.852
N 999 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.209 0.089 0.077 0.124 0.165 0.168
Mean of dependent variable 4.926 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables
(motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual benefit duration (ABD) before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of the
sample) that is instrumented by IV06 (Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work
experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and
for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when
becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table 1.13: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: PBD on Actual Benefit Duration (ABD), Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.649∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.030 -0.074∗∗ 0.004 -0.006
(0.093) (0.007) (0.049) (0.038) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.247 -0.467 -0.076∗∗ -0.671∗∗ 0.057 0.075∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.217) (0.286) (0.032) (0.288) (0.168) (0.034) (0.040)
Founder was SE before (=1) -0.157 0.185 -0.025 0.012 -0.082 -0.006 -0.018
(0.268) (0.342) (0.037) (0.338) (0.207) (0.039) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.291 -0.006 -0.077∗∗ 0.150 0.615∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.346) (0.038) (0.353) (0.165) (0.050) (0.057)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.008 -0.014 0.000 0.034∗∗ 0.009 0.001 0.001
(0.011) (0.014) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) -0.015 0.186 0.005 -1.100∗∗∗ -0.368∗ 0.062 0.099∗
(0.273) (0.321) (0.038) (0.401) (0.216) (0.047) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.134 0.219 0.042 -1.899∗∗∗ -0.535 -0.022 -0.057
(0.364) (0.504) (0.058) (0.666) (0.427) (0.054) (0.056)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.446∗∗ -0.411 0.067∗∗ -0.446 -0.272 -0.058∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.210) (0.295) (0.031) (0.280) (0.167) (0.033) (0.038)
IV_06 -9.316∗∗∗
(0.514)
IV_08 2.356∗∗∗
(0.353)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 41.07 147.61 115.608 119.869 154.434 152.383
N 1291 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.487 0.242 0.084 0.096 0.094 0.133 0.135
Mean of dependent variable 12.324 4.785 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables (ABD,
motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up that is instrumented by IV06 and IV08 (Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows
the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry
(of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample
consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control
variables is available.
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Table 1.14: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: PBD on ABD, Motiv. of Founder, Firm Outcomes focusing on Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.721∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.002 -0.115∗∗ -0.007 -0.017∗∗
(0.108) (0.008) (0.055) (0.050) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.391 -0.585∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.371 0.266 0.066∗ 0.072∗
(0.244) (0.327) (0.036) (0.295) (0.166) (0.036) (0.041)
Founder was SE before (=1) -0.396 0.595 0.003 0.097 -0.275 0.009 0.021
(0.304) (0.380) (0.042) (0.352) (0.233) (0.044) (0.051)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.112 0.096 -0.106∗∗ 0.006 0.422∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.381) (0.043) (0.378) (0.185) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.006 -0.003 0.001 0.020 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.065 0.298 0.002 -0.825∗∗ -0.533∗∗ 0.068 0.088
(0.312) (0.362) (0.042) (0.411) (0.238) (0.051) (0.056)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.031 0.214 -0.030 -1.928∗∗∗ -0.824 -0.081∗ -0.086∗
(0.386) (0.558) (0.063) (0.710) (0.510) (0.046) (0.048)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.378 -0.409 0.071∗∗ -0.636∗∗ -0.234 -0.050 -0.058
(0.231) (0.342) (0.036) (0.306) (0.197) (0.035) (0.040)
IV_06 -8.955∗∗∗
(0.579)
IV_08 2.115∗∗∗
(0.385)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 34.852 107.841 78.456 84.474 112.178 110.896
N 1022 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.493 0.241 0.084 0.080 0.110 0.155 0.146
Mean of dependent variable 12.327 4.895 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables (ABD,
motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ PBD before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75% of the sample) that is instrumented
by IV06 and IV08 (Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and
individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding
by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming
unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table 1.15: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: Actual Benefit Duration (ABD) on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration (in months) 0.023∗∗ 0.058 -0.121∗ 0.004 -0.010
(0.010) (0.095) (0.063) (0.011) (0.012)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.314 -0.065∗∗ -0.649∗∗ -0.019 0.077∗∗ 0.075∗
(0.311) (0.031) (0.287) (0.163) (0.034) (0.039)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.065 -0.029 -0.002 -0.111 -0.007 -0.016
(0.358) (0.037) (0.342) (0.205) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.143 -0.077∗∗ 0.150 0.627∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.038) (0.358) (0.161) (0.050) (0.056)
Industry Experience (in years) -0.008 0.001 0.036∗∗ 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.242 -0.001 -1.126∗∗∗ -0.361∗ 0.061 0.100∗
(0.361) (0.038) (0.407) (0.204) (0.047) (0.052)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.222 0.036 -1.930∗∗∗ -0.497 -0.023 -0.053
(0.505) (0.058) (0.670) (0.397) (0.055) (0.054)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.087 0.075∗∗ -0.431 -0.295∗ -0.056∗ -0.085∗∗
(0.312) (0.031) (0.282) (0.166) (0.034) (0.037)
IV_06 -5.798∗∗∗
(0.961)
IV_08 -0.075
(0.900)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 152.383 11.84 12.17 20.8 20.98
N 1256 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.189 0.077 0.073 0.125 0.124 0.151
Mean of dependent variable 4.828 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables
(motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual benefit duration (ABD) before starting up that is instrumented by IV06 and IV08
(Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual
characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW
(Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and
for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table 1.16: IV Results for Reforms 2006 & 2008: ABD on Motivation of Founder and Firm Outcomes for Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration (in months) 0.014 0.005 -0.166∗∗ -0.011 -0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.091) (0.075) (0.009) (0.011)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.300 -0.083∗∗ -0.372 0.153 0.060∗ 0.059
(0.356) (0.035) (0.290) (0.161) (0.035) (0.041)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.252 -0.005 0.096 -0.271 0.015 0.034
(0.376) (0.042) (0.346) (0.225) (0.044) (0.050)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.160 -0.107∗∗ 0.005 0.475∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.042) (0.381) (0.182) (0.053) (0.060)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.003 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.355 -0.002 -0.830∗∗ -0.488∗∗ 0.071 0.095∗
(0.406) (0.042) (0.418) (0.226) (0.051) (0.055)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.189 -0.033 -1.934∗∗∗ -0.793∗ -0.079∗ -0.079∗
(0.552) (0.063) (0.710) (0.464) (0.046) (0.047)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.086 0.075∗∗ -0.637∗∗ -0.283 -0.054 -0.069∗
(0.368) (0.035) (0.306) (0.200) (0.035) (0.039)
IV_06 -5.962∗∗∗
(1.111)
IV_08 -0.103
(1.085)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage F-statistic 110.896 10.01 10.13 17.61 17.7
N 999 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.209 0.090 0.078 0.128 0.168 0.169
Mean of dependent variable 4.926 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the IV regression of our outcome variables
(motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ actual benefit duration (ABD) before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector (75%
of the sample) that is instrumented by IV06 and IV08 (Section 1.3.2). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression of the IV model in column 2. We control for the founders’
education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the startup) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal
Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35
to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table 1.17: Potential Mechanisms: The Role of Selection on Observable Characteristics is limited - Composition and Treatment Effect play a role
Treated unemployed All unemployed "Treated" non-unemployed All non-unemployed
from main sample from main sample from comparison group from comparison group
Mean Mean After Mean Mean After Mean Mean After Mean Mean After
(before) (after) -before (before) (after) -before (before) (after) -before (before) (after) -before
N=106 N=397 N=259 N=1032 N=94 N=509 N=256 N=1354
UE Duration (in months) 11.171 4.873 -6.299*** 7.943 4.193 -3.75***
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.33 0.28 -0.05 0.20 0.23 0.03 0.32 0.30 -0.03 0.35 0.25 -0.10*
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.26 0.32 0.05 0.25 0.27 0.01
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.16 0.02
Industry Experience (in years) 20.02 18.81 -1.22 16.10 16.31 0.21 22.71 17.27 -5.44*** 17.15 15.38 -1.77
Female founder (=1) 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.20 0.06
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.01
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) 0.65 0.80 0.15* 0.65 0.80 0.15*** 0.27 0.34 0.07 0.30 0.36 0.06
Technology-intensive services 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00
High-technology manufacturing 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Skill-intensive services 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.07 -0.02
Software supply and consultancy 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00* 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Non-high-tech manufacturing 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02***
Other business-oriented services 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.08* 0.12 0.12 -0.01
Cons.-or. services in creative sect. 0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.05 -0.05 0.24 0.11 -0.13 0.15 0.09 -0.06
Consumer-oriented services 0.30 0.31 0.01 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.15 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.10*
Construction 0.11 0.20 0.09* 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.16 0.14 -0.02
Retail & wholesale 0.29 0.17 -0.12 0.21 0.18 -0.03 0.28 0.21 -0.07 0.24 0.22 -0.02
Average daily wage in 5 years before founding 107.87 124.75 16.88 96.87 106.56 9.69 129.17 125.10 -4.06 127.03 119.66 -7.37
Notes: Significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table show t-test comparison of different subgroups for the observable characteristics. In the first panel, we
compare those unemployed individuals that are affected by 2006 reform. In the second panel, we compare all unemployed individuals before and after the 2006 reform. In the third
panel, we compare the potentially treated non-unemployed and in the fourth panel, we do so for all non-unemployed individuals.
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I.1 Appendix: Tables & Figures
I.1.1 Figures
Figure I·1: Spikes at exhausting Pot. Benefit Duration: Necessity/Pushed Founders
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Notes: This Figure shows the difference between actual and potential unemployment duration,
i.e. when the unemployed individual starts a firm given his/her remaining PBD. The Figure
shows that when UI benefits run out (remaining PBD is close to 0) the spike in the exit rate from
unemployment to self-employment is significantly higher for those indicating to start a firm due
to necessity motives (red lines) compared to those indicating an opportunity motive (blue dashed
spikes). Thus, it is plausible to use the term pushed for necessity-driven founders (cf. Section 1.2).
For a review of the literature on UI spikes, see also Card et al. (2007).
Figure I·2: RDD-Strategy McCrary Test for Age 50 Cutoff in 2008-2011
McCrary Test:
Discontinuity est. (S.E.) = - .31 (.373)
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Notes: This Figure shows the necessary checks concerning the identifying assumption of the
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) strategy. This involves conducting a Mc-Crary test
that confirms that eligible persons are not strategically becoming unemployed to exploit the age
discontinuity in order to optimize their potential benefit duration (PBD). See Section 1.4.2.
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Figure I·3: RDD-Results for Age 50 Cutoff in 2008-2011: Exog. Increase of 3 months in PBD (1)
(a) RDD-Results: Increase in Potential Benefit Duration (PBD)
Treatment effect (S.E.) = 2.079 (.427)
Number of observations = 419
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(b) RDD-Effect of 3 months Increase in PBD on Actual Unemployment Duration
Treatment effect (S.E.) = 1.182 (.663)
Number of observations = 438
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Notes: This Figure shows in (a) that potential benefit duration increases by approximately 3
months around the age 50 cutoff, thus it confirms that our data construction process has been
successful. Moreover Figure (b) shows regression discontinuity design (RDD) results for the
actual unemployment duration of non-team founders (age 45-54) who have become unemployed.
Consistent with our IV estimates longer PBD increases actual unemployment duration (ABD).
For details on the RDD strategy, see Section 1.4.2.
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Figure I·4: RDD-Results for Age 50 Cutoff in 2008-2011: Exog. Increase of 3 months in PBD (2)
(a) RDD-Results: Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employment after Year 1
Treatment effect (S.E.) = -.123 (.078)
Number of observations = 438
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(b) RDD-Results: Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employment after Year 2
Treatment effect (S.E.) = -.247 (.098)
Number of observations = 428
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Notes: This Figure shows regression discontinuity design (RDD) results for employment growth
outcomes of non-team founders (age 45-54) who have been previously unemployed. Consistent
with our IV estimates longer actual unemployment duration induced by longer PBD leads to less
growth in terms of FTE employment. For details on the RDD strategy, see Section 1.4.2. Detailed
results are shown in Table I.1.
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I.1.2 Tables
Table I.1: Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Results: Exogenous Increase of 3 months in
PBD at age 50 cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PBD UE Duration FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
RDD Treatment-Effect 2.079∗∗∗ 1.182∗ -0.123 -0.247∗∗
(0.427) (0.663) (0.078) (0.098)
Tertiary degree (=1) 0.536 0.103 0.048 0.051
(0.333) (0.404) (0.065) (0.060)
Founder was SE -0.614∗∗ 0.720 0.000 0.025
before (=1) -0.022 (0.556) (0.058) (0.076)
Managerial Experience -0.022 0.188 0.196∗∗ 0.194∗∗
as Employee (=1) (0.269) (0.389) (0.071) (0.075)
Industry Experience 0.003 -0.013 0.002 0.001
(in years) (0.010) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003)
Female founder (=1) -0.265 0.233 0.179∗ 0.097
(0.237) (0.508) (0.096) (0.084)
Founder of 0.129 0.248 0.050 -0.037
non-German origin (=1) (0.749) (0.804) (0.076) (0.093)
SE Subsidy by Federal 0.871∗∗∗ -0.568 -0.140∗∗∗ -0.086
Employment Agency (=1) (0.241) (0.549) (0.042) (0.058)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 419 438 438 428
R2 0.299 0.083 0.156 0.165
Mean of dependent variable 12.254 4.49 0.279 0.367
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%,
* 10%. This table shows the regression discontinuity design (RDD) results for an exogenous increase of 3
months in PBD at the age 50 cutoff in 2008-2011.This table shows the RDD regression of our outcome
variables (PBD, ABD, employment growth after year 1, 2) on an increase of PBD of around 3 months
before starting up (Section 1.4.2). We control for the founders’ education; previous work experience; and
individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the start-up) fixed effects; and dummies to
control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2).
Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2008 and 2011,
were 45 to 54 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is
available.
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Table I.2: DiD Results for 2006 Reform: Reduction of at least 3 months in PBD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Treatment-Effect -3.582∗∗∗ -0.094 -0.253 0.413 -0.041 -0.005
=Treated*After (0.884) (0.070) (0.494) (0.345) (0.062) (0.072)
Treated 4.254∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.142 -0.491 0.043 -0.013
(0.853) (0.063) (0.419) (0.320) (0.054) (0.064)
After -5.091∗∗∗ -0.087 -0.093 0.417 0.030 0.142∗
(0.605) (0.071) (0.517) (0.378) (0.062) (0.074)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.217 -0.068∗∗ -0.679∗∗ 0.007 0.072∗∗ 0.074∗
(0.294) (0.032) (0.289) (0.173) (0.034) (0.040)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.061 -0.023 -0.016 -0.082 -0.012 -0.019
(0.335) (0.037) (0.343) (0.213) (0.040) (0.045)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.179 -0.072∗ 0.150 0.592∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.039) (0.358) (0.169) (0.050) (0.058)
Industry Experience (in years) -0.001 0.001 0.034∗∗ 0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.112 0.003 -1.090∗∗∗ -0.358 0.064 0.102∗
(0.337) (0.039) (0.409) (0.218) (0.047) (0.053)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.253 0.042 -1.891∗∗∗ -0.572 -0.023 -0.057
(0.479) (0.060) (0.676) (0.437) (0.056) (0.057)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.157 0.072∗∗ -0.427 -0.285∗ -0.055 -0.083∗∗
(0.297) (0.032) (0.282) (0.169) (0.034) (0.038)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1291 1256 1039 851 1291 1272
R-sq. 0.231 0.068 0.098 0.094 0.132 0.133
Mean of dependent variable 145.637 0.35 10.074 11.271 0.271 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 231,293 0.605 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the DiD regression of our outcome variables
(ABD, motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on a decrease of PBD of around 6 months, before starting up (Section 1.4.2). We control for the founders’
education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the start-up) fixed effects, and dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal
Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35
to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table I.3: DiD Results for 2006 Reform: Reduction of at least 3 months in PBD focusing on the Non-Manufacturing Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
Treatment-Effect -3.997∗∗∗ -0.070 0.090 0.698∗ 0.041 0.087
=Treated*After (1.006) (0.078) (0.511) (0.415) (0.058) (0.071)
Treated 4.885∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ -0.231 -0.776∗∗ -0.033 -0.096
(0.971) (0.071) (0.427) (0.391) (0.048) (0.061)
After -5.004∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.302 0.442 0.063 0.159∗∗
(0.686) (0.082) (0.600) (0.450) (0.062) (0.074)
Tertiary degree (=1) -0.222 -0.084∗∗ -0.381 0.178 0.059 0.060
(0.337) (0.036) (0.295) (0.173) (0.036) (0.042)
Founder was SE before (=1) 0.203 0.002 0.073 -0.220 0.009 0.029
(0.356) (0.042) (0.354) (0.233) (0.045) (0.052)
Managerial Experience as Employee (=1) 0.226 -0.103∗∗ 0.002 0.412∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.043) (0.384) (0.190) (0.054) (0.062)
Industry Experience (in years) 0.006 0.001 0.019 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Female founder (=1) 0.290 0.001 -0.829∗∗ -0.525∗∗ 0.069 0.090
(0.384) (0.043) (0.421) (0.240) (0.052) (0.057)
Founder of non-German origin (=1) 0.255 -0.032 -1.920∗∗∗ -0.878∗ -0.079∗ -0.086∗
(0.517) (0.065) (0.721) (0.518) (0.047) (0.050)
SE Subsidy by Federal Employment Agency (=1) -0.142 0.074∗∗ -0.634∗∗ -0.266 -0.051 -0.064
(0.348) (0.037) (0.311) (0.201) (0.036) (0.041)
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1022 999 815 661 1022 1009
R-sq. 0.252 0.071 0.080 0.112 0.147 0.141
Mean of dependent variable 149.003 0.352 10.21 11.251 0.25 0.329
(abs. value for log-terms) 179,344 237,112 0.549 0.76
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table shows the DiD regression of our outcome variables (ABD,
motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on a decrease of PBD of around 6 months (Section 1.4.2), before starting up in the non-manufacturing sector
(75% of the sample). We control for the founders’ education, previous work experience, and individual characteristics. We include year and industry (of the start-up) fixed effects, and
dummies to control for subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency and for funding by the KfW (Appendix I.3.2). Our regression sample consists of non-team founders who
became unemployed between 2003 and 2011, were 35 to 65 years old when becoming unemployed, and for whom information on all control variables is available.
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Table I.4: OLS - ABD Controlled vs Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration (in months) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
N 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.063 0.026 0.122 0.028 0.126 0.049 0.150 0.023 0.158 0.034
Mean of dependent variable 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Table I.5: OLS - PBD Controlled vs Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD (in months) 0.471∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.045∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.004 -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
N 1291 1291 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.256 0.215 0.077 0.044 0.099 0.003 0.096 0.012 0.133 0.004 0.134 0.008
Mean of dependent variable 4.785 4.785 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. These tables show the OLS regression of our main outcome
variables (motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ benefit duration (both ABD and PBD) before starting up. We analyze to which extent
controls for founders’ education, previous work experience and individual characteristics affect results compared to the standard case without controls. The fact that there are no
remarkable differences shows that composition effects are limited.
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Table I.6: IV - ABD Controlled vs Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
UE Duration -5.815∗∗∗ -5.695∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.060 0.145 -0.118∗ -0.115∗ 0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.017
(in months) (0.921) (0.846) (0.010) (0.010) (0.095) (0.092) (0.063) (0.066) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
First-stage F-statistic 39.831 45.318 23.487 26.687 24.016 23.626 40.992 45.866 41.07 45.886
N 1256 1256 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.189 0.135 0.075 0.021 0.072 . 0.124 0.048 0.120 0.016 0.149 0.032
Mean of dependent variable 4.828 4.828 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Table I.7: IV - PBD Controlled vs Uncontrolled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBD UE Duration Necessity Motive Sales Year 1 Sales Year 2 FTE Employment FTE Employment
(in months) (in months) (=1) (log) (log) Year 1 (log) Year 2 (log)
PBD -8.743∗∗∗ -8.322∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.034 0.084∗ -0.072∗ -0.068∗ 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.012
(in months) (0.505) (0.459) (0.094) (0.094) (0.007) (0.006) (0.052) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
CONTROLS Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
First-stage F-statistic 299.421 328.397 286.66 319.312 223.603 242.271 220.761 219.543 299.421 328.397 296.11 325.42
N 1291 1291 1291 1291 1256 1256 1039 1039 851 851 1291 1291 1272 1272
R-sq. 0.470 0.434 0.234 0.194 0.083 0.049 0.094 . 0.094 0.011 0.130 0.004 0.134 0.009
Mean of dependent variable 12.324 12.324 4.785 4.785 0.35 0.35 10.074 10.074 11.271 11.271 0.271 0.271 0.361 0.361
(abs. value for log-terms) 173,661 173,661 231,293 231,293 0.605 0.605 0.847 0.847
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. These tables show the IV regression of our outcome variables
(motivation for starting up; sales/employment growth after year 1, 2) on the founders’ benefit duration (both ABD and PBD) before starting up that are instrumented by IV06
(Section 1.3.2). We analyze to which extent controls for founders’ education, previous work experience and individual characteristics affect results compared to the standard case
without controls. The fact that there are no remarkable differences shows that composition effects are limited.
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I.2 Appendix: Technical Details of Data Construction
The IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel is a random sample drawn from the “universe” of the Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (“MUP”). The Mannheim Entreprise Panel is collected by Creditreform (Ger-
many’s largest credit rating agency) and processed by ZEW. It covers basic information (addresses,
phone numbers, industry, incorporation status, survival) about all “economically active” firms in
Germany. This is guaranteed by automated synchronization with official commercial registers,
automated synchronization with Chambers of Industry and Commerce (IHKs), active search for
new firms by local Creditreform offices as well as by the fact that Creditreform usually receives
a request for conducting a credit rating when new firms enter the market or require initially
investments for starting their business.
Only independent new firms are sampled for the Start-Up Panel survey, which means that
all start-ups are included but with a few exceptions: no subsidiaries, no new establishments of
established firms, and no firm is included due to a business succession (also in case of insolvency).
Instead, joint ventures and franchise are allowed and included. Moreover, a maximum of 75% of
the firm may be held by other firms. In conclusion, the interviewee entering into the Start-Up
Panel is financially engaged in the firm and usually the single founder or one member of a team
of founder(s). The Start-Up Panel is a stratified random sample. The stratification is based on
a variable indicating KfW-funding (until 2011), the founding year and the industry sector. The
detailed first interview is supposed to take place within one year after the firm has been started.
Only a small proportion of firms is first sampled up to three years after foundation to balance
small stratification cells (they can be excluded). Shorter follow-up surveys are then conducted
in the subsequent years. Each start-up stays in the sample for up to 7 interviews or until they
drop out by missing two subsequent interviews. All information is retrieved by computer-assisted
telephone interviews. By 2018, survey waves on cohorts 2005-2015 include 68,500 observations
from 52,000 interviews on 21,200 firms.
The employment statistics contain information on all reportable employees subject to social
security contributions in Germany. This includes apprentices, interns, and people in marginal part-
time employment. All notifications on an individual’s spells of employment and unemployment
can be linked with the aid of a unique person-specific identifier, thereby revealing an employment
history for each employee. A further identifier makes it possible to match the employees to
establishments. However, there is no unique identifier to match establishments to firms.
Therefore, we matched establishments to firms in the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel using a
text search algorithm via firm/establishment names and addresses. The text search algorithm
is described in detail in Appendix B of Czarnitzki et al. (2015) and has proved to deliver very
reliable results in various settings. In the matching procedure we were able to find about 90% of
the firms in the IAB/ZEW Start-Up Panel that reported having employees in the yearly telephone
surveys. We removed firms from the sample which reported that they had reportable employees
but which we were unable to find during the matching procedure. In addition, to safeguard against
false matches, all matches were double-checked manually and we excluded the matches in the
1st and 100th percentile of the difference between self-reported and process-generated firm sizes
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from the sample. The correlation coefficient between self-reported and process-generated firm
sizes in the final firm-year panel dataset is slightly above 0.95.
I.3 Appendix: Institutional Details
I.3.1 Labour Market Reforms in Germany
In this first chapter of my dissertation, we exploit parts of the big labor market reforms enacted
between 2003 and 2005 that are known as Hartz-Reforms (compare e.g. Hartung et al. (2018),
Petrunyk & Pfeifer (2018) or Price (2019) evaluating theses reforms).
• In 2003 the first two parts of this labour market reform were passed: the first measure
(Hartz I) liberalized the sector of temporary work, thus allowing firms to hire workers from
temp agencies for short-term periods. The second measure package (Hartz II) reduced the
regulations on marginal employment and introduced an additional form of social security
tax-favored employment (midi-jobs). Moreover, it created new subsidies for unemployed
workers starting their own business (Ich-AG). But this program ended in 2006 and was
replaced by the new startup subsidy scheme (Gründungszuschuss, see Appendix I.3.2).
• In 2004, the third reform package (Hartz III) renewed the structure and role of the federal
employment agency. Most important, the original placement agencies (Arbeitsämter) and
social security offices (Sozialämter) were merged into single institutions (Arbeitsagenturen).
Moreover, additional job centers were set up in each municipality. Finally, case managers
were introduced to have one person in charge of assisting unemployed workers over the
entire job search process.
• In 2005, the last reform package (Hartz IV) transformed the three-tier system of unemploy-
ment benefits, unemployment assistance, and subsistence benefits into a two-tier system of
unemployment benefits and subsistence benefits.
– Concerning the benefit level, the reform involved abolishing unemployment assis-
tance benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe). The unemployment assistance depended on some
previous work history and could be received for several years after unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits expired. The net replacement rates were at 53% for a single
person and could reach 57% for persons with dependent children. Instead, those who
were not eligible for unemployment assistance could still get a minimum subsistence
benefit (Sozialhilfe) that included rent payments but was not linked to previous wages.
The reform of 2005 removed wage-dependent benefits for long-term unemployed, and
merged unemployment assistance and subsistence benefit to create a new minimum
benefit scheme (Arbeitslosengeld II) that is independent of previous wages and only
intended to provide recipients with minimum benefits necessary to survive and subject
to a tight means testing procedure. Instead, the unemployment insurance (UI) benefits
(Arbeitslosengeld I) remained unchanged at a net replacement rate of 60% for single
persons and 67% for those with dependent children. Note that we only focus on
individuals who enter unemployment and receive UI benefits, thus, they were not
affected by these benefit level changes targeted to those having exhausted UI benefits.
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– Moreover, this package involved changing the duration of unemployment benefits
(Table 1.6). The changes came only in effect for individuals claiming for UI benefits
after February 1, 2006. In our identification strategy, we exploit this reform along
with the 2008 one that partially increased the duration eligibility for older employees
again (Lichter 2016). Focusing on 30-60 years old, there is no potential interference
with early retirement rules affecting only workers above 60 (ie. 63 since 2004).
I.3.2 Startup Subsidies
This Section provides an overview of startup subsidies in Germany. The important thing to note is
that all the startup subsidies schemes were and are not dependent on the age of claimants and did
not change exactly at the same point in time as the reforms on potential unemployment insurance
(UI) benefit duration (PBD). Thus, they do not threaten the identification strategy as explained in
Section 1.3.
1. Bridging Allowance (BA) - “Überbrückungsgeld” (1986-07/2006)
• Eligibility: it covered individuals who were eligible for unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits, and presented an externally approved business plan (issued by the regional
chamber of commerce). It was not possible to quit a job and directly apply for this
bridging allowance.
• Amount: financial support was based on unemployment insurance (UI) benefits plus
social security contributions and it could be provided for up to six months.
• Until 2002, individuals had to stay unemployed for a minimum of one month to apply
for BA. From 2002, one could apply for BA from the first unemployment day onward.
2. Existenzgründerzuschuss (Ich-AG) (startup subsidies (SUS)) (01/2003-06/2006)
• Eligibility: it covered individuals who were eligible for unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits, but also those with means-tested social assistance or limited labor market
experience (hence it was open to more people than BA).
• Amount: it involved a monthly lump-sum payment for up to three years with 600
Euro per month in the first year, 360 Euro per month in the second year, 240 Euro
per month in the third year. In contrast to BA, these startup subsidies were approved
yearly if self-employment income did not exceed 25,000 Euro per year.
• There was no need of business plans for approval, but parallel receipts of BA and
SUS were excluded.
3. New SUS: new startup subsidy program (“Gründungszuschuss”) (08/2006-12/2011)
• Eligibility: it covered individuals that were unemployed for at least one day, eligible
to receive unemployment insurance (UI) (Arbeitslosengeld I) and that still had at
least 90 days of potential UI benefit duration left when making the transition from
unemployment to self-employment. Thus, it was not possible to get this startup
subsidy when an unemployed worker just exhausted her UI benefits.
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• Amount: it involved UI benefits plus 300 Euro (for social security contributions) for
nine months. It was possible to get an extension of six months by proving that the
business is economically active. The amount of startup subsidies after the first nine
months was reduced to just 300 Euro for the remaining six months. In total the startup
subsidies could be taken for a maximum of 15 months.
• The first period of SUS could be legally claimed by all persons who fulfilled the legal
eligibility requirements. The second period was entirely subject to an assessment.
• In case of returning from self-employment to unemployment, the potential benefit
duration (PBD) would be reduced by the number of months the person received SUS
up to a minimum of zero PBD months.
4. New SUS adjusted: startup subsidy program (“Gründungszuschuss”) adjusted (01/2012-
today)
• Eligibility: it covers individuals that are unemployed for at least one day, eligible
to receive unemployment insurance (UI) (Arbeitslosengeld I) and that still have at
least 150 days (instead of previously 90 days) of potential UI benefit duration left
when making the transition from unemployment to self-employment. Thus, it is not
possible to get this star-up subsidy when an unemployed worker just exhausts her UI
benefits.
• Amount: it involves unemployment insurance benefits plus 300 Euro (for social
security contributions) for six (instead of previously nine) months. It is possible
to get an extension of nine (instead of six) months by proving that the business is
economically active. The amount of startup subsidies after the first nine months is
reduced to just 300 Euro for the remaining six months. In total, the startup subsidies
can be taken for a maximum of 15 months.
• The assessment for receiving startup subsidies has been extended to the first period.
The previous legal right to claim this subsidy has been abolished by December 2011
and is now a subsidy that is available upon assessment of the caseworker at the federal
employment agency.
• Background: as part of public spending cuts, the intention was to reduce money
allocated for such active labor market policies.
It should be noted that we control for any funding provided by the federal employment agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) in our regression. Thus, we control for these startup subsidies targeted
at founders starting a business out of unemployment.
Moreover, it should be noted that in all regression models, we control for KfW-funding, ie.
funding of startups by subsidized credits from the German government-owned development bank,
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) (Reconstuction Credit Institute) that was formed in 1948 to
fund the reconstruction of Germany after World War II. The funding via the KfW is an important
channel through which startups in Germany are financed.
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I.4 Appendix: Model Extension - Derivations and Details
I.4.1 Unemployment Duration on the Value of Searching for Employment
Starting from the modeling framework as discussed in Section 1.5.1 with the value function of an
unemployed individual searching for employment (Equation (1.8)), we have:
V eu,t = bt −ψt(st)+
β
{
pt [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
V et+1(wt+1)dF(wt+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(13)
This value function is increasing in the next period’s wage wt+1, such that the reservation
wage plays an important role in the optimal search behavior. Every wage that is larger than the
reservation wage, i.e wt+1 ≥ φt , will be accepted. Therefore, we can write Equation (13) in terms
of the following Bellman equation as:
V eu,t = bt −ψt(st)+β
{
V ut+1+ pt [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
V et+1(wt+1)−V ut+1
]
dF(wt+1)
}
(14)
As mentioned in Section 1.5.1, pt = p(st ,θ). The case of leaving unemployment to employ-
ment is dependent on the search intensity and an unemployed individual’s skill. Holding the
level of ability θ fix, pt is directly dependent on the search intensity st , and can be substituted
accordingly. Further, defining the discount factor β as 11+ρ , with ρ being the discount rate (see
Schmieder & von Wachter 2016), one can rewrite Equation (14) to:
V eu,t = bt −ψt(st)+
1
1+ρ
{
V ut+1+ st [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
V et+1(wt+1)−V ut+1
]
dF(wt+1)
}
(15)
Assuming that the value of unemployment is in equilibrium equal to the discounted reservation
wage, we define V ut+1 =
1
ρ φt . Analogously, the value of leaving unemployment in the next period
depends on the present value of the reservation wage V eu,t+1 =
1
ρ φt , or in this case V
e
u,t =
1
ρ φt−1.
Note that the individual is indifferent between leaving unemployment or staying unemployed
at the exact level of the reservation wage when V eu,t+1 =V
u
t+1. Knowing the reservation wage φt
and the optimal search intensity st in period t will enable us to detect the reservation wage in
period t−1. Therefore, plugging in V ut+1 = 1ρ φt , V ut = 1ρ φt−1 into Equation (15), we get:
1
ρ
φt−1 = bt−1−ψt(st)+ 11+ρ
{ 1
ρ
φt + st [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
V et+1(wt+1)−
1
ρ
φt
]
dF(wt+1)
}
(16)
Multiplying Equation (16) by ρ(1+ρ), we get:
(1+ρ)φt−1 =(1+ρ)ρ(bt−1−ψt(st))+φt+st [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
ρV et+1(wt+1)−φt
]
dF(wt+1) (17)
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To find the optimal reservation wage, we need to derive the first-order conditions. With
the optimal reservation wage implying indifference between the value functions for searching
employment and for remaining unemployed (when V eu,t+1 =V
u
t+1), we can further solve for the
optimal search intensity (taking the derivative of Equation (17) for st at the reservation wage
φt−1):
(1+ρ)ρψ ′t (st−1)− [1−F(φt−1)]
∞∫
φt−1
[ρV et (wt)−φt−1]dF(wt) = 0 (18)
As mentioned in the main text, an unemployed individual receives a constant benefit bt for a
duration d. When t ≥ d = PBD, the benefit drops to a lower and constant level. This illustrates
the importance of duration d. Since the reservation wage and the optimal search intensity are
two choice variables that directly influence the value for employment, we are interested in their
behavior over the unemployment duration spell d.
Exploiting the fact V ut+1 =
1
ρ φt , the first order condition for the optimal reservation path is
given by:
∂φt
∂d
=
∂V ut+1
∂d
ρ (19)
Taking the total derivative of Equation (18) with respect to d, we get for the optimal search
intensity path at period t:
∂ st
∂d
=−∂φt
∂d
[1−F(φt)]2+ f (φt)
∫ ∞
φt [ρV
e
t (wt)−φt ]dF(wt)
(1+ρ)ρψ ′′t (st)
(20)
If there exists at least the slightest chance someone cannot find a job by the time unemployment
benefits expire i.e t = d = PBD, then a longer benefit duration in general increases the value for
unemployment i.e δV
u
t+1
δd > 0. Equation (19) and Equation (20) show that a longer d will lead to a
higher reservation wage φt and a lower search intensity st .
This means that given the hazard of leaving unemployment is given as ht = st(1−F(φt)),
an extension of PBD would lower the probability of leaving unemployment in that period,
thus increasing actual unemployment duration (compare also Schmieder & von Wachter 2016).
Moreover, this implies that the effect of unemployment duration on the value of searching for
employment should be negative
∂V eut
∂d
|θ < 0 (21)
In other words, this model implies negative duration dependence which leads to the implications
as described in the main text in Section 1.5.
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I.4.2 Effect of Unemployment Duration on the Value of Self-Employment
Starting from the modeling framework as discussed in Section 1.5.1 with the value function of an
unemployed individual searching for employment (Equation (1.10)), we have:
V seu,t = bt −ψset (st ,θ)+
β
{
pt [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
V set+1(pit+1)dF(pit+1)+ [ptF(φt)+(1− pt)]V ut+1
}
(22)
Giving the same importance to the reservation wage and using the same definition for β as in the
case before, holding θ fixed we can rewrite the above equation in terms of the following Bellman
equation as:
V seu,t = bt −ψset (st)+β
{
V ut+1+ p
se
t [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
V set+1(pit+1)−V ut+1
]
dF(pit+1)
}
(23)
This value function is again increasing in the next period’s profits as income when being
self-employed pit+1. Every potential profit as self-employed that is larger than the reservation
wage, i.e pit+1 ≥ φt , will be accepted. Note that the search costs have a different interpretation in
this case. ψse reflects costs related to developing a startup idea, doing the required research on it
or finding capital. Furthermore, defining the discount factor β as 11+ρ , with ρ being the discount
rate, one can rewrite Equation (23) to:
V seu,t = bt −ψset (st)+
1
1+ρ
{
V ut+1+ p
se
t [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
V set+1(pit+1)−V ut+1
]
dF(pit+1)
}
(24)
For the case of moving from unemployment to self-employment, we define V seu,t+1 =
1−γ(θ¯)
ρ φt :
i.e it depends also on the probability of startup success (survival), here for the average type at θ¯ .
Note, that the individual is indifferent between leaving unemployment or staying unemployed at
the exact level of the reservation wage when V seu,t+1 =V
u
t+1. Knowing the reservation wage φt and
the optimal search intensity st in period t will enable us to detect the reservation wage in period
t−1. Plugging in V ut+1 = 1−γ(θ¯)ρ φt , V ut = 1−γ(θ¯)ρ φt−1 into Equation (24), we get:
1− γ(θ¯)
ρ
φt−1 = bt−1−ψset (st)
+
1
1+ρ
{1− γ(θ¯)
ρ
φt + sset [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
V set+1(pit+1)−
1− γ(θ¯)
ρ
φt
]
dF(pit+1)
}
(25)
After some rearranging we get:
[1− γ(θ¯)](1+ρ)φt−1 = (1+ρ)ρ(bt−1−ψset (st))
+(1− γ(θ¯))φt + sset [1−F(φt)]
∞∫
φt
[
ρV set (pit+1)− (1− γ(θ¯))φt
]
dF(pit+1) (26)
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To find the optimal reservation wage, we again need to derive the first-order conditions. With
the optimal reservation wage implying indifference between the value functions for becoming
self-employed and for remaining unemployed (when V seu,t+1 =V
u
t+1), we can further solve for the
optimal search intensity (taking the derivative of Equation (26) for st at the reservation wage
φt−1):
(1+ρ)ρψse′t−1(st−1)− [1−F(φt−1)]
∞∫
φt−1
[
ρV set (pit)− (1− γ(θ¯))φt−1
]
dF(pit) = 0 (27)
As mentioned in the main text, an unemployed individual receives a constant benefit bt for a
duration d. When t ≥ d = PBD, the benefit drops to a lower and constant level. This illustrates
the importance of duration d. Since the reservation wage and the optimal search intensity are
two choice variables that directly influence the value for employment, we are interested in their
behavior over the unemployment duration spell d.
Exploiting the fact V ut+1 =
(1−γ(θ¯))
ρ φt , the first order condition for the optimal reservation
path is given by:
∂φt
∂d
=
∂V ut+1
∂d
ρ
(1− γ(θ¯)) (28)
Taking the total derivative of Equation (27) with respect to d, we get for the optimal search
intensity path:
∂ st
∂d
=−∂φt
∂d
[1−F(φt)]2+ f (φt)
∫ ∞
φt
[
ρV set (pit)− (1− γ(θ¯))φt
]
dF(pit)
(1+ρ)ρψ ′′t (st)
(29)
Again when unemployment benefit duration increases and there is chance of not finding
a job when benefits expire, we expect that ∂V
u
t+1
∂d > 0. With ρ being the discount rate taking
values < 1 and [1− γ(θ¯)] being the probability of startup success that is higher than ρ , the whole
fraction is ρ
(1−γ(θ¯)) < 1. The denominator becomes larger the higher an individual’s ability θ .
Equation (28) and Equation (29) show that searching market opportunities for self employment
exhibits a smaller unemployment duration dependence of the reservation wage path ( ∂φt∂d ) and also
a less negative duration dependence of the search intensity path ( ∂ st∂d ).
This implies that given Equation (22) the effect of unemployment duration on the value
of searching for self-employment should be negative but less than in the case of searching for
employment (compare Equation (21))
∂V eut
∂d
|θ < ∂V
se
ut
∂d
|θ < 0 (30)
In other words, this model implies negative duration dependence when searching for self-
employment out of unemployment, however, it is less negative than the duration dependence
when searching for employment. This leads to the implications as described in the main text in
Section 1.5. Thus, ∂V
se
ut
∂d is larger than in the case of searching for employment, i.e. there is a
higher UI duration elasticity - which is in line with our empirical results in Section 1.4.
Chapter 2
Unemployment Benefits and the Transition into
Self-Employment
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2.1 Introduction
Reducing unemployment is a common public policy goal which becomes especially
important during a period of economic crisis. For this reason, unemployment insurance
(UI) policies aim to provide a social safety net while limiting moral hazard to promote re-
employment and reduce time in unemployment. In this context, most studies analyze how
the generosity of UI systems in terms of potential benefit duration (PBD) and replacement
rates (i.e. benefit levels) affects re-employment outcomes (Solon 1985, Katz & Meyer
1990b, Card & Levine 2000, Kolsrud et al. 2018, etc.). However, this focus neglects
another typical channel of leaving unemployment: the transitions into self-employment
(SE). This post-unemployment outcome which accounts for 10-15% of the labor force in
the member countries of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)1 is economically relevant since one quarter of all new firms is started out of
unemployment each year.2 Therefore, given the potential of successful startups to sus-
tainably create additional employment or boost innovation, and because self-employment
is a typical trajectory for individuals to exit unemployment, it is important to understand
the role of UI benefits on the transition from unemployment to self-employment. This is
necessary to complete the analysis of how the design of unemployment benefits affects
all relevant post-unemployment outcomes (and not only dependent employment), and
thus may lead to more efficient unemployment policies.
The second chapter of my doctoral thesis aims to shed light on this issue by analyzing
how UI benefit levels affect the probability of unemployed individuals to become self-
employed, as well as their actual unemployment duration before transitioning to self-
employment in comparison to the case of re-employment.3 Exploiting reform-driven
exogenous variation in UI benefit levels, we are among the first to estimate the causal
effect of UI benefits (holding PBD fixed) on total employment, and decompose the overall
effect into the causal effects on transitions from unemployment to self-employment and to
re-employment. Since most other studies investigate increases in UI generosity, our focus
on analyzing a reduction in UI benefit levels is also novel within this field of research.
To answer the research questions mentioned above, we focus on the Spanish UI
system and use comprehensive social insurance data linked with income tax data from
the Continuous Working Life Sample (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales) (MCVL).
In particular, we prepare the administrative data to include so far inaccessible information
on self-employment because this is necessary to analyze our variables of interest.
1Spain is particularly interesting because its self-employment rate is among the highest in the European Union
(EU). Spain’s self-employment rate has been between 16.4% and 17.9% within the last decade (OECD 2018).
2In Spain, around 30-50% of founders between 2005 to 2017 have been unemployed before starting their firms.
3Concerning the notation in this chapter: with self-employment, we refer to the labor market status to distinguish
unemployment, employment and self-employment. Within the labor market status of self-employment, the term founder
refers to the person starting a firm which covers both firms with and without employees. The term entrepreneur is used
to focus on a founder who continues to run a firm after having started it. The term startup refers to the act of starting a
firm and is used as a synonym for new firm.
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First, we document the evolution of all relevant labor market status flows over the busi-
ness cycle (2005-2017) in Spain, and analyze the relevance of flows from unemployment
into self-employment. Second, our causal analysis focuses on the direct link between
the reduction of UI benefits and the probability to become self-employed (compared to
becoming re-employed) in a setting where the PBD schedule of the UI system remained
fixed. In 2012, the Spanish government implemented a labor market reform which led
to a sharp change in UI benefits: it decreased UI benefit levels by 10 percentage points
(from a replacement rate of 60% to one of 50%) for all eligible individuals with a PBD
surpassing six months. This quasi-experimental set-up allows us to exploit exogenous
variation in our explanatory variable of interest, the UI benefit level, in order to estimate
the causal effect of a reduction of UI benefits on the probability to become either self-
employed or re-employed as dependent employee. In this context, we decompose the total
reform effect on the average actual unemployment duration into the effect on individuals
who become either self-employed or re-employed, and we calculate distinct UI benefit
level duration elasticities. We apply both a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach
and a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to estimate our causal effects. The DiD
estimation allows us to study not only the average treatment effect, but also the dynamic
reform effects on treated relative to untreated individuals over the unemployment spell.
This enables us to analyze the behavioral responses to UI benefits with respect to both job
search and startup efforts. The RDD approach, which relies on the time interval between
the UI entry date and the sharp reform cutoff date, confirms the internal validity of our
identification strategy: it shows that manipulation around the cutoff date is not an issue
because the reform could not be anticipated due to its unexpected implementation.
Regarding the causal effects of the reform, we find that in response to the cut in UI
benefit levels the self-employment probability is estimated to be rather unaffected in
the short run. In the medium and long run, this effect tends to become negative. On
the contrary, the probability of finding a job is rather positively affected in the short
run while flattening out in the medium and long run. The total employment effect is
thus rather slightly positive in the short run, but attenuates towards zero after two years.
These results clearly show a behavioral response of the affected individuals. In response
to the reform, treated unemployed individuals increase their search intensity to find
employment before UI benefits drop after six months. This explains the increase in the
short-run employment probability and its decline after the first six months. Instead, when
we consider self-employment as an additional exit channel out of unemployment, this
response seems to be much smaller. In relative terms, the self-employment probability
declines compared to the job-finding probability.
We estimate that the UI benefit duration elasticity is around 0.4 (in the DiD setting)
and 0.5-0.66 (in the RDD setting) for those becoming re-employed, which is slightly
higher compared to findings in other studies of the literature. Interestingly, we find the UI
benefit duration elasticity to be smaller (around 0.26-0.33 in the DiD setting and 0.11-0.38
in the RDD setting) for those transitioning from unemployment to self-employment.
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Thus, UI benefit levels affect the actual unemployment duration of unemployed
individuals no matter whether they become re-employed or self-employed. However,
the effect is stronger for re-employment than self-employment, i.e. reducing UI benefit
levels reduces actual UI duration more for those transitioning into employment than
those becoming self-employed. On the macro level, our results suggest that the cut in
UI benefit levels shifts the transition from unemployment towards employment rather
than self-employment. Finally, our descriptive analysis illustrates that in response to the
reform new firms are predominantly created in the service sector, whereas the share of
startups in the industry and construction sector declines. This indicates that in addition
to the effects on the extensive margin, the quality of self-employment may be affected.
Less generous UI benefits may not only decrease transitions from unemployment to
self-employment, but also increase the share of necessity-driven entrepreneurship among
previously unemployed founders. Therefore, we try to disentangle the causal reform
effect on different measures of self-employment quality to obtain evidence for the
potential welfare effect. However, as both of our quasi-experimental models produce
only insignificant results, we cannot confirm the causal nature of the welfare effects.
Thus, more research is needed to assess the potential welfare implications of UI benefits
on self-employment.
This chapter of my dissertation relates to three strands of the literature, and makes
three contributions. First, we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by provid-
ing evidence on the role of UI benefits for entrepreneurship (Evans & Leighton 1989a,
Levine & Rubinstein 2017, etc.). Using administrative data from social insurance and
tax authorities in Spain, we enable analyzing the unemployment exit channel into en-
trepreneurship over time (and business cycle), and show that inflows into self-employment
from unemployment can account for up to 50% of all new businesses (in times of crisis).
Second, this project adds to the literature in public economics on the optimal design of
unemployment insurance; especially, by providing evidence for the effect of UI benefits
on the transitions into re-employment and self-employment. The public economics
literature has discussed several aspects concerning the optimal design of unemployment
insurance policies, i.e. the level of benefits and their eligible duration (Schmieder et al.
2012, 2016, Kolsrud et al. 2018, etc.). Its focus has been on investigating effects on
subsequent employment outcomes, predominantly re-employment wages (Schmieder
et al. 2016, Nekoei & Weber 2017). Results suggest that increases in UI benefit levels
lead to increases in actual unemployment duration. However, the effects of longer actual
unemployment on re-employment wages are disputed. For instance, Nekoei & Weber
(2017) argue that longer PBD can either induce delay in job acceptance and simply
subsidize leisure, or improve job opportunities through promoting a longer search that
results in job matches of higher quality. While Nekoei & Weber (2017) find that the latter
positive effect dominates in Austria, Schmieder et al. (2016) report negative effects of
unemployment durations on re-employment wages in Germany. We contribute to the
debate by providing first evidence on the causal effect of cutting unemployment benefit
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levels on self-employment. Thus, this chapter complements the analysis of UI benefits
regarding post-unemployment outcomes (Jäger et al. 2019). We show that UI benefits
generate a fiscal externality (Lawson 2017) through the transition from unemployment to
self-employment. This should be taken into account for the optimal design of UI systems.
Third, we contribute to the literature on (un)intended consequences of economic
crisis politics. In fact, the labor market reform that we analyze was one of the policies
to deal with the Spanish crisis and was supposed to reduce unemployment under the
pressure of fiscal consolidation. Thus, we contribute to the literature on extending UI
generosity during times of crisis which has mostly focused on the US (e.g. Farber et al.
2015, Card et al. 2015) because we provide evidence on how the non-standard response
of cutting UI benefits in a crisis period affects both re-employment and self-employment.
Therefore, we also contribute to the limited literature on reducing UI generosity instead
of increasing it. For instance, Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020) or Doris et al.
(2018) find that cuts in UI benefits can increase the job-finding rate. Instead, we are the
first to investigate the effect of a cut in UI benefits on the self-employment (start-up)
rate. Moreover, this chapter relates to the work of Hombert et al. (2020) who exploit a
French reform in 2002 which lowered the downside risk to start a business. They find
that more self-employment is created when more social security is provided. In contrast,
our contribution is to analyze the causal effect of providing less security (less UI benefits)
on self-employment (instead of employment), and on the UI benefit duration elasticity.
The case of Spain is especially interesting as its external validity is higher compared
with inference from other European countries with good data access on self-employed
individuals (e.g. Scandinavian countries whose labor markets are smaller). Our research
questions appear to be of high relevance in times of high unemployment rates (as in
Spain and other European countries during the 2010s).4 Moreover, we can learn about
the general bias created in studies which focus only on employment and give insights on
the full picture of inflows into self-employment.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides the theoretical background
in relation to the literature and discusses potential determinants of the self-employment
probability. Section 2.3 illustrates the data used and presents a descriptive analysis of
the Spanish labor market and all labor market flows over time (2005-2017). Section 2.4
describes the institutional setting of the unemployment benefit system in Spain, as well
as the investigated labor market reform on which our identification strategy relies. In
Section 2.5, we explain our estimation methodology and its underlying assumptions.
Section 2.6 presents results, while Section 2.7 discusses their interpretation (with respect
to the theory) and potential policy implications (welfare). Section 2.8 concludes.
4Current active labor market policies in Europe increasingly subsidize unemployed individuals to start their own
businesses. Especially in Spain, such policies have been used to address the high (youth) unemployment rates after the
economic crisis of 2007/2008. For instance, in 2013 the Spanish government launched the Strategy of Entrepreneurship
and Youth Employment 2013-2016. This program aimed at promoting self-employment among the unemployed youth
through reductions in social security contributions (González Menéndez & Cueto 2015).
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2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Literature Review
The labor market literature has already extensively discussed the implications of changes
in UI generosity on the probability of leaving unemployment in favor of employment
(see Atkinson & Micklewright 1991, for a critical literature review). However, there is a
lack of literature which deals with the link between UI generosity and self-employment.
This research field is related to two strands of literature: Standard Search Theory and the
Entrepreneurial Choice Model.
Standard Search Theory. Mortensen (1977) provides a general framework to investigate
the relationship between UI generosity and the probability of leaving unemployment.
A representative individual maximizes the present value of lifetime utility based on the
expected income5 from her labor market status and leisure. The probability of leaving the
UI benefit spell depends, on the one hand, positively on the worker’s search intensity6,
and on the other hand, negatively on her reservation wage. If either the UI benefit level
or the entitlement period is increased, the opportunity cost of searching will rise as well,
thus creating disincentives to find employment quickly (Schmieder et al. 2016). Hence,
both an increase in the UI benefit level and in the UI potential benefit duration lead
to a lower probability of leaving unemployment. Conversely, unemployed individuals
ineligible to benefits will experience an entitlement effect. Their expected future utility
from UI benefits will increase, which gives them an incentive to work so that they
become qualified for future UI benefits. As a consequence, their probability of leaving
unemployment increases (Mortensen 1977).
In the case of Spain, Bover et al. (2002) use exogenous variation in the receipt of UI
benefits in order to disentangle the effect of benefits on unemployment duration for male
workers. They exploit a labor market reform in 1984 which generated a new worker type
who was ineligible for any UI benefits. The authors find that if unemployed individuals
receive benefits, their hazard of leaving unemployment will significantly decline, which
is in line with Standard Search Theory.
According to Reize (2000) Standard Search Theory offers a framework to investigate
the search behavior of unemployed individuals and their decision to leave unemployment,
regardless of the destined labor market status. However, most authors use this theory
to analyze the transition into re-employment. For instance, Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-
Planas (2020) consider a Spanish labor market reform in 2012 which decreased the UI
benefit amount after the first six months of the UI benefit period. Supporting the findings
of Bover et al. (2002), they find that the benefit reduction shortens the mean expected
5Income equals earnings if the individual is (self-)employed and it equals the unemployment benefit amount if the
individual receives UI benefits.
6A higher search intensity will increase the likelihood of receiving a job offer and, thus, increase the probability of
leaving the UI benefit spell (Mortensen 1977).
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unemployment duration by 14%. Additionally, the authors show that the benefit reduction
increased the employment probability of unemployed individuals by 41% compared to
workers unaffected by the reform, using both a DiD approach and a RDD. The authors
also investigate potential responses in the job search behavior to the reform. They find
most of the reform effect is captured by individuals adapting their search behavior before
the UI benefit level is actually reduced after six month (Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas
2020). Our analysis is based on exploiting the same reform, but with regards to analyzing
the transition into self-employment and taking into account longer-term responses (up
till 2017, and not only until 2014).
Entrepreneurial Choice Model. This theoretical framework originated from the find-
ings of Lucas (1978), Kihlstrom & Laffont (1979), and Evans & Jovanovic (1989).
Individuals compare their expected returns from employment and self-employment, and
choose the status with the larger expected net income. The basic models focus on certain
aspects of the entrepreneurial choice problem but they do not take into account the broad
range of possible determinants for starting up, such as being unemployment.
Firstly, Lucas (1978) focuses on entrepreneurial skills.7 He finds that if an indi-
vidual’s entrepreneurial skill exceeds a certain threshold, he or she will become an
entrepreneur, whereas individuals with an entrepreneurial ability below this threshold
will switch into employment. Secondly, Kihlstrom & Laffont (1979) consider the im-
pact of an individual’s risk attitude on the entrepreneurial choice.8 They show that in
equilibrium, less risk averse individuals choose to become self-employed, whereas risk
averse individuals choose employment. Lastly, Evans & Jovanovic (1989) were the first
to account for two potential determinants in a model of entrepreneurial choice: capital
constraints and entrepreneurial skills.9 According to the authors, individuals with a lack
in entrepreneurial skills will not select into self-employment. Individuals whose skills
are large enough will become self-employed and invest into their businesses according to
their liquidity constraints.10 Evans & Jovanovic (1989) conclude that without liquidity
constraints, more people would enter self-employment and invest more efficiently.
Regarding Spain, Alba-Ramirez (1994) expanded the Entrepreneurial Choice Model
and included unemployment. According to the author, the self-employment probability
decreases with the increase of UI benefit spell duration. He argues that job search is
costly because human capital deteriorates during the state of unemployment. Therefore,
the longer the spell continues, the more an individual’s reservation wage decreases, which
would also lower the expected utility from employment. Additionally, the author states
7Liquidity constraints are ignored and all individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have the same
employment skills (Lucas 1978).
8Entrepreneurial ability and wealth are assumed to be equal across individuals (Kihlstrom & Laffont 1979).
9Risk preferences are ignored (Evans & Jovanovic 1989).
10One group has enough entrepreneurial skills but is liquidity constrained, as they have not enough initial assets
and, thus, their access to capital is constrained. These entrepreneurs will invest an inefficiently low amount of money.
Another group has enough entrepreneurial skills and is unconstrained because they have access to enough initial assets
(Evans & Jovanovic 1989).
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that job search takes place in a learning environment. The longer the UI spell duration,
the more the individual will learn about his or her market opportunities. Caused by this
learning environment, entrepreneurial ability increases and self-employment prospects
improve. Consequently, the self-employment probability rises. If the expected income
from self-employment exceeds the expected income from employment, the individual
stops searching for employment and instead focuses on starting a business. Alba-Ramirez
(1994) estimates the determinants of the self-employment probability in a sample of
previously employed workers and UI recipients. Given the individual was a former UI
recipient, the author finds that the probability for self-employment significantly increases
with longer UI spell duration. Unfortunately, his estimates may suffer from selection bias
as individuals who remain UI benefit recipients are not taken into account.
2.2.2 Hypotheses
The Spanish labor market reform in 2012 decreased the level of UI benefits received
after the first six months of the benefit spell. Based on the previous literature review,
different hypotheses can be derived about the effect of a reduction in UI benefits on the
self-employment probability.
Standard Search Theory Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the drop in UI
benefit levels may lead to an increase in the self-employment probability, already at the
beginning of the UI benefit spell. In particular, if the UI benefit level is decreased after
six months, this will lower the reservation wage and opportunity costs of searching will
decline. Since individuals could anticipate the impending drop in the UI benefit level, the
search intensity for job or market opportunities will increase already at the beginning
of the UI benefit spell. Consequently, the probability of leaving unemployment would
increase and, thus, unemployment duration would become shorter.
It must be noted that this effect is mostly attributed to a rise in the employment
probability (see e.g. Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas 2020). However, according to
Reize (2000), the destination state does not necessarily correspond to employment. The
self-employment probability could rise as well. If self-employment mostly depends
on ability rather than search efforts for market opportunities and the relative value of
employment declines as the reservation wage decreases, we could also investigate whether
the UI benefit cut may lead to more opportunity-driven entrepreneurs. This is not clear
ex-ante and needs to be empirically analyzed.
In line with Standard Search Theory, one could also think of a different scenario.
As the reservation wage for employment decreases and potential employees become
cheaper, this could lead to an increase in vacancies in the general equilibrium. In this
situation we would expect a higher job-finding rate, whereas self-employment may be
rather unaffected (or in relative terms less likely to occur). It is unclear whether this
could affect the quality of self-employment, i.e. whether the cut in benefits leads to more
or less necessity entrepreneurship.
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Entrepreneurial Choice Model Hypothesis. Regarding the extended version of the
Entrepreneurial Choice Model in the spirit of Alba-Ramirez (1994), the decrease in
benefits shortens actual UI duration. This may lead to less human capital deterioration
and relatively better employment prospects compared to a setting without changes in UI
benefits. As the reservation wage remains on a higher level, the expected income from
employment would decrease relatively less. Simultaneously, a shorter UI benefit duration
implies a shorter period of learning regarding market opportunities. The entrepreneurial
ability improves relatively less, which leads to worse self-employment prospects. Thus,
the Entrepreneurial Choice Model predicts a decrease in the self-employment probability.
2.2.3 Determinants of the Self-Employment Probability
It is not yet clear what kind of mechanisms can explain the transition from unemployment
towards self-employment. Standard Search Theory analyzes unemployment duration
and it is used to model the transition into employment. Most authors ignore that a
transition from unemployment into self-employment is also possible. Conversely, the
Entrepreneurial Choice Model investigates the entry decision into self-employment,
ignoring a possible prior state of unemployment. Nonetheless, Reize (2000) suggests that
the basic determinants of self-employment, “e.g. expected income, risk aversion, human
capital, assets, IRR11, social background, etc.”, should be inferred from both theories.
To the best of our knowledge, only Carrasco (1999) analyzes elements of both Stan-
dard Search Theory and Entrepreneurial Choice Model in the case of Spain. Previously
employed and unemployed individuals are considered separately. The author estimates
the self-employment probability of previously employed individuals in a binomial logit
framework, where remaining employed constitutes the reference group.12 Regarding
previously unemployed individuals, Carrasco (1999) estimates a multinomial logit model.
She differentiates between self-employment and employment as possible destinations,
while remaining unemployed constitutes the reference group. The author distinguishes
unemployed individuals who receive UI benefits from those unemployed but ineligible
to benefits – two basic elements from Standard Search Theory. She finds that benefit
recipients are less likely to become self-employed (disincentive effect) compared to
individuals who are unemployed but ineligible to benefits (entitlement effect). However,
she connects these findings to the Disadvantage Theory.13 According to Reize (2000),
this result may also point towards risk aversion, a basic element of the Entrepreneurial
Choice Model.14
11The income replacement ratio (IRR) is the ratio of unemployment benefits to the expected (self-)employment
income (Reize 2000).
12Additionally, the author estimates a multinomial logit model, distinguishing the destinations of being self-
employed without employees, self-employed with employees, and remaining employed (Carrasco 1999).
13This theory predicts that labor markets are misfit for those who are ineligible for benefits (they could not contribute
long enough to be entitled for benefits) because they cannot obtain enough labor market experience or skills. Potential
employers may consider them as low-quality workers. Thus, these workers are pushed into self-employment.
14As self-employment income is more uncertain than UI benefits, risk-averse UI recipients will only switch into
self-employment if their expected income considerably exceeds their UI benefits. Conversely, unemployed individuals
ineligible for benefits have “nothing to lose” and are more likely to switch into self-employment (Reize 2000).
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2.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
Before investigating the hypotheses explained in the previous section, we first explain
the administrative data used for studying our research question and the construction of
our analysis dataset. Second, we demonstrate the success of our data-building process
by illustrating to which extent we are able to match relevant labor market stocks and
flows over time with official statistics for Spain. In this context, we provide a descriptive
analysis of the Spanish labor market, in particular with respect to analyzing transitions
between unemployment, self-employment and employment over time (2005-2017) in-
cluding the whole economic crisis period. Therefore, this section illustrates the relevance
of our research questions, establishes interesting facts that may be of interest for future
research and provides some insights into how the data can be used.
2.3.1 MCVL Data
The dataset used for the analysis is Spain’s MCVL. It contains administrative information
on individual socioeconomic characteristics and longitudinal information on labor market
statuses and job characteristics for a four percent non-stratified random sample of Spain’s
population. The MCVL takes into account individuals who have been registered for
social security at any point since 2005 until 2017, but it also entails reliable employment
histories retrospectively since the 1980s (cf. Appendix II.3.1). It has been released in 14
waves, from the MCVL 2005 wave until the 2017 wave. As the anonymized identifiers are
maintained, all MCVL editions can be combined. This leads to a high representativeness
of the data and, as opposed to survey data, there is no problem concerning sample attrition
using MCVL data. More detailed information on the MCVL and how we constructed our
analysis dataset from the original raw data is provided in Appendix II.3.
MCVL data identifies five different labor market spells: 1) employment; 2) self-
employment; 3) receiving UI benefits; 4) receiving unemployment assistance (UA)
benefits; and 5) inactivity. The retrospective nature of the data enables to track an
individual over his or her whole labor market history. Starting from the point when an
individual joined a social security scheme for the first time, the labor market trajectory
can be tracked until 2017. Naturally, the forthcoming spells after 2017 are right-censored
with the exception of individuals who deceased earlier. The spells 1) to 4) connote that the
individuals are actively registered with the social security authorities, whereas individuals
in spell 5) are unregistered. Aside from individual labor market trajectories, MCVL
data contains job characteristics. For each employment spell, it provides information on
sector, occupation, skill level required for this job, contract type (fixed-term vs. open-
end contract, as well as part-time vs. full-time contract), contribution basis, reason of
dismissal, firm ownership (private vs. public), and the firm’s location. As an individual’s
spell entry/exit date can be observed, (self-)employment experience can be computed.15
15Following the definition of De La Roca & Puga (2017), we computed experience as accumulated time spent in
employment, starting from the first job in an individual’s life.
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The socioeconomic characteristics entail an individual’s age, sex, date of birth/death,
country of birth, nationality, and formal education. The current province where the
individual resides by the time he or she gets unemployed can be inferred from the
province code where the individual is registered as UI recipient (compare Appendix
II.3.3).
Restrictions. In general, for the construction of the quarterly dataset which we use to
obtain the relevant descriptive statistics, we restrict our sample to the individuals of
working age (18 years or older), who are included in the social security files from 2005
to 2017. However, some additional restrictions are necessary to carry out the different
estimations. The analysis dataset for the DiD approach is restricted to individuals who
enter their UI benefit spell between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013 (large sample).
In addition to that, we restrict our sample to individuals with at least 120 days of UI
benefit entitlement duration. Regarding the RDD, the analysis dataset only includes
individuals who enter their UI benefit spell between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013
(medium sample) and with an UI entitlement duration of at least 180 days.
Moreover, it is important to note that some individuals have multiple UI benefit spells
within the respective period of interest. For those cases, we only keep one random draw
instead of pooling UI spells and treating them as if they stem from different individuals.
Furthermore, we exclude individuals who turn older than 52 years within our analysis
period, and use minimum age restrictions of 20 and 35 as a robustness check. In contrast
to other authors (e.g. De La Roca & Puga 2017, Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas
2020), we do not exclude formerly self-employed individuals or those who worked in
the agricultural sector before getting unemployed. We also include individuals who
worked part-time in their pre-displacement job. As described in Appendix II.3.2, exact
procedures to replicate our results and sample datasets can be inferred from our data
documentations.
2.3.2 Other Data
While processing the data, the nominal contribution basis was deflated using the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) with 2015 as a base year. Furthermore, some other macroeco-
nomic indicators which are interesting for the data description and the analysis have been
obtained from official sources. For instance, the quarterly real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth rate relative to the previous period is used as a control variable in our
regressions. Similarly, the annual unemployment rate and some other labor market data,
such as the self-employment rate or the labor force participation, have been extracted
and used to generate the descriptive statistics which follow in Section 2.3.3. All of these
indicators are drawn from the Selected indicators for Spain of the OECD (2018)16 and
the INE (2018)17.
16OECD data for Spain can be retrieved from: https://data.oecd.org/spain.htm.
17INE data for Spain can be retrieved from: https://www.ine.es/.
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2.3.3 Descriptives - Matching Labor Market Flows
In the following, we document the main labor market statuses in Spain and describe
how they evolved in the time period 2005-2017, thereby confirming our accuracy in
constructing the dataset by showing that we are able to match key labor market facts as
provided by official bodies like the OECD or the Spanish National Statistics Institution
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)).
Labor Force. The composition of the labor force is plotted in Figure II·1. The largest
part of the labor force is compounded by employed workers. At the beginning of the
sample period this part is almost constant at 78% and declines due to the crisis from
2008 onward, until a share of approximately 70% is reached. This drop of 8 percentage
points (p.p.) is absorbed in the unemployed individuals’ share which increases after the
crisis by an equivalent amount. In contrast, the share of self-employed individuals stays
roughly constant at 18%. A slight increase in the self-employment share is observable
since 2013. Looking at the age distribution of the labor force, Figure II·2 reveals that
self-employment is more relevant for the older individuals (age groups over 40) than for
younger individuals. The share of self-employed as percentage of the labor force is only
around 10-15% for those younger than 40, whereas it ranges between 20-24% for those
in the age groups above 40. A closer look at Spain’s labor force levels from OECD data
reveals that a four percent sample should equal on average 913,000 individuals across
the sample period (OECD 2018).18
Evolution of Labor Market Statuses. In Figure II·4 Spain’s annual unemployment rate
using MCVL and OECD data is illustrated for the sample period. The unemployment
rates from both sources are based on individuals of working age and include all sectors,
as well as all social security schemes, such that they are comparable. It is important
to note that the OECD restricts the working age population to individuals between 15
and 64 years old, whilst the INE’s Working Conditions Survey (Encuesta Nacional
de Condiciones de Trabajo) focuses on individuals who are 16 years or older. We
restrict our descriptive sample to individuals who are 18 years or older19. In spite of
these differences, the computed unemployment rate using MCVL data is very similar to
the quarterly unemployment rate reported by INE (left panel figure) and also matches
OECD’s annual unemployment rate (right panel figure). Concerning the self-employment
rate that is measured with respect to the total employment rate, Figure II·3 reconfirms that
our data cleaning process and the construction of our dataset from the MCVL data enable
us to match quarterly statistics from INE (left-hand panel), as well as annual statistics
from OECD data (right-hand panel). Specifically, Figure II·3 in the Appendix shows that
self-employment has been slowly rising until reaching a peak in 2014 at nearly 20% and
then declining again.
18The Spanish average labor force level from 2005 until 2015 was about 22,817,000 individuals per year (OECD
2018). Thus, a four percent sample should result in 0.04 ·22,817,000≈ 913,000 individuals.
19For a summary of the main characteristics of the sample, on a spell basis, see Appendix Table II.1.
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For completeness, Figure II·5 illustrates part-time and Figure II·6 temporary contract
rates in Spain. Again, note that we compare our calculated data with both official statistics
from Spain (quarterly INE data in the left-hand panels) and OECD data (annual data in the
right-hand panels). In particular, while the part-time rate has increased from around 10%
to 15% during the whole sample period, the temporary contract rate reflects a U-shape
evolution. This is in line with the observation that during an economic crisis temporary
contracts are not renewed, and therefore this group of workers is among the first to be
laid-off (as can be seen from the drop of around 30 to 23% during the crisis). In contrast,
when the recovery started (in Spain around the end of 2013) temporary employment
recovered first and in 2017 reached pre-crisis levels.
Labor Market Flows. Figure 2·1 shows that the inflow into self-employment is consid-
erably dominated by flows from unemployment. Thus, a relevant share of founders in
Spain has been previously unemployed, and the inflow from unemployment into self-
employment is important. It makes up 30-50% of all new self-employed every year.20
Moreover, the evolution of the composition of inflows into self-employment exhibits
counter-cyclical patterns, especially from 2010 onward. The share of inflows from
previously employed workers decreases, the one of previously unemployed individuals
increases during a crisis. Although it is true that the outflows from unemployment to
self-employment may only reflect 5% of the whole unemployment stock (Figure II·12), it
should be noted that usually there exist job spillovers, i.e. most founders have employees.
Figure 2·1: Composition of Inflows into Self-Employment excl. Stocks
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Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly inflows to self-employment in Spain, in both absolute (left-hand side) and
relative (right-hand side) terms. The sample consists of all individuals older than 18. We distinguish inflows of
individuals from the relevant states: out of the labor force (OL), dependent employment (E), and unemployment (U).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
20In the Appendix, we show also the same figures including the stocks of self-employed. Looking at stocks
of self-employed individuals in our representative sample shows that about 80% of the self-employed remain in
self-employment (SE) in the next year (less during the crisis period): Figure II·7 shows the yearly inflows including
the SE stock dimension, Figure II·8 shows the same for outflows from SE. The graphs confirm that new inflows into
SE are mainly composed out of new self-employed individuals who were previously unemployed or employed. In
particular, the share of new inflows to SE out of unemployment increases until around 2013.
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Consequently, the economic significance of this flow is a multiple of the outflow statis-
tics from unemployment to self-employment and quantitatively important. In other words,
startups can be engines for economic growth. Note that the role of self-employment
for the inflows into employment (Figure II·9) appears not to change much over time.
This is also true for the outflows from employment to self-employment (Figure II·10),
but different to the patterns when analyzing the outflows from unemployment. We ob-
serve in Figure II·12 that the share of individuals who transition from unemployment
to self-employment remains quite stable during the years surrounding the reform, even
though they are relatively larger than at the beginning of the sample period. However, the
outflows from unemployment are clearly dominated by employment, especially during
the years 2012 and 2013. Moreover, Figure II·11 shows a similar pattern regarding the
inflows into unemployment. The relative destruction of employment increases year by
year until 2012/2013, then the economic recovery leads to a decreasing trend thereafter,
by which the inflow into unemployment from employment declines.
Self-Employment Characteristics. Table II.2 shows a comparison of the main char-
acteristics of individuals in self-employment, compared to individuals in dependent
employment. Regarding their socioeconomic features, we observe that there is a gen-
der gap in the group of self-employed individuals: while 48% of the individuals in
the sub-sample of dependent employment correspond to female workers, only 36% of
individuals in the self-employment group are female. Moreover, the average age in the
self-employment group is slightly larger than in the sub-sample of employees. We also
notice how the distribution of education levels differs to some extent across groups: e.g.
the share of highly educated workers is larger for self-employment than employment.
This may be due to the fact that the service sector is more important for self-employment
(39% of all SE spells).
Moreover, Figure II·13 illustrates the composition of self-employment with respect
to the sector in which the business has been started. We can confirm the fact that self-
employment is indeed quite important in the construction sector. Figure II·13 shows
that the share of workers in that sector increases until 2008, when it starts to decrease in
favor of other sectors like transport, tourism and retail, but also professional, scientific,
administrative and auxiliary services. Lastly, we obtain information on the average
amount of experience and tenure in both groups, as well as concerning the spell duration
and daily earnings. In this context, it becomes apparent that the average duration of
the self-employment spells is remarkably larger than that of the employment spells
(Table II.2). The self-employed individuals tend to remain longer in their position than
the average employee, which indicates that many of the self-employed are successful,
and that a majority of them are rather opportunity than necessity-driven entrepreneurs.
Earnings. Figure II·16 shows yearly mean earnings comparing our income data from
either tax or from social security data. The mean annual labor income is about 20,000
Euro. It declined during the crisis and is recovering again since 2014, but still below the
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2007 pre-crisis level. Figure II·17 shows that monthly earnings translate into about 1,700
Euro, which corresponds to 60 Euro on a daily basis. This helps to ease the interpretation
of the size of Spanish UI benefit levels (relative to other countries). Figure II·15 shows
that the distribution of monthly earnings is skewed to the left with a large dispersion
across top incomes, but that most Spanish citizens earn income that is below the mean.21
2.4 Institutional Framework and Reform
Spain’s institutional framework provides contributory social security protection covering
healthcare, professional care for illnesses or accidents, and benefits for (temporary)
disability, maternity, paternity, family, death, retirement, and job loss. The basic needs
within these areas are also covered by non-contributory assistance benefits. Contributory
benefits always have priority over non-contributory benefits and eligible individuals
must claim them first (SEPE 2019). In the following, we focus on two different types
of unemployment benefits. For details on the institutional background, we refer to our
Appendix II.4.
2.4.1 Unemployment Benefits in Spain
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits. In order to receive contributory UI benefits,
an individual must be legally unemployed, between 16 and 65 years old, must have
contributed for a minimum of 12 months within the last six years, and the reason of
unemployment must be an involuntary dismissal (SEPE 2019). The monthly UI benefit
amount is computed from the regulatory base, which is an approximation of the average
labor income over the six months preceding the unemployment spell, multiplied by the
replacement rate. For the first six months of the UI benefit period, a replacement rate
of 70% is applied. If the individual is entitled to more than six months of UI benefits,
another replacement rate is valid from day 181 onward. This second rate corresponded to
60% in the time period before the reform of July 2012 took place. This reform reduced
the second replacement rate to 50% of the regulatory base.
According to the SEPE (2019), the monthly UI benefit amount is subject to a floor
of 80% of the Public Income Index (IPREM)22 and a ceiling of 225% of the IPREM.
It is increased by one sixth of the monthly benefit amount conditional on the number
of dependent children. Details on the calculation of UI benefits can be inferred from
Table II.3 in the Appendix. Moreover, the bounds of UI (and of unemployment assistance)
benefit amounts were kept constant between 2010 and 2016, when the IPREM was frozen.
In other words, during the period of this chapter’s analysis, all relevant social security
benefit levels were kept nominally constant in Spain.
21This observation is in line with the increase in earnings inequality during the recession which mostly affected the
bottom half of the distribution (Bonhomme & Hospido 2017).
22The IPREM serves as a reference to calculate social security benefits. By virtue of section 1 of Royal Legislative
Decree No. 3/2004 of 25 June 2004, the IPREM replaced the minimum wage which was previously used to calculate
social benefit amounts. The IPREM is revised on an annual basis.
90
Table 2.1: Duration of Entitlement to UI Benefits
Contribution Period (in months) Benefit Period (in months)
< 12 0
12-17 4
18-23 6
24-29 8
30-35 10
36-41 12
42-47 14
48-53 16
54-59 18
60-65 20
66-71 22
≥ 72 24
Notes: This table summarizes the Spanish system of UI PBD. Eligibility requires a minimum contribution
period of 12 months. PBD ranges from 4 to 24 months, and it is a function of the individual’s months of
contribution.
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on the SEPE (2019).
The duration of entitlement to UI benefits depends on the contribution period. Table 2.1
shows that the potential benefit duration (PBD) starts from a minimum of four months
given a contribution period of at least one year. It increases step-wise by two months
conditional on the respective length of the contribution period (first column in Table 2.1).
The maximum possible UI benefit duration is 24 months (SEPE 2019). For more details
on the Spanish UI system, we refer to Section II.4.2 in Appendix II.4.
Unemployment Assistance (UA) Benefits. Registered job seekers may be eligible for
non-contributory UA benefits under certain circumstances. In case such a job searching
individual is ineligible for UI benefits and if the monthly gross incomes correspond to
at most 75% of Spain’s minimum wage, he or she can claim UA benefits. Additional
information on the UA system is provided in Section II.4.3 of Appendix II.4.
2.4.2 Labor Market Reform in 2012
By virtue of the Real Decree-Law 20/2012 which aimed to ensure budgetary stability and
competitiveness, details on the labor market reform discussed in this chapter were only
publicly announced on 13 July 2012. On this day, Spain’s vice president explained that all
recipients entitled to more than six months of UI benefits who would start their UI spell
on 15 July 2012 or thereafter would experience a reduced replacement rate of 50% after
their first six months of receiving UI benefits. Thus, this reform decreased UI benefits
by approximately 16.67% in comparison to the previous replacement rate of 60%. This
new replacement rate is marked by the red line in Figure 2·2. For all UI recipients who
entered the UI system before 15 July 2012 the old rate (blue line) remained valid from
day 181 of the benefit period onward. As illustrated by the black line, the replacement
rate of 70% for the first six months of the UI PBD remained unchanged.
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Figure 2·2: Replacement Rate Before and After the Reform
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Notes: This figure illustrates the drop in the replacement rate of the UI benefits that took effect on 15 July
2012.
Source: Authors’ illustration of the reform.
Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020) note that the public was quickly aware
of the reform’s consequences regarding the UI benefit amount because the new law
received medial attention and the government informed the people via several channels.
Nonetheless, a displaced worker’s decision to claim his or her benefits should not
have been affected by the reform because for the first six months of benefit receipt the
replacement rate stayed the same. Aside from that, as the reduction kicks in six months
after the beginning of the benefit spell, it is possible to investigate the responses in
individuals’ job search behavior before and after the actual drop in the net replacement
rate (i.e. in the UI benefit level) takes place.
According to Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020), strategic lay-offs caused by
the new law have been rather improbable because the reform was implemented already
two days after its announcement. Moreover, they argue that trends of monthly inflows into
the UI system have been similar during 2011 and 2012. As we discuss in Section 2.5.1,
our analysis confirms that strategic manipulation around the reform cutoff date is not
an issue, and thus the reform can be exploited as quasi-experiment. Moreover, the
implementation of this reform affected a large share of the Spanish labor force, and could
not be avoided in times when the economy was unlikely to improve for many months to
come (Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas 2020). This argumentation is plausible because
the unemployment rate reached its zenith of 26.1% in 2013 (OECD 2018).
Besides the reduction in the replacement rate, the new law also changed labor market
rules for part-time workers and workers older than 52. For a detailed overview of all
reforms, we refer to our Appendix Section II.4.6 in Appendix II.4.
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2.5 Empirical Strategy
2.5.1 Difference-in-Differences (DiD) Approach
DiD Methodology
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the effect of a decrease in the UI benefit level
on the self-employment probability in Spain. Such an UI benefit level change was
implemented in the context of the labor market reform agenda 2012. The new law
lowered the replacement rate after the first six months of an individual’s UI benefit receipt
by about 16.67% (see Section 2.4.2). As this reform affected only individuals entitled to
more than six months of benefits who entered their UI benefit spell after 15 July 2012,
one can differentiate between treated and untreated individuals who entered their UI
benefit spell either during the pre- or during the post-reform period.
We exploit this quasi-experimental setup to identify the causal reform effect of
this UI benefit level reduction using a parametric Difference-in-Differences (DiD) ap-
proach. While Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020) estimate the reform effect on
the job-finding probability in employment, we apply the DiD strategy additionally to
self-employment and total employment (= employment + self-employment). In other
words, we decompose the total employment effect of the reform into the effect on self-
employment and employment (vs. staying unemployed). Consequently, we are able
to identify the potential bias that emerges through ignoring self-employment and only
focusing on employment. We implement this strategy estimating a linear probability
model separately for each month23 after UI spell entry as illustrated below:
P(Yit = 1|Ti,POSTi,Xi j) =α+β ·Ti+ γ ·POSTi+δ ·Ti×POSTi
+
J
∑
j=1
λ j ·Xi j + εit
(2.1)
Individuals who entered into unemployment prior to 15 July (1 January 2011 -
14 July 2012) are assigned to the pre-reform period, whereas those who entered into
unemployment on 15 July or later (15 July 2012 - 31 December 2013) are assigned to the
post-reform period. This circumstance is indicated by the binary variable POSTi which
takes either the value 0 when an individual belongs to the pre-reform period (POSTi = 0),
or the value 1 when belonging to the post-reform period group (POSTi = 1). Moreover,
individuals are assigned to either treatment or control group. Those entitled to more
than six months of UI benefits constitute the treatment group which is represented by the
dummy variable, Ti, taking the value 1 (Ti = 1). Conversely, individuals entitled to UI
benefits of not more than six months form the control group (Ti = 0).
23We measure months approximately by taking four-week intervals.
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Our estimation sample includes individuals who received UI benefits within the
period between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013 (large sample). We follow them
over their unemployment24 spell until they exit into a new job, become self-employed or
their observations get censored. Furthermore, the sample is restricted to individuals of
age 35-52 with an UI entitlement length of at least 120 days to align treatment and control
groups. In addition, we apply the same strategy to a sample with an age restriction that is
in line with Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020), i.e. with individuals who are 35
to 52 years old.
Three different sets of outcome variables are used. In the first set, our dependent
variable Yit represents a binary outcome that takes the value 1 if individual i exits from
unemployment into the state of interest (either self-employment, employment or total
employment - see Figure 2·3) in month t, given that we still observe this individual as
being unemployed at the beginning of month t. The outcome variable takes the value 0 if
the individual stays unemployed in month t. Consequently, the effects on three different
outcome variables per month t can be estimated. We follow each individual’s UI spell
over 26 months and identify the dynamic development of the Average Treatment Effect
(ATE). The second set of outcome variables measures whether the individual became
self-employed or employed within a certain amount of months t. We chose intervals of
6, 12, 18, and 24 months. Finally, a set of unemployment duration variables is used as
outcome variable to estimate different types of duration elasticities. In particular, we
distinguish between the total unemployment spell duration (considering UI, UA and
unregistered periods as job seeker to constitute unemployment) and the UI spell duration.
In our basic setting, only models including the group dummy Ti, POSTi and their
interaction are estimated. In further steps, different sets of control variables are added
(represented by vector Xi j). All of them are measured at an individual’s UI spell entry.
Socioeconomic variables include a female dummy, log of age, educational level dummies
(lower, secondary, and university education), an indicator whether the individual has
Figure 2·3: Illustration of Binary Outcome Variables
Notes: Besides UI spells, unemployment also includes UA spells and unregistered spells which we count as being
unemployed without receiving any kind of benefits. For more details, see also Appendix II.3.3.
Source: Authors’ own illustration.
24The unemployment spell includes both UI and UA receipt and counts unregistered periods as unemployment
spells without receiving any kind of benefits.
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children, and an immigrant dummy. Macroeconomic control variables include quar-
terly real GDP growth rate, month indicators, and dummy variables for all Spanish
Autonomous Regions. Ultimately, the vector of controls entails a set of pre-displacement
job characteristics: log of employment experience, log of self-employment experience,
and occupational skill level (high, medium, low skilled). The summary statistics of all
variables used in this chapter are presented in Tables II.4 and II.5 of the Appendix. The
variables’ exact definitions can be inferred from Appendix II.3.3.
DiD Identification
The identification strategy of the reform effect can be summarized in the following
steps: first, estimating the (self-)employment probabilities of treated relative to non-
treated individuals; and second, comparing both groups across time, i.e. those who were
displaced in the post-reform period with those displaced in the pre-reform period. The
additional comparison with workers displaced at the same time but assigned to the control
group (CG) is used to cancel out other factors that may have systematically affected both
groups.
Unlike in a laboratory experiment, we only observe individuals in one of the four
states (in the pre-reform or post-reform period, and belonging to the control or treatment
group). So first of all, our identification strategy requires that the composition of treatment
and control group is not affected by the reform itself. Additionally, our identification
strategy requires that the treatment and control group behave similarly regarding our
outcome variable in the pre-reform period. In other words, the DiD estimator can only be
unbiased if the parallel-trend assumption holds. Then, the average of the control group
captures the counterfactual development of the treatment group and we can identify the
causal reform effect. As long as their composition stays constant and time shocks are
common to both groups, the parallel trend assumption holds. In this case, treatment and
control group are allowed to start at different levels of the outcome variable.
Figure 2·4 illustrates the quarterly number25 of UI inflows by group. The quarterly
inflow level is constantly higher with regards to the treatment group compared to the
control group. However, the composition of both groups’ inflows seems to develop fairly
parallel, which could serve as evidence in favor of a fixed group composition. Moreover,
there is no evidence of UI entry date manipulation, i.e. there are no suspicious spikes
right before the reform was implemented (red line). This finding speaks in favor of a fixed
group composition and emphasizes the statement of Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas
(2020) that strategic lay-offs to avoid the replacement rate reduction are rather unlikely
since the reform was implemented already two days after its announcement.
25In the Appendix, Figure II·18 shows the corresponding figure in percentage terms or Figure II·19 in a monthly
dimension.
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Figure 2·4: UI Transitions (Total Numbers)
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Notes: This figure illustrates the quarterly transitions into UI, i.e. the total number of individuals in both the treatment
and the control group who switch into UI in each quarter. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20 to 52
years old, with an UI benefit entitlement length of at least 120 days, whose transition takes place between the first
quarter of 2008 and the last quarter of 2014. The reform quarter is highlighted with a red dashed line. In the Appendix,
Figure II·18 shows the corresponding figure in percentage terms or Figure II·19 in a monthly dimension.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure 2·5 illustrates the validity of the parallel trend assumption. It plots quarterly
average probabilities of exiting into self-employment26 in the period between Q1/2010
and Q4/2014. The sample is restricted to individuals of age 20-52, with an UI entitlement
length of at least 120 days; and the reform quarter is highlighted in red. This figure shows
that the common trend assumption holds, i.e. that treatment and control group seem to
have parallel trends with respect to their outcome variables before the reform took place.
Even though our evidence speaks in favor of both a fixed group composition and a
valid common trend assumption, some risk remains that the DiD estimator is biased due
to inherent differences between the groups. Tables II.6 and II.7 show mean comparison
tests of some interesting covariates between the two groups for different age restrictions.
Indeed, most of the variables are significantly different between treatment and control
groups, and some of them are included into our model (through Xi j) to control for
group differences to make parallel trends more plausible. Moreover, the conditional
independence assumption27 requires a full common support of both treated and non-
treated individuals’ characteristics. Thus, we decided to pre-select our sample based on
the propensity score, under the awareness that implementing such trimming may come at
the expense of some external validity, since the focus is set on a subset of the original
sample.
26The parallel trend checks for employment and total employment as outcome variables can be inferred from
Appendix Figure II·20. They are in line with the findings with regards to self-employment.
27This asserts that treatment and control groups are, on average, comparable given some specific control variables.
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Figure 2·5: Parallel Trends Check for Self-Employment
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Notes: This figure illustrates quarterly average probabilities of exiting into self-employment in the period between the
first quarter of 2010 and the last quarter of 2014. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20 to 52 years old,
with an UI entitlement length of at least 120 days. The reform quarter is highlighted with a red dashed line.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
In line with Crump et al. (2009), we only include individuals with a treatment
propensity score between 0.1 and 0.9. Figures 2·4 and 2·5 and Tables II.6 and II.7 are
already based on the pre-selected sample. However note, that without pscore trimming
these figures look almost identical in shape.28 The mean comparison tests improved
slightly through pscore trimming and some of the differences turned insignificant or
smaller in its magnitude.29 The DiD analysis which follows in Section 2.6.1 is based on
the pscore trimmed sample. Since the new law from 2012 also changed labor market
rules for workers older than 52, this seems to be a reasonable maximum age restriction to
avoid that other sections of the reform bias our results. In our main settings, we restrict
our estimation sample even further to individuals who are between 35 and 52 years old.
The reason for this is the Royal Decree-Law 4/2013, which was adopted on 22 February
with the goal of promoting self-employment among young workers (defined as men
younger than 30 and women younger than 35), and which could affect our results as well.
To sum up, the DiD approach allows us to estimate the average treatment effects of
the reform in our quasi-experimental scenario. However, we can also take advantage
of the discontinuity in the replacement rate which was the object of the 2012 labor
market reform. In fact, focusing only on treated individuals, we would be able to identify
local average treatment effects only for the respective group, providing us with a more
complete picture for this impact evaluation.
28Figures without pscore trimming can be provided upon request. Note, that the levels in Figure 2·4 decrease as
individuals with the lowest and highest pscore percentiles are excluded.
29Mean comparison tables without pscore trimming are available upon request.
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2.5.2 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Approach
RDD Methodology
Besides the DiD approach, we also exploit the sharp discontinuity introduced by the
reform using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Being affected by the reform is
a deterministic and discontinuous function of time. We normalize the UI entry date of
individual i to 0 at cutoff date (15 July 2012). Moreover, we only consider individuals
with at least 180 days of UI benefit entitlement. In other words, we restrict the sample to
the treatment group of our DiD analysis. In the RDD analysis, the term control group
solely refers to individuals eligible to more than 180 days of UI benefits who entered
their UI spell before the cutoff date. Consequently, individuals are treated if they entered
their UI benefit spell after the cutoff date. Our estimation equation can be illustrated as
follows:
Yi = α ·1(ti ≥ 0)+
K
∑
k=0
γCkg(dik) ·1(ti ≤ 0)+
K
∑
k=0
γT kg(dik) ·1(ti ≥ 0)+
J
∑
j=1
λ j ·Xi j + εi
(2.2)
We use our set of within measures and UI/UE duration as outcome variables, Yi. The
vector of control variables, Xi j, contains the same set of variables as explained in the
previous Section 2.5.1. The normalized UI entry date of individual i is represented by ti,
while dik measures the entry date’s distance (in weeks k) from the cutoff date. Polynomial
g(·) connects dik and Yi when the UI entry date is below (ti ≤ 0) or above (ti ≥ 0) the
cutoff date, respectively. Regarding g(·), we first worked with a local linear regression.
However, the quadratic version of the polynomial provides a better fit to the data, and
thus the main RDD results are based on the quadratic version of Equation (2.2). The
coefficients γCk and γT k measure how the particular group assignment (treatment/control)
affects the outcome variable, thereby taking into account potential group-specific UI
entry date effects.
In the following, we focus on α as our explanatory variable of interest. Instead of
measuring an average treatment effect (ATE) as we did in our DiD analysis, α now
measures the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) of a 10 p.p. drop in the
replacement rate after 180 days of UI receipt for workers who switch into an UI spell in
the vicinity of the cutoff date.
RDD Identification
As assignment into treatment is solely determined by each individual’s UI entry date, our
RDD identification strategy of the causal ATET hinges crucially on the assumption that
individuals cannot manipulate this running variable around the cutoff. Thus, we need
continuity around the cutoff which can be analyzed by conducting a McCrary test with
the null hypothesis of continuity.
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Figure 2·6 shows the results of running the aforementioned test using our medium
sample with a bandwidth of one year. This includes individuals who entered their UI
spell between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013. According to the estimated test statistic
of -0.0035 (0.0368), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected which confirms that our
identification assumption holds. Details about the distribution of observations per bin30
for the McCrary test can be inferred from the Appendix Figure II·21.
The reason for choosing the medium sample rather than the large sample (used in
our DiD approach) is that individuals should be more comparable in a shorter time
window, as they experience the same economic conditions. Nonetheless, we conducted
our regression analysis with all three sample sizes (large, medium, and small31). The
small and large sample McCrary test statistics also speak in favor of the existence of
continuity around the cutoff date. Details can be inferred from the Appendix Figure II·22.
Figure 2·6: McCrary Test for Individuals Entering their UI Spell (medium sample)
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Notes: This figure illustrates the McCrary test for individuals entering their UI spell within 380 days
(medium sample) distance from the cutoff. The medium sample consists of individuals entering between
1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013. We consider individuals who are 35 to 52 years old. The discontinuity
estimate (log difference in height) for the medium sample is -0.0035 (0.0368). Standard errors are shown
in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
30Bins are defined fortnightly.
31The small sample includes individuals who enter their UI benefit spell in 2012.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 DiD Results
DiD Main Specification Results
The results of the described DiD model are illustrated in Table 2.2 below. They show
the reform’s effect on the set of outcome variables that measure whether an individual
transitions into employment, self-employment or total employment (= self-employment
+ employment) within a particular period of months (6, 12, 18, 24). In the following,
we will refer to them as our within measures. The first column of each table shows the
results of our general setting which includes 20-52 year old individuals, while our main
results in the second column are based on individuals who are aged between 35 and 52
years to avoid potential bias from other reforms.32 The estimates in Table 2.2 refer to the
main model with all covariates as described in Section 2.5.1.
Table 2.2: Difference-in-Differences Main Results
(a) Self-Employment and Employment
Outcome 20-52 35-52
Self-Employment
6 months 0.006∗∗ 0.008
(0.002) (0.005)
12 months 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.002) (0.006)
18 months 0.005∗ 0.006
(0.003) (0.007)
24 months 0.005 0.006
(0.003) (0.007)
Employment
6 months 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗
(0.007) (0.011)
12 months -0.003 -0.008
(0.010) (0.012)
18 months -0.006 -0.026∗∗
(0.008) (0.011)
24 months -0.008 -0.029∗∗
(0.007) (0.010)
N 51,903 20,585
(b) Total Employment and UI/UE Duration
Outcome 20-52 35-52
Total Employment
6 months 0.033∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.007) (0.011)
12 months 0.004 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
18 months -0.001 -0.020∗
(0.007) (0.011)
24 months -0.003 -0.022∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
Unemployment Duration
UI -18.551∗∗∗ -14.536∗∗∗
(2.470) (4.667)
UE -9.549 -13.415
(6.049) (9.319)
N 51,903 20,585
Notes: Region-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%. We only report the ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using our main specification. Our
estimation sample includes individuals who switched into an UI spell between January 2011 and December 2013
(large sample), with an UI entitlement duration of at least 120 days.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
32Our age restriction excludes particular age groups which have been targeted by other reforms that could potentially
bias our results (e.g. the Royal Decree-Law 4/2013 with the aim of promoting self-employment among the youth). For
details on other reforms, see Appendix II.4.6.
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The first column of Table 2.2 shows that the average probability to become self-employed
(within 6, 12, and 18 months after entering UI) is estimated to be significantly positive.
However, this effect is very small and close to zero. It turns insignificant if we consider
the probability to get self-employed within 24 months.
The reform affects our within measures of the average probability to become re-
employed significantly positive (at the 1% level) for the first 6-month interval. According
to Table 2.2, the probability of finding a job within the first six months of unemployment
increases by 2.7% in anticipation of the 16.67% reduction in the replacement rate that
would follow after the sixth month. This constitutes evidence in favor of a behavioral
response effect, which is in line with the results of Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas
(2020). However, the average reform effect on re-employment becomes slightly negative
for the medium term (12 months) and the long term (18 and 24 months), but then also
becomes statistically insignificant.
The right-hand panel of Table 2.2 shows how the reform effects on self-employment
and employment add up and shape the impact on total employment (TE). The effects on
TE roughly mirror the estimates on employment. We find a highly significant positive
effect on the TE probability within the first six months because then the effects on both
self-employment and employment point into the same direction. For the medium run,
the reform’s impact on TE is positive but insignificant – suggesting that then the positive
impact on self-employment dominates. In the long run, the effect on TE is negative but
insignificant – suggesting that then the negative effect on re-employment dominates.
The additional restriction to focus on individuals who are 35 to 52 years old does
not change the estimated coefficients’ direction. We find that estimates of the self-
employment probability turn completely insignificant, pointing towards a null effect on
startups. Considering the within measures for employment and total employment, the
estimates regarding the first six months remain positive but their statistical significance
decreases (to the 10% level), whereas the negative long-run average effects become
more significant (reaching the 5% level) and larger in size.33 Since the average reform
effect on the self-employment probability seems to be insignificant, the impact on total
employment appears to be mainly driven by the effect on the employment probability.
Finally, the last panel of Table 2.2 presents the reform effects on actual UI duration
and on general unemployment (UE) duration. On average, the replacement rate drop of
approximately 16.67% decreased actual UI benefit duration by 15 (19) days in case of
the 35-52 (20-52) year old individuals. The estimated effects on actual UE duration are
smaller in absolute terms but statistically insignificant.
33In the context of the Spanish labor market reforms in 2001 and 2006, Rebollo-Sanz (2012) also finds that UI
benefits have a negative effect on employment duration.
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DiD Robustness Checks
Table 2.3 adds different sets of covariates Xi j (socioeconomic characteristics, macro-
economic controls, and pre-displacement job characteristics) to the baseline setting, using
our within outcome measures as dependent variables. In what follows, we focus on
individuals of age 35-52 to avoid potential bias due to other reforms. The last column
shows our main specification including all sets of control variables (as in Table 2.2).
Table 2.3: Difference-in-Differences Robustness
Outcome Baseline +Socioeconomic +Macroeconomic +Job Charac.
Self-employment
6 months 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
12 months 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
18 months 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
24 months 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment
6 months 0.021 0.021∗ 0.020 0.021∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
12 months -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
18 months -0.027∗ -0.026∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
24 months -0.030∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Total Employment
6 months 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
12 months -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
18 months -0.022∗ -0.021∗ -0.022∗ -0.020∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
24 months -0.025∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.022∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Unemployment Dur.
UI -15.164∗∗∗ -15.313∗∗∗ -15.130∗∗∗ -14.536∗∗∗
(4.645) (4.646) (4.472) (4.667)
UE -12.474 -12.818 -12.502 -13.415
(10.256) (9.950) (9.663) (9.319)
N 20,585 20,585 20,585 20,585
Notes: Region-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%. We only report the ATE coefficients but control for all additional sets of covariates described in the
column header. Our estimation sample includes individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, and switched into an UI spell
between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample). They have an UI entitlement duration of at least 120 days.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Directions and magnitudes of the average effects in the main specification are al-
ready visible in the baseline setting. Again, the effects on our within measures of the
self-employment probability are slightly positive but insignificant over all specifications.
The reform affects our within measures of the (total) employment probability positively
in the short run but negatively in the medium and long run. While the statistical signifi-
cance slightly changes across different specifications, the point estimates remain stable.
Moreover, the highly significant average reform effect on the actual UI benefit duration
is very robust. Starting from a decrease in actual UI duration of almost 15 days in the
baseline setting, this number slightly increases when adding socioeconomic controls,
but then declines again when additionally controlling for macro-economic variables and
pre-displacement job characteristics. The effect on general actual unemployment (UE)
duration remains slightly smaller but insignificant across all specifications.
As our estimated average treatment effects of a reduction in UI benefits on actual
UI duration are highly significant across all specifications, we can calculate precise UI
benefit level duration elasticities. Instead, the importance attached to our computed
UE duration elasticities should stay within reason, since they are based upon mostly
insignificant point estimates. An overview of our estimated elasticities for the 35-52
year old individuals with different sets of covariates can be inferred from Table 2.4. The
first row in the upper panel shows UI duration elasticities for the total sample (based on
Table 2.3). In the second row, the sample is restricted to individuals who either continue
to receive UI benefits or get employed. Those entering self-employment are excluded.
Table 2.4: UI and UE Duration Elasticities
Outcome Baseline + Socioec. + Macroec. + Job Charact.
UI
Total 0.410∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
Employment 0.412∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
Self-Employment 0.262∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.334∗∗
UE
Total 0.203 0.208 0.203 0.218
Employment 0.198 0.208 0.211 0.225
Self-Employment 0.199 0.239 0.229 0.280
Notes: Significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table presents the UI and UE duration
elasticities, computed from the DiD estimation results. The elasticity η is derived according to the following formula:
η = ∆(duration)∆(RR) . In other words, we calculate the elasticity based on the percentage variation in UI or UE duration (with
respect to the average duration before the reform) divided by the variation in the replacement rates due to the reform
(approx. 16.67%). The sample includes all individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, with an UI entitlement duration of
at least 120 days, and who became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample). The results
for the Total row header are based on the total sample used in Table 2.3. The Employment header corresponds to our
sample that excludes individuals who transition into self-employment (it keeps those who either stay unemployed or
find a job). The Self-Employment header corresponds to our sample that excludes individuals who find a job after their
unemployment spell (it keeps those who stay either unemployed or transition into self-employment).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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The third row shows estimated duration elasticities when restricting the sample to in-
dividuals who either continue to receive UI benefits or become self-employed. Hence,
individuals who find a job are excluded. The second panel shows the results for the
same samples but with the general UE duration as outcome variable. Details on the
point estimates and the average values of actual UI/UE duration used to calculate these
duration elasticities can be inferred from Appendix Tables II.8 and II.9.
We find that UI duration elasticities for future self-employed individuals are roughly
10 percentage points smaller than those of future employed individuals. This pattern
stays stable across all specifications; and given that estimates of future self-employed
individuals’ UI duration elasticity did not exist so far, this finding is of particular interest.
According to our estimates, a 16.67% decrease in the replacement rate leads on average
to a 5.67% (= 16.67% ·0.334) decrease in the UI benefit spell duration, in case we only
focus on individuals who become self-employed (or stay unemployed). When focusing
on individuals who exit into employment, a 16.67% decrease in the replacement rate
leads on average to a 6.68%(= 16.67% ·0.401) decrease in the UI benefit spell duration.
If we augment our sample and include all individuals, regardless of their UI exit state,
the average effect on the UI benefit duration corresponds to 6.55% (= 16.67% ·0.393).
Consequently, the exclusion of self-employed workers from the sample biases the average
effect on UI duration slightly upwards.
Moreover, we find that UE duration elasticities are almost half the size of UI duration
elasticities when it comes to (total) employment but similar regarding self-employment.
In the main specification, the UE duration elasticity of future self-employed individuals
is even larger than the one of future employed workers, but remains insignificant. Alto-
gether, we find fairly robust UI/UE duration elasticity results for all post-unemployment
outcomes.
DiD Placebo Tests
To evaluate the plausibility of the quasi-experimental identification strategy which allows
a causal interpretation of lower UI benefits induced by the drop in the replacement rate
on our outcome variables of interest, it is important to conduct placebo tests (Bertrand
et al. 2004). Our DiD placebo test estimations are presented in Table 2.5. The first
column shows the estimated results of our main specification. In the second column we
demonstrate our findings when we set the reform to take place at a fictive date in July
2011. Clearly, our estimates are insignificant and close to zero which provides evidence
in favor of our identification strategy. The third column corresponds to a fictive reform
date in April 2012. Then, our point estimates become slightly larger in absolute terms
but remain insignificant. In summary, placebo tests confirm the reliability of our DiD
estimation approach.
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Differences Placebo Tests
PLACEBO TESTS
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
Self-Employment
6 months 0.008 0.002 0.009
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011)
12 months 0.006 0.001 0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015)
18 months 0.006 0.001 0.021
(0.007) (0.005) (0.017)
24 months 0.006 0.001 0.019
(0.007) (0.005) (0.017)
Employment
6 months 0.021∗ 0.003 -0.023
(0.011) (0.019) (0.021)
12 months -0.008 0.016 -0.025
(0.012) (0.017) (0.024)
18 months -0.026∗∗ 0.007 -0.026
(0.011) (0.013) (0.027)
24 months -0.029∗∗ 0.010 -0.029
(0.010) (0.012) (0.032)
Total Employment
6 months 0.029∗ 0.004 -0.014
(0.011) (0.017) (0.027)
12 months -0.002 0.016 -0.008
(0.009) (0.016) (0.026)
18 months -0.020∗ 0.008 -0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.026)
24 months -0.022∗∗ 0.011 -0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.027)
N 20,585 30,832 19,710
Notes: Region-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, **
5%, * 10%. We only report the ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using our main specification. Column (1)
shows our main setting from Table 2.2. In column (2), we set the reform to take place at a fictive date on 1 July 2011
(bandwidth of 12 months). In column (3), the fictive reform date is April 2012. All samples only include individuals
who are 35 to 52 years old, with an UI entitlement of more than 120 days.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
DiD Dynamic Average Treatment Effects
Figure 2·7 shows our estimated coefficients of the average treatment effect (ATE) [solid
line] and their 95% confidence intervals [dashed lines] when using alternative outcome
variables which measure individual i’s binary exit state in each month t.34
Panel (a) shows that the estimated ATEs on self-employment are slightly positive in
the first five months of the UI spell. Then, they become slightly negative but they flatten
out with increasing t. These ATEs are not significantly different from zero which also
becomes clear when considering the scale. Thus, there does not seem to be a significant
effect with respect to the self-employment probability in response to UI benefit cuts.
34Note that in this case we aim to compare these groups over time while allowing treatment effects to vary across
points in time (heterogeneous time effects). See de Chaisemartin & D’Haultfoeuille (2019) for a more complete
analysis of this type of estimations.
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Figure 2·7: Dynamic Average Treatment Effects (ATE)
(a) Dynamic ATE on Self-Employment
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(b) Dynamic ATE on Employment
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(c) Dynamic ATE on Total Employment
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Notes: These figures illustrate our estimated coefficients for the average treatment effects (solid line), as well as their
95% confidence intervals (dashed lines), regarding each relevant outcome: self-employment, dependent employment
and total employment. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, and became unemployed
between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample). They have at least 120 days of UI benefit entitlement.
Vertical dashed lines visually delimit the corresponding six-month periods.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Considering the ATEs on employment, as illustrated in panel (b), there is evidence for
a positive behavioral response effect four to six months after entering the UI spell. This
indicates that affected individuals react to a future reduction in UI benefits by increasing
their search efforts.35 After the drop in UI benefits took place in the sixth month, the ATE
plummets to a significantly estimated coefficient of approximately −0.02. Consequently,
reducing the replacement rate by 10 percentage points decreases the probability of finding
a job seven months after entering the UI system, on average by 2%. Moreover, we also
estimate a significantly negative ATE of 1% on the employment probability after 12
months of UI benefit receipt. The ATEs converge to zero when t further increases. This
result illustrates that the estimated negative long-run effects on our within measures
from Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are driven by negative effects on the employment probability in
the months shortly after the replacement rate drop, and after the first year of UI benefit
receipt. This feature is visible in the dynamic ATE figures. Finally, panel (c) of Figure 2·7
illustrates that the pattern for total employment mirrors the one of employment.
35These findings are in line with those of Marinescu & Skandalis (2019) who conclude that unemployed individuals
strongly increase their number of applications as benefit exhaustion approaches, and decrease it after benefits exhaust.
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In summary, the reform appears not to have an effect on self-employment but increases
an individual’s (total) employment probability just before the drop in UI benefits occurs.
Shortly after that, the reform leads to a significantly negative effect on the probability of
finding a job, most likely because the unemployed individuals’ search intensity decreases.
In the long run, there is no significant effect on the (total) employment probability.
DiD Subgroup Analysis
Since the identified reform effects could be heterogeneously driven by specific subgroups,
Table 2.6 presents estimation results of a subgroup analysis when we use our within
outcome measures as dependent variables. Each panel represents different subgroups
(age older than 45 vs. at most 45, female vs. male, permanent vs. fixed-term contract,
public vs. private sector) that are compared.
Potential subgroup differences with respect to age can be inferred from the first panel.
The significantly positive effect on the short-run (total) employment probability seems to
be driven by younger individuals. In contrast to that, the positive effect on the long-run
self-employment probability seems to be more prevalent for older workers.
The second panel compares average estimates for female individuals with those of
male individuals. We find that the slightly positive average effect on self-employment
is entirely driven by male individuals. Turning towards employment, male individuals
experience a slightly more intensified negative effect in the long run as compared to their
female counterparts. As positive effects on males’ self-employment and negative effects
on their employment probability cancel out each other, effects for men turn insignificant
when we consider total employment. In the long run, the cut in UI benefits significantly
lowered women’s probability to return to any sort of employment (total employment).
In contrast, men tend to have slightly higher probabilities to become self-employed in
the medium and long run. The long-run self-employment probability is increased further
when it comes to older men as compared to young men, most likely because they have
better financial resources.
In the third panel, we distinguish individuals with a permanent contract from those
with a fixed-term contract in their pre-displacement jobs. The significantly positive
reform effect on the (total) employment probability of our main short-run specification
(within 6 months) seems to be partially driven by individuals who had a temporary
contract before entering the UI system. Those with previously permanent contracts seem
to be more negatively affected in the medium and long run. Finally, we distinguish former
public and private sector workers. We find a larger positive reform effect on the short-run
(total) employment probability of former public compared to private sector workers.
Our findings suggest a heterogeneous reform effect with respect to age, gender
and pre-displacement contract characteristics. The positive short-run effects on (total)
employment are partially driven by younger individuals who previously worked under a
temporary contract. This effect is even stronger for former public sector workers.
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In the medium and long run, negative average treatment effects on (total) employment
seem to be more prevalent for individuals who previously worked under a permanent
contract. The slightly positive effects on the self-employment probability are driven by
male individuals. In the long run, older individuals also contribute to a slightly positive
average reform effect on the self-employment probability. Results of this subgroup
analysis for the UI/UE duration elasticity as outcome variable are provided in Appendix
Table II.10.
Table 2.6: Difference-in-Differences Subgroup Analysis
Age SE > 45 SE ≤ 45 E > 45 E ≤ 45 TE > 45 TE ≤ 45
6 months 0.017 0.006 -0.004 0.031∗∗ 0.012 0.037∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.005) (0.026) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
12 months 0.015 0.002 -0.022 -0.002 -0.006 0.000
(0.013) (0.006) (0.031) (0.013) (0.027) (0.012)
18 months 0.018 0.001 -0.033 -0.023 -0.015 -0.021
(0.012) (0.007) (0.034) (0.013) (0.030) (0.013)
24 months 0.022∗ 0.001 -0.035 -0.027∗∗ -0.013 -0.026∗
(0.013) (0.007) (0.029) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012)
N 5,723 14,862 5,723 14,862 5,723 14,862
Female SE (FEM.) SE (MALE) E (FEM.) E (MALE) TE (FEM.) TE (MALE)
6 months 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.010 0.033 0.021
(0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014)
12 months -0.005 0.018∗∗ 0.001 -0.022 -0.004 -0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019)
18 months -0.003 0.015∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.032∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.017
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018)
24 months -0.006 0.019∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.017
(0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
N 10,475 10,110 10,475 10,110 10,475 10,110
Permanent SE (PERM.) SE (TEMP.) E (PERM.) E (TEMP.) TE (PERM.) TE (TEMP.)
6 months 0.017 0.001 -0.004 0.051∗∗∗ 0.013 0.052∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.006) (0.030) (0.012) (0.032) (0.011)
12 months 0.014 -0.004 -0.041∗ 0.024 -0.028∗ 0.020
(0.018) (0.007) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
18 months 0.021 -0.007 -0.046∗ -0.001 -0.025 -0.009
(0.019) (0.007) (0.024) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
24 months 0.021 -0.005 -0.045 -0.007 -0.024 -0.013
(0.019) (0.008) (0.028) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010)
N 7,537 13,048 7,537 13,048 7,537 13,048
Public SE (PUB.) SE (PRIV.) E (PUB.) E (PRIV.) TE (PUB.) TE (PRIV.)
6 months 0.011 0.009 0.089∗∗∗ 0.013 0.100∗∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.012) (0.032) (0.012)
12 months 0.008 0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.009 0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.037) (0.014) (0.040) (0.012)
18 months 0.000 0.008 -0.028 -0.022∗ -0.028 -0.014
(0.009) (0.008) (0.033) (0.012) (0.034) (0.011)
24 months 0.004 0.008 -0.034 -0.025∗ -0.030 -0.016
(0.009) (0.008) (0.035) (0.012) (0.037) (0.011)
N 2,186 17,825 2,186 17,825 2,186 17,825
Notes: Region-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by:
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using our main
specification. The sample includes all individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, with UI entitlement larger
than 120 days, and who became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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2.6.2 RDD Results
RDD Main Specification Results
As Figure 2·6 shows, the RDD identification assumption is plausible and, thus, our
empirical strategy allows to identify the causal local average treatment effect of the cut in
UI benefits on the probability to enter self-employment or (total) employment, as well as
on the UI duration elasticity. Table 2.7 presents our estimated coefficients based on the
medium sample and a quadratic RDD set up. Again, we show the results for individuals
who are 20 to 52 years old in the first column, and results for individuals who are 35 to
52 years old in the second column.
The direction of the reform effects does not change across age restrictions. As
compared to the insignificant ATEs that we obtain using our DiD strategy, the ATET
estimated by the RDD points towards a negative reform effect on the probability to
become self-employed. These effects turn slightly significant when only considering
individuals who are 35 to 52 years old.
Table 2.7: Regression Discontinuity Design Main Results
(a) Sel-Employment and Employment
Outcome 20-52 35-52
Self-Employment
6 months -0.013 -0.024∗
(0.009) (0.015)
12 months -0.017 -0.028∗
(0.011) (0.016)
18 months -0.017 -0.029∗
(0.012) (0.017)
24 months -0.019 -0.033∗∗
(0.012) (0.016)
Employment
6 months 0.028 0.064
(0.030) (0.040)
12 months 0.032 0.066∗
(0.027) (0.037)
18 months 0.030 0.054∗
(0.025) (0.032)
24 months 0.035 0.064∗∗
(0.022) (0.030)
N 45,562 24,961
(b) Total Employment and UI/UE Duration
Outcome 20-52 35-52
Total Employment
6 months 0.015 0.040
(0.028) (0.036)
12 months 0.014 0.038
(0.024) (0.032)
18 months 0.013 0.025
(0.021) (0.028)
24 months 0.017 0.030
(0.017) (0.023)
Unemployment Duration
UI -15.213 -25.235
(11.113) (15.991)
UE -27.310∗ -39.108∗
(16.104) (23.598)
N 45,562 24,961
Notes: UI entry-date-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the local ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using our main specification.
Results in the first column are based on individuals who are 20 to 52 years old. The second column refers to individuals
who are 35 to 52 years old. Both samples are restricted to individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits
who entered their UI spell between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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The overall local ATEs are positive regarding our within outcome measures of the
employment probability. In this case, restricting the sample to individuals who are 35 to
52 years old translates into ATEs that almost double in size and turn slightly significant.
We find insignificant effects on the total employment probability, as it covers both the
positive effects on the probability of finding a job, and the counteracting effects on
the self-employment probability. More detailed RDD results are shown in Appendix
Tables II.11 and II.12.
In line with the DiD results, the reform’s local effect on the actual UI duration is
negative but insignificant. We find a significantly negative effect with respect to the
general unemployment (UE) duration. Even though the levels are different, we observe
a very similar pattern of the UI and UE duration elasticities (see Appendix Table II.14)
calculated from the RDD estimates compared with those obtained from the DiD (see
Table 2.4). Again, differences in levels of the elasticities across both estimation methods
may be explained by the fact that we rather measure local effects in the RDD setting.
RDD Visualized Results
Our main RDD results are visualized in Figure 2·8. It plots the jump in the average
unemployment exit probabilities after the cutoff date. We only consider the within-
probabilities for the short and long run. The remaining results are very similar, though.
The quadratic set-up of our RDD fits the data pretty well. The negative reform effects
on self-employment as well as the positive effects on (total) employment are visible.
The jumps intensify in the long run – regardless of the outcome variable. More detailed
versions of these results and a comparison of findings for 20-52 and 35-52 years old
individuals can be inferred from Appendix Figures II·23 to II·25. There are only few
differences across the result specifications, which indicates their robustness.
RDD Robustness Checks
It is worth to mention a few findings concerning robustness. Our RDD results turned out
to be insignificant when using the large sample, but those results point towards the same
direction as our medium sample based main results.36 When using a smaller sample (see
Table II.13) with a bandwidth of only six months, we obtain almost the same results. But
they turn out to be even more significant than those for the medium sample.
36The RDD regression results for the large sample are provided upon request.
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Figure 2·8: RDD Short- and Long-Run Reform Effects
(1) Effect on Self-Employment Probabilities
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(2) Effect on Employment Probabilities
(c) Within 6 Months
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(d) Within 24 Months
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(3) Effect on Total Employment Probabilities
(e) Within 6 Months
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(f) Within 24 Months
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
-3
80
-2
85
-1
90 -9
5 0 95 19
0
28
5
38
0
Bin
Notes: These figures illustrate the RDD results for our quadratic prediction plots of exit state probabilities.
The sample is restricted to individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, entitled to more than 180 days of UI
benefits. We only include individuals whose UI benefit spell starts between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013
(medium sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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RDD Placebo Tests
We show placebo tests of our RDD in Table 2.8 to provide further support on the reliability
of our identification strategy. Again, column (1) shows our main specification for the
sample of individuals who are 35 to 52 years old. Column (2) tests the effect of a placebo
reform that is set to artificially take place in July 2011. The third column refers to our
estimates when we only include individuals unaffected by the reform because they are
entitled to no more than six months of UI benefits. By generating insignificant estimates
both placebo tests support the reliability of the RDD identification strategy.
Table 2.8: RDD Placebo Tests
PLACEBO TESTS
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
Self-Employment
6 months -0.024∗ -0.006 -0.005
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
12 months -0.028∗ -0.004 0.009
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015)
18 months -0.029∗ -0.007 0.020
(0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
24 months -0.033∗∗ -0.003 0.022
(0.016) (0.011) (0.017)
Employment
6 months 0.064 0.038 0.040
(0.040) (0.046) (0.050)
12 months 0.066∗ 0.026 0.027
(0.037) (0.024) (0.048)
18 months 0.054∗ 0.005 -0.005
(0.032) (0.024) (0.047)
24 months 0.064∗∗ -0.007 0.025
(0.030) (0.023) (0.043)
Total Employment
6 months 0.040 0.036 0.036
(0.036) (0.023) (0.050)
12 months 0.038 0.023 0.035
(0.032) (0.021) (0.048)
18 months 0.025 -0.001 0.015
(0.028) (0.021) (0.045)
24 months 0.030 -0.010 0.047
(0.023) (0.020) (0.041)
N 24,961 50,176 6,994
Notes: UI entry-date-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated
by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the local ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using
our main specification. For comparison reasons, column (1) presents the results for our main setting using
the medium sample (see Table 2.7). In column (2), we set the reform to take place at a fictive date on 1
July 2011. Column (3) reports the placebo test results if we only include individuals unaffected by the
reform because they are entitled to no more than 6 months of UI benefits. All samples are restricted to
individuals who are 35 to 52 years old.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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2.7 Discussion and Interpretation of Results - Potential Mechanisms
2.7.1 Summary and Discussion of Main Results
Our results show that a reduction of UI benefits affects the transition out of unemployment.
On the one hand, both DiD and RDD show that the probability to become re-employed
increases in the short run. Thereby, a behavioral pattern in line with Search Theory can
be observed: in expectation of the drop in UI benefits, unemployed individuals increase
their search efforts and are thus more likely to leave UI towards re-employment before
the drop in UI benefits takes effect after six months. This result seems to confirm findings
of Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020).
On the other hand, the effect of the cut in UI benefits appears to be different for
the transition into self-employment. Our results suggest that the probability to transfer
from unemployment to self-employment is less affected (DiD results) or even slightly
declines (RDD results). This indicates that the reduction in UI benefit levels does not
push unemployed individuals to become self-employed, but rather induces search for
employment on the extensive margin. However, it also reduces actual UI duration of
those transitioning into self-employment, and thus may affect new startups.
Moreover, the UI duration elasticity for those unemployed individuals that become
self-employed is smaller (around 0.25 in DiD, up to 0.5 in RDD) than for those becoming
employed (around 0.4 in DiD, up till 0.9 in RDD). Hence, UI benefit levels have less
effect on the flow from unemployment to self-employment than for the channel from
unemployment into employment. Regarding our UI duration elasticity, one should note
that we can only compare our estimate with respect to employment to other estimates in
the literature. Given the fact that we analyze a cut in UI benefit levels, the estimate of
around 0.4 appears to be in line with other estimates (Doris et al. 2018). However, our
estimate is much smaller than the one reported by Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas
(2020). This may be related to the fact that we are able to evaluate the long-run reform
effect, and that we take into account total employment, construct a more representative
sample, and do not only limit on full-time employment after 64 weeks. In conclusion,
UI benefit levels affect the actual UI duration for those transferring into re-employment
more than for those who decide to start a business out of unemployment.
Our main findings are in line with the predictions from Standard Search Theory which
suggests that a decrease in benefit levels would lead to higher search intensity (compare
also to Marinescu & Skandalis 2019). Thus, the reservation wage for employment would
decrease. In general equilibrium, vacancies may increase and therefore labor market
tightness rises, which means that we would expect a higher job-finding rate. In fact, this
is what we find in our empirical results for the short term (see Figure 2·7). However,
as employment may rise, self-employment may be unaffected or becomes less likely in
relative terms. This reasoning is in line with our DiD results which estimate the average
treatment effect to be close to zero (Section 2.6.1).
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Turning to our RDD results in Section 2.6.2, we find a significantly negative local
treatment effect on the self-employment probability. This finding is in line with the
Entrepreneurial Choice Model which predicts that shortened UI duration, caused by
the decrease in benefits, leads to less human capital deterioration and relatively better
employment prospects compared with an unchanged UI benefit level. As there is less
time for learning about proper business opportunities, it is easier to find a job than starting
a business.
In summary, we find a significantly negative local average treatment effect (RDD) on
the probability to become self-employed but a zero average treatment effect (DiD). The
DiD approach compares treated individuals (with more than six months of UI entitlement)
before and after the reform with individuals from the control group (with at most six
months of UI entitlement) before and after the reform. The RDD approach only considers
the local difference of individuals in the treatment group (with more than six months of
UI entitlement) around the cutoff date. This suggests that the additional difference used
in the DiD absorbs most of the negative effect that we estimate in our RDD.
2.7.2 Welfare Analysis - Potential Mechanisms
From a policy perspective, it is interesting to understand the welfare implications of the
estimated causal results on the transition into self-employment. In the following, we
provide evidence whether the quality of self-employment has changed in response to the
reform, thus revealing the potential direction of the welfare effect.
Figure II·14 shows that the average share of self-employment among different age
groups before and after the reform has changed. Older individuals are less often self-
employed than before, whereas the opposite can be observed with respect to the younger
generation. However, this is only descriptive evidence because it could be caused by
other reforms in 2013 which particularly target young unemployed individuals to become
self-employed (see Appendix II.4.6 for more details about reforms).
We also find some descriptive evidence for the change in self-employment quality
once we analyze changes in the sector classification of the self-employed. Figure II·13
shows a remarkable decreasing trend in the construction sector during the years of
the recession until 2013 when the economy becomes stable again. The distributions
of agricultural, industrial, finance/real estate, and information/communication sectors
virtually stay constant over time. Most interesting is the rise of the service sector and the
sector of professional activities after the crisis but also during the years after the reform.
Especially, a growing service sector which includes transport, tourism and retail activities
could indicate an increase in necessity entrepreneurship.
The mean comparison in Appendix Table II.15 shows that among treated individuals
there is indeed a significant difference between the sector in which individuals worked
before they became unemployed and the new sector in which they run a their business.
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Table 2.9: Welfare Analysis: Sectors of New Self-Employment
Agr. Ind. Constr. Serv.
DiD 0.004 -0.025 -0.058 0.103
(0.023) (0.032) (0.078) (0.090)
N 752 752 752 752
RDD -0.010 -0.037 -0.018 0.027
(0.012) (0.044) (0.062) (0.091)
N 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224
Notes: Region-clustered (DiD) and entry-date-clustered (RDD) standard errors are shown in parentheses and signifi-
cance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We apply DiD and RDD estimation methods to derive results
using different self-employment sector indicators (agricultural, industrial, construction, and service sector) as depen-
dent variables. These variables refer to the sector of activity in the self-employment spell right after unemployment.
We use the specification in which we control for all covariates, but we only report the ATE (DiD) and local ATE (RDD)
coefficients respectively. We use the large sample for the DiD and the medium sample for the RDD, restricted to
individuals who are 35 to 52 years old and who exit from unemployment into self-employment within 24 months.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
We observe that the share of treated individuals who started to work as self-employed in
the service sector significantly increases at the expense of the industry and construction
sector. Again, this could be interpreted as evidence that the reform may have fostered
necessity37 entrepreneurship rather than opportunity entrepreneurship.
So far we only considered correlations. In the following, we try to disentangle the
potential causal relationship between the cut in UI benefits and self-employment quality
estimating the same DiD and RDD specifications as described in Section 2.5 but using
outcome variables for (self-)employment quality. We measure (self-)employment quality
using industry classification, the subsequent (self-)employment duration in days, as
well as the social security contribution basis as best available proxy for self-employment
income38. By restricting our samples to individuals who transition into (self-)employment
when they exit their unemployment spell, they are much smaller than the samples used in
our main specifications above.
Table 2.9 above shows the regression results using different self-employment sector
indicators as outcome variables. Clearly there is no significant impact of the reform on
self-employment sector choice, neither in the DiD nor in the RDD setting. Table 2.10
shows that we obtain similar results if we use earnings as outcome variable, approximated
by the social security contribution basis. The effect on self-employment income is mixed:
it seems to be negative in the DiD but positive using the RDD. But both effects are
insignificant. This mixed result may be related to the fact that for self-employed indi-
viduals the social security contribution basis is not ideal to approximate actual earnings.
37Fairlie & Fossen (2018) show that this type of self-employment follows a strongly counter-cyclical pattern and is
moving with the national unemployment rate.
38Note that, in case of employment, the social security contribution basis corresponds to the average spell-specific
monthly earnings.
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Table 2.10: Welfare Analysis: Exit Spell Earnings and Duration Regressions
EXIT SPELL EARNINGS EXIT SPELL DURATION
SE 24 SE 12 E 24 E 12 SE 24 SE 12 E 24 E 12
DiD -13.421 -15.600 -26.539 -36.400 -19.524 11.202 2.902 -3.224
(13.536) (17.392) (23.698) (24.488) (49.115) (76.614) (11.549) (13.370)
N 1,302 1,068 13,081 11,045 1,302 1,068 13,165 11,109
SE 12 SE 6 E 12 E 6 SE 12 SE 6 E 12 E 6
RDD 16.557 22.495 -1.477 3.355 50.041 4.007 -17.019 -30.381
(74.004) (90.282) (66.631) (72.350) (86.758) (88.435) (27.356) (29.320)
N 1,648 1,314 13,639 10,870 1,648 1,314 13,723 10,941
Notes: Region-clustered (DiD) and UI entry-date-clustered (RDD) standard errors are shown in parentheses and
significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We conduct DiD and RDD estimations using two different
outcome variables: 1) spell-specific monthly social security contribution basis to approximate (self-)employment
earnings and 2) spell duration (in days), right-censored to 1,080 days (3 years). Both dependent variables refer to the
spell right after unemployment (either employment or self-employment). We use the specification in which we control
for all covariates, but we only report the ATE (DiD) and local ATE (RDD) coefficients respectively. We use the large
sample for the DiD and the medium sample for the RDD, restricted to individuals who are 35 to 52 years old. We
only include those that exit from unemployment into (self-)employment. For the DiD, we consider transitions into
(self-)employment within 12 and 24 months. For the RDD, transitions within 6 and 12 months are considered.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Regarding employment, the negative effect is at least persistent across both models, but
again insignificant.39 The right-hand side of Table 2.10 refers to our regression results
using spell duration of the exit state as outcome variable. Again, the results from both
models are mixed and highly insignificant considering the huge standard errors.
All in all, we find descriptive evidence but no causal reform effect on self-employment
quality. As all our quasi-experimental estimation results are insignificant, the reform
does not seem to affect the quality of self-employment which means that the composition
of self-employment does not change due to the reform. Consequently, potential welfare
implications seem to be limited to the increase in the job-finding rate but with a much
smaller degree than proposed by Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020). This suggests
that ignoring self-employment and only focusing on results for employment instead of
total employment may lead to biased conclusions.
39Note that these apparently negative effects might be related to changes in the sector, rather than (self-)employment
experience, as suggested by Kaiser & Malchow-Møller (2011).
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2.8 Conclusion
This second chapter of my dissertation addresses how a reduction in UI benefit levels
affects total employment, i.e. the probability to become (re-)employed. Thereby, we
distinguish between self-employment and dependent employment. We investigate how
this reduction affects actual unemployment duration before unemployed individuals
become self-employed, as compared to those who become re-employed. Furthermore,
we also present approaches to disentangle the causal effect on self-employment by
analyzing its consequences on different outcomes of self-employment quality, in order to
investigate potential welfare implications. Finally, we rationalize our findings in relation
to the existing literature in labor and public economics.
While the existing literature has addressed how UI policies affect unemployment
duration and re-employment wages when self-employment as post-unemployment exit
state is excluded, we are among the first to include it. Since active labor market policies,
which incentivize mainly long-term unemployed individuals to become self-employed,
are commonly used policy measures to fight unemployment, understanding the effects of
the design of UI policies on self-employment seems to be highly relevant.
To surpass data limitation on the labor market employment histories of founders,
we prepare Spanish administrative social insurance and labor income data to analyze
all relevant labor market flows over the business cycle (2005-2017). This allows us to
provide a descriptive analysis of self-employment in Spain, both with respect to stock
and flow dimension. We show that flows from unemployment to self-employment are
very relevant in the case of Spain: 30% of all new businesses are created by previously
unemployed founders. During the crisis, this share increases up to 50% for some years.
We exploit a Spanish labor market reform in 2012 which affected the UI benefit
schedule by reducing the existing replacement rate of an individual’s previous net income
by approximately 16.67%. Using both RDD and DiD methods, we identify the causal
effects of the reduction in UI benefits on the transition probabilities and on actual
unemployment duration by exploiting reform-based exogenous variation in UI benefit
level schedules within the Spanish UI system.
Our DiD results show that on average a reduction in UI benefits does not significantly
affect the self-employment probability, neither in the short run (within six months of UI
entry) nor in the medium and long run (within 12-24 months of UI entry). If we focus on
the local average treatment effect identified by our RDD, we find a significantly negative
effect on the self-employment probability expanding in size throughout UI spell duration.
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On the contrary, our estimated average treatment effect on the probability to become
(re-)employed seems to be positive in the short run. It converges towards zero in the
medium run and turns significantly negative in the long run when we consider the whole
period. The local average treatment effect on employment is estimated to be significantly
positive throughout the UI spell. Our estimates’ magnitude is much smaller than the
dimension of the estimates provided by Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020). They
estimate a (local) average treatment effect on the job-finding rate of (26%) 41% in their
(RDD) DiD while our estimates point towards a short-run (local) average treatment effect
of (6.4%) 2.7%. This shows that the exclusion of data on self-employment matters and
may lead to substantial overestimation bias.
In line with Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas (2020), our DiD results clearly show
a behavioral response of the treated individuals: unemployed individuals increase their
search intensity to find employment within the first six months of unemployment, an-
ticipating the drop in UI benefits after six months. This explains the increase in the
short-term employment rate and its decline after the first six months. We find a much
smaller reaction to changes in UI benefits when it comes to self-employment. Conse-
quently, the probability to become self-employed declines in relative terms. Our DiD
results are in line with Standard Search Theory for both employment as well as self-
employment. Moreover, the local treatment effect (as measured by the RDD) speaks
in favor of a significantly negative effect on the self-employment probability which is
supported by the Entrepreneurial Choice Model.
In line with the findings of Doris et al. (2018) and Rebollo-Sanz & Rodríguez-Planas
(2020), we confirm that the UI benefit level duration elasticity is larger with respect to
UI benefit level cuts (rather than increases). We also find that the UI duration elasticity
is larger for those exiting into employment compared to those transitioning into self-
employment. Taking stocks including the results derived in Chapter 1 of my dissertation
(which corresponds to the discussion paper of Camarero Garcia & Murmann 2020), time
seems to be more important than money when it comes to the effect on self-employment.
Camarero Garcia & Murmann (2020) show that the extension of potential UI benefit
duration prolongs actual unemployment duration of those becoming self-employed. In
this case, the UI duration elasticity for those transitioning to self-employment is higher
than common estimates for those becoming re-employed suggest.
While we find some descriptive evidence for changes in self-employment quality due
to the reform that speaks in favor of an increase in necessity-driven entrepreneurship, we
cannot confirm a causal relationship. Future research may help to investigate the welfare
implications of reducing UI benefits on self-employment in more detail. Moreover,
theoretical models would help to rationalize our findings, thereby taking into account
both the effect of PBD on start-up success (Camarero Garcia & Murmann 2020), as
well as the effect of UI benefit levels on the probability to exit into self-employment, as
discussed in this second chapter of my doctoral thesis.
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II.1 Appendix: Supplementary Figures
II.1.1 Descriptive Analysis Figures
Figure II·1: Composition of the Labor Force in Spain
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Notes: This figure illustrates the composition of the Spanish labor force between 2005 and 2017. It shows
the percentage of individuals of working age (in this case, over 18 years old) distinguishing Unemployment,
Dependent Employment and Self-Employment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·2: Distribution of Workers across Employment States and Age Groups
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Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of workers across the different employment states: Unemploy-
ment, Temporary Employment, Permanent Employment and Self-Employment, with respect to their age
group, as a percentage of the Spanish labor force.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·3: Self-Employment Rate
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Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the self-employment rates in Spain from 2005 to
2017 on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).
Figure II·4: Unemployment Rate
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Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the unemployment rates in Spain from 2005 to 2017
on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly basis.
Note that our definition of unemployment includes individuals who receive either contributory (UI) or
non-contributory (UA) unemployment benefits, as well as individuals who do not receive any benefits at
all, and those who are tagged as receiving cease-of-activity benefits.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).
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Figure II·5: Part-Time Employment Rate
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Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the part-time employment rates in Spain from 2005
to 2017 on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly
basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).
Figure II·6: Temporary Employment Rate
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Notes: The left-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the temporary employment rates in Spain from 2005
to 2017 on a quarterly basis. The right-hand figure illustrates the evolution of the same rates on a yearly
basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data and official statistics provided by INE
(2018) and OECD (2018).
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Figure II·7: Composition: Inflows into/Outflows from Self-Employment incl. Stocks
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(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of self-employment in Spain providing the share of
each component in percentage of the total stock. We distinguish transitions to self-employment (inflows),
on the left-hand side, and transitions from self-employment (outflows), on the right-hand side, with respect
to the following labor market states: out of the labor force (OL), dependent employment (E), unemployment
(U), and the corresponding stock of those who remain in self-employment (SE). The sample is restricted to
individuals of working age (in this case, over 18 years old).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·8: Composition of Outflows from Self-Employment excl. Stocks
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(a) Yearly Outflows
0
20
40
60
80
100
T
o
ta
l 
o
f 
o
u
tf
lo
w
s
 f
ro
m
 S
E
 (
1
0
0
%
) 
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
OL E U
(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly outflows from self-employment in Spain, in both absolute (left)
and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age (in this case, over 18 years
old). We distinguish outflows of individuals from self-employment (SE) to the following labor market
states: out of the labor force (OL), dependent employment (E), and unemployment (U). This is the other
side of the coin: the inflows are shown in the main text in Figure 2·1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·9: Composition of Inflows into Employment
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(a) Yearly Inflows
0
20
40
60
80
100
T
o
ta
l 
o
f 
e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s
 (
1
0
0
%
) 
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
OL E SE U
(b) Yearly Inflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions to employment (inflows) in Spain, in
both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age (in
this case, over 18 years old). We consider inflows of individuals into employment (E) from the following
labor market states: out of the labor force (OL), self-employment (SE), and unemployment (U), along with
the corresponding stock of those who remain in dependent employment (E).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·10: Composition of Outflows from Employment
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(a) Yearly Outflows
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(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions from employment (outflows) in Spain,
in both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age (in
this case, over 18 years old). We consider outflows of individuals from employment (E) into the following
labor market states: out of the labor force (OL), self-employment (SE), and unemployment (U), along with
the corresponding stock of those who remain in dependent employment (E).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·11: Composition of Inflows into Unemployment
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(a) Yearly Inflows
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(b) Yearly Inflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions to unemployment (inflows) in Spain, in
both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working age (in this
case, over 18 years old). We consider inflows of individuals into unemployment (U) from the following
labor market states: out of the labor force (OL), dependent employment (E), and self-employment (SE),
along with the corresponding stock of those who remain in unemployment (U).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·12: Composition of Outflows from Unemployment
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(b) Yearly Outflows in %
Notes: These figures illustrate the yearly composition of transitions from unemployment (outflows) in
Spain, in both absolute (left) and relative (right) terms. The sample is restricted to individuals of working
age (in this case, over 18 years old). We consider outflows of individuals from unemployment (U) into the
following labor market states: out of the labor force (OL), dependent employment (E), and self-employment
(SE), along with the corresponding stock of those who remain in unemployment (U).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·13: Sector Distribution of the Self-Employed
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Notes: This figure illustrates the composition of self-employment in Spain, with respect to the sector
variable in each year. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 35 to 52 years old.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data and on the classification in García &
Román (2019).
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Figure II·14: Distribution of Workers across Employment States and Age Groups
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Notes: These figures illustrate the distribution of workers across the different employment states: unem-
ployment, temporary employment, permanent employment and self-employment, with respect to their age
group, as a percentage of the Spanish labor force. The share of self-employed among older individuals (50
and older) appears to decline in favor of unemployment and part-time employment, whereas for the youth
(below 30) self-employment becomes more relevant.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·15: Distribution of Monthly Earnings (Tax Data)
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Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of real monthly earnings in Spain, according to the tax files.
The sample is restricted to individuals who are older than 18.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·16: Evolution of Yearly Earnings
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Notes: This figure illustrates the evolution of mean annual earnings in Spain for Employment, according to
the Social Security records and the tax files. The sample is restricted to individuals who are older than 18.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·17: Evolution of Monthly and Daily Earnings
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(a) Monthly Earnings
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(b) Daily Earnings
Notes: These figures illustrate the evolution of monthly (left) and daily (right) earnings in Spain for
Employment, according to the Social Security records and the tax files. The sample is restricted to
individuals who are older than 18.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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II.1.2 Empirical Analysis Figures
Figure II·18: UI Transitions per Quarter (Percentage)
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Notes: This figure shows the quarterly transitions to UI, in absolute and relative terms, for both the control
and the treatment group. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20 to 52 years old, with an UI
entitlement length of at least 120 days. It includes individuals who enter their UI benefit spell between
2008 and 2014.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·19: UI Transitions per Month (Total Numbers and Percentage)
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Notes: These figures show the monthly transitions to UI, in absolute (left) and relative (right) terms, for
both the control and the treatment group. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20 to 52 years
old and who have an UI entitlement length of at least 120 days. It includes individuals who enter their UI
benefit spell between 2008 and 2014.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·20: Parallel Trends Check for Employment and Total Employment
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Notes: These figures show quarterly average probabilities of exiting from unemployment (UI) into em-
ployment (E) and total employment (TE) in the period between Q1/2010 and Q4/2014. The sample is
restricted to individuals who are 20 to 52 years old and who have an UI entitlement length of at least 120
days. The reform quarter is highlighted with a red dashed line. These figures illustrate that the common
trend assumption holds, i.e. that there appear to exist parallel trends in both treatment and control group
before the reform.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·21: Distribution of Observations per Bin for the McCrary Test (Medium Sample)
McCrary Test:
Discontinuity est.= -.003(.037)
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Notes: The sample consists of all individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, with more than 180 days of UI
benefit entitlement. We consider only entries into UI between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium
sample). Each bin covers 14 days.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Figure II·22: McCrary Test for Individuals Entering their UI Spell (Large/Small Sample)
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Notes: These figures illustrate the McCrary tests for individuals entering their UI spell within 540 (large
sample) and 180 (small sample) days distance from the cutoff, respectively. The large sample (left) consists
of individuals entering their UI spell between January 2011 and December 2013. The small sample (right)
only considers entries into the UI system in 2012. In both samples, we consider individuals who are 35 to
52 years old and who have more than 180 days of UI benefit entitlement. The discontinuity estimates (log
differences in height) are 0.0005 (0.0352) for the large sample, and -0.0134 (0.0582) for the small sample.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·23: RDD Reform Effect on Self-Employment Probabilities by Age Restrictions (20-52
left vs. 35-52 right)
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Notes: These figures illustrate RDD results for our quadratic prediction plots of self-employment probabili-
ties. The sample is restricted to individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits who are 20 to 52
years old in the left, and 35 to 52 years old in the right figure panels. We only consider individuals whose
UI benefit spell starts between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·24: RDD Reform Effect on Employment Probabilities by Age Restrictions (20-52 left
vs. 35-52 right)
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Notes: These figures illustrate RDD results for our quadratic prediction plots of employment probabilities.
The sample is restricted to individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits who are 20 to 52 years
old in the left, and 35 to 52 years old in the right panel figures. We only consider individuals whose UI
benefit spell starts between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Figure II·25: RDD Reform Effect on Total Employment Probabilities by Age Restrictions (20-52
left vs. 35-52 right)
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Notes: These figures illustrate RDD results for our quadratic prediction plots of total employment probabil-
ities. The sample is restricted to individuals entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits who are 20 to 52
years old in the left, and 35 to 52 years old in the right figure panels. We only consider individuals whose
UI benefit spell starts between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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II.2 Appendix: Supplementary Tables
Table II.1: Personal Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.46 (0.50)
Age at entry into spell 41.11 (12.64)
Immigrant dummy (nationality) 0.18 (0.38)
Kids 0.40 (0.49)
Less than secondary education 0.58 (0.49)
Secondary education 0.25 (0.43)
University education 0.17 (0.38)
Agriculture 0.03 (0.18)
Industry 0.08 (0.27)
Construction 0.05 (0.22)
All Services and others 0.52 (0.50)
SE experience in months 30.46 (80.29)
WE experience in months 143.62 (136.41)
SE tenure in months 24.48 (71.64)
WE tenure in months 46.29 (76.85)
Observations 1,307,568
Notes: This table presents the mean and standard deviation for some main personal characteristics in the
MCVL sample between 2005 and 2017. Each observation corresponds to one individual. Time-varying
characteristics refer to the last spell of an individual. The sample is restricted to individuals older than 18.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Table II.2: Personal Characteristics: Self-Employed and Employed
SELF-EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.50
Age at entry into spell 43.49 11.54 39.29 11.76
Immigrant dummy 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38
Kids 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.50
Less than secondary education 0.60 0.49 0.53 0.50
Secondary education 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.44
University education 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.40
Agriculture 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19
Industry 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.32
Construction 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.24
All Services and Others 0.68 0.46 0.72 0.45
SE experience in months 164.75 132.03 7.67 31.95
WE experience in months 73.04 85.19 166.08 138.34
SE tenure in months 138.63 129.47 5.52 25.81
WE tenure in months 24.27 45.90 59.20 84.29
Part-time contract 0.20 0.40
Temporary contract 0.40 0.49
Observations 166,808 788,439
Notes: This table presents the mean and the standard deviation for some main personal characteristics. We
distinguish between self-employed and employed workers. Time-varying characteristics refer to the last
spell of each individual. The information refers to the sample between 2005 and 2017, which is restricted
to individuals who are older than 18.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the MCVL data.
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Table II.3: Minimum and Maximum UI Benefit Amount (valid 2010-2016)
Dependent Children Minimum Maximum
0 80% IPREM + 1/6 · (monthly benefit) [497.01C] 175% IPREM [1,087.21C]
1 107% IPREM + 1/6 · (monthly benefit) [664.75C] 200% IPREM [1,242.52C]
≥ 2 107% IPREM + 1/6 · (monthly benefit) [664.75C] 225% IPREM [1,397.84C]
Notes: This table summarizes the computation of the legal maximum and minimum benefit amounts. Note
that these limits depend on the family responsibilities (number of dependent children or descendants) and
the value of the IPREM index in a given year. We present the amounts for the period 2010-2016, when the
IPREM index remained unchanged at 532.51 Euro per month.
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on the SEPE (2019).
Table II.4: Summary Statistics (age group 20-52)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
treated 0.66 0.47 0 1 51,867
post 0.46 0.5 0 1 51,867
treated_post 0.31 0.46 0 1 51,867
female 0.5 0.5 0 1 51,867
age_entry 33.53 7.95 20 51.92 51,867
immigrant_nat 0.18 0.38 0 1 51,867
children 0.53 0.5 0 1 51,867
university 0.15 0.36 0 1 51,867
med_educ 0.24 0.43 0 1 51,867
low_educ 0.61 0.49 0 1 51,867
low_skill 0.59 0.49 0 1 51,867
med_skill 0.3 0.46 0 1 51,867
high_skill 0.1 0.3 0 1 51,867
sec_agri 0.03 0.17 0 1 50,823
sec_industry 0.1 0.3 0 1 50,823
sec_construction 0.12 0.33 0 1 50,823
sec_service 0.36 0.48 0 1 50,823
WE_exper 2,104.6 1,297.92 364 8,689 51,867
SE_exper 238.09 795.71 0 11,030 51,867
UI_entitlement 340.41 199.66 120 720 51,867
UI_dur 160.75 160.5 1 773 51,867
UE_dur 304.05 369.55 1 2,507 51,867
gdp_gr_entry -0.49 0.37 -0.98 0.29 51,867
Notes: This table presents some summary statistics for the covariates that are relevant for our estimations.
We also include statistics on sector and UI entitlement. The sample corresponds to those individuals who
are 20 to 52 years old and became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample).
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the MCVL data.
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Table II.5: Summary Statistics (age group 35-52)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
treated 0.71 0.46 0 1 20,568
post 0.47 0.5 0 1 20,568
treated_post 0.34 0.47 0 1 20,568
female 0.51 0.5 0 1 20,568
age_entry 41.88 4.60 35 51.92 20,568
immigrant_nat 0.21 0.41 0 1 20,568
children 0.63 0.48 0 1 20,568
university 0.11 0.31 0 1 20,568
med_educ 0.25 0.43 0 1 20,568
low_educ 0.64 0.48 0 1 20,568
low_skill 0.64 0.48 0 1 20,568
med_skill 0.28 0.45 0 1 20,568
high_skill 0.07 0.26 0 1 20,568
sec_agri 0.03 0.18 0 1 20,051
sec_industry 0.1 0.3 0 1 20,051
sec_construction 0.14 0.35 0 1 20,051
sec_service 0.35 0.48 0 1 20,051
WE_exper 2,927.24 1,418.56 365 8,689 20,568
SE_exper 488.23 1,154.36 0 11,030 20,568
UI_entitlement 379.45 216.04 120 720 20,568
UI_dur 181.25 187.06 1 769 20,568
UE_dur 325.59 392.79 1 2507 20,568
gdp_gr_entry -0.48 0.37 -0.98 0.29 20,568
Notes: This table presents some summary statistics for the covariates that are relevant for our estimations.
We also include statistics on sector and UI entitlement. The sample corresponds to those individuals who
are 35 to 52 years old, and became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample).
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the MCVL data.
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Table II.6: Mean-Comparison Tests (age group 20-52)
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM
Mean TG Mean CG Mean diff. Mean TG Mean CG Mean diff.
female 0.49 0.50 -0.02∗∗ 0.51 0.51 -0.00
age_entry 33.98 32.27 1.71∗∗∗ 34.35 32.16 2.19∗∗∗
immigrant_nat 0.17 0.21 -0.05∗∗∗ 0.15 0.18 -0.03∗∗∗
children 0.52 0.53 -0.01 0.52 0.54 -0.02∗∗∗
university 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.02∗∗∗
med_educ 0.25 0.23 0.01∗∗ 0.25 0.23 0.01∗∗
low_educ 0.62 0.64 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.58 0.61 -0.03∗∗∗
low_skill 0.59 0.63 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.58 0.62 -0.04∗∗∗
med_skill 0.30 0.29 0.02∗∗∗ 0.30 0.29 0.01
high_skill 0.10 0.09 0.02∗∗∗ 0.12 0.09 0.04∗∗∗
sec_agri 0.02 0.02 0.01∗∗ 0.04 0.03 0.01∗∗∗
sec_industry 0.10 0.09 0.01∗∗∗ 0.10 0.09 0.01∗∗
sec_construction 0.15 0.13 0.01∗∗∗ 0.11 0.09 0.02∗∗∗
sec_service 0.34 0.36 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.36 0.41 -0.04∗∗∗
WE_exper 2,316.97 1,559.66 757.31∗∗∗ 2,434.16 1,613.00 821.17∗∗∗
SE_exper 221.98 241.42 -19.45∗ 241.90 268.02 -26.11∗∗
UI_entitlement 437.12 144.04 293.08∗∗∗ 445.66 144.33 301.33∗∗∗
UI_dur 202.92 103.84 99.08∗∗∗ 182.07 102.49 79.58∗∗∗
UE_dur 347.69 305.97 41.72∗∗∗ 287.19 258.34 28.85∗∗∗
gdp_gr_entry -0.61 -0.61 -0.004 -0.33 -0.36 0.02∗∗∗
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%. This table presents the results of the mean-comparison t-tests for our treatment and control
groups, both before and after the reform. The sample corresponds to those individuals who are 20 to 52
years old, and became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample). We restrict
our sample to those individuals with 120 days of UI entitlement or more.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MCVL data.
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Table II.7: Mean-Comparison Tests (age group 35-52)
PRE-REFORM POST-REFORM
Mean TG Mean CG Mean diff. Mean TG Mean CG Mean diff.
female 0.49 0.53 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.51 0.52 -0.01
age_entry 41.88 41.84 0.04 41.85 41.82 0.02
immigrant_nat 0.22 0.23 -0.02∗ 0.18 0.20 -0.02∗
children 0.62 0.65 -0.03∗∗ 0.61 0.66 -0.05∗∗∗
university 0.11 0.09 0.03∗∗∗ 0.14 0.10 0.04∗∗∗
med_educ 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.27 0.23 0.04∗∗∗
low_educ 0.63 0.67 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.60 0.67 -0.07∗∗∗
low_skill 0.65 0.68 -0.04∗∗∗ 0.63 0.70 -0.07∗∗∗
med_skill 0.28 0.26 0.02∗∗ 0.27 0.24 0.03∗∗∗
high_skill 0.07 0.06 0.01∗∗ 0.09 0.06 0.03∗∗∗
sec_agri 0.03 0.02 0.01∗∗∗ 0.04 0.03 0.01∗∗∗
sec_industry 0.10 0.09 0.02∗∗∗ 0.11 0.10 0.01
sec_construction 0.16 0.16 -0.00 0.12 0.12 -0.00
sec_service 0.34 0.33 0.01 0.37 0.38 -0.01
WE_exper 3,009.24 2,453.38 555.86∗∗∗ 3,177.00 2,643.01 533.98∗∗∗
SE_exper 450.58 520.56 -69.98∗∗∗ 467.17 634.46 -167.29∗∗∗
UI_entitlement 467.92 143.11 324.81∗∗∗ 485.07 143.72 341.35∗∗∗
UI_dur 227.06 105.42 121.65∗∗∗ 207.07 102.89 104.18∗∗∗
UE_dur 377.13 305.40 71.73∗∗∗ 319.10 263.52 55.58∗∗∗
gdp_gr_entry -0.61 -0.60 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.33 -0.35 0.03∗∗
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%. This table presents the results of the mean-comparison t-tests for our treatment and control
groups, both before and after the reform. The sample corresponds to those individuals who are 35 to 52
years old, and became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample). We restrict
our sample to those individuals with 120 days of UI entitlement or more.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL data.
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Table II.8: Robustness Check of UI and UE Duration Estimates (DiD)
Outcome Baseline + Socioec. + Macroec. + Job Charact.
UI Duration
Total -15.16∗∗∗ -15.31∗∗∗ -15.13∗∗∗ -14.54∗∗∗
(4.645) (4.646) (4.472) (4.667)
N 20,585 20,585 20,585 20,585
Employment -15.57∗∗∗ -15.73∗∗∗ -15.88∗∗∗ -15.15∗∗∗
(4.692) (4.698) (4.399) (4.648)
N 19,198 19,198 19,198 19,198
Self-Employment -14.54∗∗ -17.87∗∗ -17.17∗∗ -18.59∗∗
(6.525) (6.602) (6.804) (6.667)
N 6,844 6,844 6,844 6,844
UE Duration
Total -12.47 -12.82 -12.50 -13.42
(10.26) (9.950) (9.663) (9.319)
N 20,585 20,585 20,585 20,585
Employment -12.61 -13.22 -13.43 -14.33
(10.78) (10.31) (9.752) (9.440)
N 19,198 19,198 19,198 19,198
Self-Employment -21.58 -25.89 -24.89 -30.37
(28.06) (27.82) (28.62) (26.28)
N 6,844 6,844 6,844 6,844
Notes: Region-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated
by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the ATE coefficients but control for all additional sets of
covariates described in the column header. We use UI/UE duration (in days) as our dependent variable.
Our estimation sample includes individuals who are 35 to 52 years old and who switched into an UI spell
between January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample). They have an UI entitlement duration of at least
120 days. The results for the total sample correspond to those presented in Table 2.3. The Employment
row header corresponds to our sample that excludes individuals who transition into self-employment (it
keeps those who either stay unemployed or find a job). The Self-Employment row header corresponds to
our sample that excludes individuals who find a job after their unemployment spell (it keeps those who
stay either unemployed or transition into self-employment).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Table II.9: UI and UE Duration Average Values
TREATMENT GROUP CONTROL GROUP
Outcome Pre-Reform Post-Reform Pre-Reform Post-Reform
UI
Total 222.147 204.471 105.100 102.588
Employment 226.557 208.430 105.195 102.641
Self-employment 333.456 313.830 121.542 116.453
UE
Total 369.124 314.684 304.330 262.365
Employment 381.547 325.317 307.429 263.809
Self-employment 650.848 579.282 528.559 478.574
Notes: This table presents the UI and UE duration average values. The sample is restricted to individuals
who are 35 to 52 years old, and became unemployed between January 2011 and December 2013 (large
sample). The Employment row header corresponds to our sample that excludes individuals who transition
into self-employment (it keeps those who either stay unemployed or find a job). The Self-Employment
row header corresponds to our sample that excludes individuals who find a job after their unemployment
spell (it keeps those who stay either unemployed or transition into self-employment). The Total row header
corresponds to the sample that includes all of these cases (individuals who transition into self-employment,
find a job or stay unemployed).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Table II.10: Difference-in-Differences (Heterogeneity Tests: UI/UE Duration)
UI DURATION UE DURATION
Age > 45 ≤ 45 > 45 ≤ 45
-13.062 -15.263∗∗∗ 11.521 -23.850∗∗
(9.282) (4.054) (22.645) (8.266)
N 5,723 14,862 5,723 14,862
Children With Without With Without
-13.865∗∗∗ -14.118∗∗ -10.379 -16.536
(4.755) (6.043) (13.232) (13.716)
N 12,893 7,692 12,893 7,692
Gender Female Male Female Male
-7.728 -20.526∗∗∗ -12.081 -11.547
(6.672) (6.662) (9.972) (19.776)
N 10,475 10,110 10,475 10,110
Contract Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
-9.981 -18.474∗∗∗ -20.475 -22.684
(8.842) (3.863) (16.211) (15.711)
N 7,537 13,048 7,537 13,048
Employer Public Private Public Private
-10.458 -15.895∗∗ -17.743 -15.929
(11.968) (5.543) (49.913) (12.017)
N 2,186 17,825 2,186 17,825
Notes: Region-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by:
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using our main
specification and UI/UE duration as dependent variables. The sample includes all individuals who are 35
to 52 years old, who have an UI entitlement larger than 120 days, and who became unemployed between
January 2011 and December 2013 (large sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Table II.11: Regression Discontinuity Robustness (medium sample)
Outcome Baseline +Socioeconomic +Macroeconomic +Job Charac.
Self-Employment
6 months -0.014 -0.016∗ -0.023∗ -0.024∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
12 months -0.013 -0.016 -0.026∗ -0.028∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
18 months -0.013 -0.016 -0.027∗ -0.029∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017)
24 months -0.017 -0.021∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Employment
6 months 0.037 0.034 0.067 0.064
(0.029) (0.028) (0.044) (0.040)
12 months 0.068∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.066∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.040) (0.037)
18 months 0.052∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.055 0.054∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.032)
24 months 0.066∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.030)
Total Employment
6 months 0.024 0.018 0.044 0.040
(0.027) (0.026) (0.041) (0.036)
12 months 0.054∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.042 0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.032)
18 months 0.039∗ 0.036 0.028 0.025
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.028)
24 months 0.049∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.033 0.030
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023)
Unemployment Duration
UI -33.834∗∗∗ -34.917∗∗∗ -27.796 -25.235
(12.826) (12.758) (18.603) (15.991)
UE -43.611∗∗ -43.923∗∗ -42.433 -39.108∗
(18.498) (18.497) (26.105) (23.598)
N 24,961 24,961 24,961 24,961
Notes: UI entry-date-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated
by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the local ATE coefficients but control for all additional sets of
covariates described in the column header. Our estimation sample includes individuals who are 35 to 52
years old, and entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits, who entered their UI spell between 1 July
2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Table II.12: Regression Discontinuity Robustness (small sample)
Outcome Baseline +Socioeconomic +Macroeconomic +Job Charac.
Self-Employment
6 months -0.012 -0.019 -0.027 -0.031
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
12 months -0.013 -0.020 -0.033∗ -0.037∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020)
18 months -0.015 -0.024 -0.039∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)
24 months -0.018 -0.028∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
Employment
6 months 0.066 0.062 0.104∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.045) (0.043) (0.052) (0.048)
12 months 0.036 0.035 0.081∗ 0.076∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.046)
18 months 0.041 0.040 0.077∗ 0.074∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.041)
24 months 0.042 0.039 0.089∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.038)
Total Employment
6 months 0.054 0.043 0.076 0.067
(0.041) (0.040) (0.052) (0.047)
12 months 0.024 0.015 0.048 0.039
(0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044)
18 months 0.027 0.017 0.038 0.030
(0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.039)
24 months 0.023 0.011 0.047 0.042
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.030)
Unemployment Duration
UI -19.643 -23.124 -38.462 -33.166
(18.524) (18.441) (24.838) (22.226)
UE -27.898 -29.073 -61.428∗ -53.811
(26.334) (26.502) (35.861) (33.228)
N 12,415 12,415 12,415 12,415
Notes: UI entry-date-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated
by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the local ATE coefficients but control for all additional sets
of covariates described in the column header. Our estimation sample includes individuals who are 35 to
52 years old, and entitled to more than 180 days of UI benefits, who entered their UI spell in 2012 (small
sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Table II.13: Small Sample Results (RDD)
(a) SE and E
Outcome 20-52 35-52
Self-employment
6 months -0.020∗ -0.031
(0.012) (0.019)
12 months -0.030∗∗ -0.037∗
(0.014) (0.020)
18 months -0.033∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.015) (0.021)
24 months -0.034∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.015) (0.020)
Employment
6 months 0.059 0.097∗∗
(0.038) (0.048)
12 months 0.055 0.076∗
(0.036) (0.046)
18 months 0.052 0.074∗
(0.033) (0.041)
24 months 0.059∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.029) (0.038)
N 22,771 12,415
(b) TE and UI/UE Duration
Outcome 20-52 35-52
Total Employment
6 months 0.039 0.067
(0.037) (0.047)
12 months 0.026 0.039
(0.035) (0.044)
18 months 0.019 0.030
(0.029) (0.039)
24 months 0.025 0.042
(0.023) (0.030)
Unemployment Duration
UI -23.994 -33.166
(15.438) (22.226)
UE -39.327∗ -53.811
(21.974) (33.228)
N 22,771 12,415
Notes: UI entry-date-clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated
by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. We only report the local ATE coefficients but control for all covariates using
our main specification. Results in the first column are based on individuals who are 20 to 52 years old. The
second column refers to individuals who are 35 to 52. Both samples are restricted to individuals entitled to
more than 180 days of UI benefits who entered their UI spell in 2012 (small sample).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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Table II.14: UI and UE Duration Elasticities from RDD
Outcome Baseline + Socioec. + Macroec. + Job Charact.
UI
Total 0.577∗∗ 0.568∗∗ 0.463 0.419
Employment 0.664∗∗ 0.652∗∗ 0.545 0.498
Self-employment 0.375 0.305 0.139 0.108
UE
Total 0.336 0.320 0.528 0.495∗
Employment 0.411 0.394 0.626∗ 0.589∗∗
Self-employment 0.090 0.077 0.210 0.175
Notes: Significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. This table presents the UI and UE
duration elasticities, computed from the RDD estimation results. The elasticity η is computed according to
the following formula: η = ∆(duration)∆(RR) . In other words, we calculate the elasticity based on the percentage
variation in UI or UE duration (with respect to the average duration before the reform) divided by the
variation in the replacement rates due to the reform (approx. 16.67%). The sample includes all individuals
who are 35 to 52 years old, with an UI entitlement duration of at least 180 days, who became unemployed
between 1 July 2011 and 31 July 2013 (medium sample). The results for the Total row header are based
on the total sample used in Table 2.3. The Employment header corresponds to our sample that excludes
individuals who transition into self-employment (it keeps those who either stay unemployed or find a job).
The Self-Employment header corresponds to our sample that excludes individuals who find a job after their
unemployment spell (it keeps those who stay either unemployed or transition into self-employment).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
Table II.15: Mean Comparison Test for Sectors of Self-Employed Workers
Pre UE Post UE Difference
Mean Mean (Std. Error)
Agriculture 0.008 0.014 0.007
(0.005)
Industry 0.102 0.050 −0.052∗∗∗
(0.010)
Construction 0.163 0.136 −0.028∗∗∗
(0.010)
Services 0.405 0.493 0.088∗∗∗
(0.016)
N 1,040 1,040
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, **
5%, * 10%. The sample consists of individuals who are 35 to 52 years old, with more than six month of UI
entitlement (treatment group), who became unemployed between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013
(large sample) and transitioned into self-employment within 24 months right after their unemployment spell.
We compare the pre-displacement activity sector and the self-employment sector right after unemployment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MCVL 2005-2017 data.
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II.3 Appendix: Data and Variables
II.3.1 MCVL Dataset
MCVL - Overview
Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) means Continuous Working Lives Sample.
It can be used to extract a monthly panel of administrative microeconomic data. Starting
from the year 2004, MCVL has been released every year by Spain’s Dirección General
de Ordenación de la Seguridad Social (DGOSS), with 2017 as the latest edition. It
contains social security data of a 4% non-stratified random sample of the population.
Any individual who is working, receiving unemployment benefits, or receiving a pension
in Spain could be in this sample.40
The MCVL consists of two versions. The version Sin Datos Fiscales (SDF) includes
social security data without income tax records. Each edition provides data of contribution
bases from which the real labor earnings can be inferred for most individuals. However,
these real earnings are top- and bottom coded. In the version Con Datos Fiscales (CDF),
income tax records data is added, which provides information on each job and the
uncensored real earnings separately. The data files contained in each edition can be
merged via the person ID which is maintained across MCVL editions. Even though the
person ID used in SDF differs from the one used in CDF, observations are obtained from
the same sample. Each MCVL edition comprises the complete labor market history of
the individuals in the sample from 1953 until the respective year of the MCVL wave,
although earnings data are available only since 1980. Combining the editions is useful to
optimize representativeness over time, since it allows to detect all individuals who are
added because they have been registered with the Social Security, even though they may
have been missing in one MCVL wave due to administrative mistakes. Thus, linking
the MCVL editions allows to fill gaps in the affiliations with the Social Security and
to update variables which are only updated when a new MCVL wave is produced (e.g.
residence).
The MCVL provides not only monthly data on labor income and (un-)employment
spells but also information on individual characteristics (gender, age, education, national-
ity, occupation, etc.), working time, and employers’ characteristics (firm size, firm sector,
etc.). Additionally, experience levels can be computed.
Due to space limitation this appendix provides a brief overview of our extensive data
work referring to more detailed data documentations that allow a replication of our work.
Moreover, we think that our data and variable documentation can prove to be useful for
other researchers who intend to work with the MCVL data.Our data documentations are
available upon request.
40Note that in this working paper, we do not consider pension data and only partially use taxable income data.
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Data Sources
For more information on the Spanish social security data and the availability of these
datasets, the reader is recommended to refer to the Dirección General de Ordenación de
la Seguridad Social.
To be able to work with the MCVL data, one has to apply for getting access to the
data which is described in details on http://www.seg-social.es/wps/portal/wss/
internet/EstadisticasPresupuestosEstudios/Estadisticas/EST211/1459.
We created an overview document that lists all variables that are contained in each
of the MCVL original datasets (2005-2017): “Documentation of MCVL Variables and
Labels”.
II.3.2 Data Construction
From Raw to Master Data
We refer to our first part of our data documentation “Documentation I: From Original
Data to Master Data” for a detailed description of how to clean the original raw dataset
from the Spanish social security authorities and construct our “master dataset”. The
documentation is intended to provide guidance how to use our do-files to replicate our
work and generate the master dataset. Our master dataset aims to include as much
variables and information as possible (e.g. it keeps parallel and overlapping spells from
side jobs), such that it can be used as starting point for other research projects. We created
an Excel-document that provides an overview of all variables which we obtain in the
master dataset: “MCVL-Variables.xlsx”.
Our code partially builds up on the replication files and data documentation for
“Unemployment in Administrative data using Survey data as a benchmark” by Lafuente
(2019), “Learning by working in big cities” by De La Roca & Puga (2017), and the repli-
cation files for “Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes
from Spanish Reforms” by Agrawal & Foremny (2019). In the data documentations,
we cite them as reference when we follow the corresponding author’s approach, or we
indicate in which way our concept differs from these key references.
From Master Data to Final Results
Our analysis dataset is restricted to the needs of this research project. Therefore, we
only keep an individual’s main spells and eliminate parallel and overlapping spells from
side jobs. We provide a detailed description of how we create our analysis dataset based
on the master dataset in our documentation file “Documentation II: From Master Data
to Results”. Finally, we created an Excel-document that provides an overview of all
variables which we obtain in the process from transforming the master dataset into the
analysis dataset: “MCVL_Variables_Analysis”.
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II.3.3 Variables Overview
Outcome Variables
• Within measures of unemployment exit states: This is a set of binary outcome
variables that take a value of one if individual i becomes self-employed or (total)
employed within a certain amount of months t. The variable takes a value of zero if
the individual remains unemployed within this period. We choose intervals of 6,
12, 18, and 24 months.
• Unemployment exit states of month t: This is a set of binary outcome variables
that take the value one if individual i exits from unemployment into the state of
interest (either self-employment (SE), employment (E) or total employment (TE)
- see Figure 2·3) in month t, given that we still observe this individual as being
unemployed at the beginning of month t. The variable takes the value zero if the
individual stays unemployed in month t. Consequently, we estimate the effects on
three different outcome variables (SE, E, TE) per month t, where t reaches from
month 1 to 26 of the unemployment spell.
• Duration measures
– UI spell duration: This variable only considers the UI spell duration and
excludes UA spells as well as unregistered periods of unemployment. It is
measured in days.
– UE spell duration: This variable measure the general unemployment (UE)
spell duration (including UI spells, UA spells and unregistered periods of
unemployment). It is measured in days.
Control Variables
All control variables are measured at the individual’s UI spell entry.
• Socioeconomic characteristics
– Female dummy: female (1), male (0).
– ln(age): natural logarithm of the individual’s age in years.
– Educational level: distinguishes individuals with lower41, secondary42, and
university43 education.
– Children dummy: with children (1), without children (0).
– Immigrant dummy: immigrant44 (1), native (0).
41This category includes up to Secondary Education and Basic Professional Training.
42This category includes Bachillerato, Advanced Professional Training and other intermediate diplomas.
43This category includes all university degrees, post-graduate and specialization studies.
44Based on the individual’s nationality, regardless of birth country.
148
• Macroeconomic control variables
– Quarterly real GDP growth rate: as obtained from INE (2018).
– UI entry month indicators.
– Autonomous Regions indicators: Andalusia, Aragon, Principality of Asturias,
Balearic Islands, Basque Autonomous Community, Canary Islands, Cantabria,
Castile and Leon, Castilla-La-Mancha, Catalonia, Estremadura, Galicia, La
Rioja, Community of Madrid, Region of Murcia, Navarra and Valencian
Community.
• Pre-displacement job characteristics:
– ln(employment experience): natural logarithm of the individual’s number of
days employed.
– ln(self-employment experience): natural logarithm of the individual’s number
of days self-employed.
– Occupational skill level: distinguishes high45, medium46, and low47 skilled
workers.
II.4 Appendix: Institutional Details
II.4.1 Social Security System in Spain
The Spanish social security system is organised in four different contribution regimes
(schemes). Ordinary employed individuals are registered within the General Scheme, but
there are also special schemes for sea workers, coal mining workers and self-employed
individuals (Autonomous Scheme). The Spanish social security system has gained in
complexity over the years, and currently each of these broad schemes consists of several
sub-schemes and special situations (artists, domestic workers, seasonal workers, etc.).
Moreover, the social security legislation has established a specific regulation of the
regimes for some groups, such as civil servants, armed forces, or education and health
workers. However, some reforms in the last decade have aimed at simplifying this intricate
system (Spanish Social Security 2018). For instance, in 2008 self-employed individuals
of the former Special Scheme for Agriculture were integrated into the Autonomous
Scheme. Furthermore, the former Special Scheme for Agriculture and the Special Scheme
for Domestic Employees were integrated into the General Scheme as of January 2012.
For information on unemployment and self-employment programs, we refer to our
Online-Appendix “Unemployment and Self-Employment: Institutional Background”.
45This category includes administrative and technical managers, technical engineers and graduate assistants, as
well as engineers, college graduates and senior managers.
46This category includes administrative assistants, subordinates and auxiliary workers, administrative officers, and
non-graduate assistants.
47This category includes other laborers, as well as third-, second- and first-class officers and technicians.
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II.4.2 Unemployment Insurance (UI)
The contribution period, which is used to calculate the length of UI benefit entitlements,
excludes contributions which have already been used for previous UI spells. However,
one can claim the remaining entitlements. If an individual’s employment spell lasted
for at least 12 months and, thus, she qualifies for UI benefits, the individual has the
right to choose between the non-exhausted benefits from the last UI spell, and the new
entitlement collected from the most recent employment spell. Obviously, not only the UI
PBD may differ, but also the amount of old and new benefits because they are calculated
from different pre-unemployment salaries. The non-selected entitlement will be lost.
However, if the employment spell that followed the previous UI spell lasted for less than
12 months, the newly gathered entitlement is not lost. Instead, the worker can claim it
as soon as the accumulated short-term employment spells reach the 12-month threshold
(Alba-Ramirez et al. 2007).
In case of part-time employment, the eligibility of a worker can only be determined
with respect to the contribution periods in those jobs from which she has already been
dismissed. Moreover, from 29 July 2018 onward, the relevant contribution period
corresponds to the time when the worker had an active affiliation, regardless of how
many days in a given week she has worked and regardless of the amount of hours on
each day worked. However, the regulatory base which is relevant for the UI benefits
amount corresponds to the average of the individual’s contribution bases in both the
lost and ongoing part-time contracts. Note that the UI benefits amounts, which result
from applying the replacement rate to the regulatory base, must be weighted by the
corresponding part-time coefficient48. Lastly, part-time workers are not eligible for UI
benefits if they work no more than 48 hours per month (Kyyrä et al. 2019).
II.4.3 Unemployment Assistance (UA)
UA eligibility requires one of the following circumstances: (1) UI benefits are exhausted
and the individual has family dependents; (2) the individual received UI benefits for
at least 12 months and is at least 45 years old; (3) the individual is ineligible for UI
benefits because he or she contributed less than 12 months; (4) the individual is a returned
emigrant; (5) the individual was released from prison; (6) the individual’s disability spell
ended because he or she was declared to be able to work; (7) the individual is at least
55 years old. The UA benefit amount is independent from the pre-displacement salary.
Instead, a flat benefit amount equal to 80% of the IPREM is paid to UA recipients. The
duration of entitlement to UA benefits can reach a maximum of 30 months, depending on
the individual’s age and family responsibilities (SEPE 2019).
Both UI and UA recipients are subject to penalties in terms of (partial) benefit loss if
they commit an offense against provisions that regulate the unemployment protection.
The level of a penalty depends on an offense’s severity (SEPE 2019).49
48Hence, a half-day job collects only 50% of the benefits a full-day job would have generated (Kyyrä et al. 2019).
49There exist minor, serious, and very serious offences. The penalty becomes more severe, the more often an
offence is committed. For very serious offences benefits are cancelled, and unduly collected benefits must be returned.
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II.4.4 Self-Employment and Social Security in Spain
The concept of self-employment (trabajo autónomo) or own-account work (trabajo por
cuenta propia) is actually a broad category which includes different types of individuals:
self-employed workers, self-employed professionals and freelancers, self-employed
entrepreneurs, economically dependent self-employed workers (TRADE), agrarian self-
employed workers and some special cases. From a social security perspective, self-
employed individuals (the autonomous) pay their social security contributions to the
Special Regime of Self-Employed Workers (RETA). RETA includes self-employed workers
who are over 18 years old and not bound by a work contract, but also cases such as
unpaid family members, book writers, TRADE workers, managers and CEOs.
The contributions paid by the self-employed worker (cuotas) depend on the level of
social protection chosen by the individual, who determines the contribution rate as well
as the desired contribution base. The self-employed individual (the autonomous) must
choose a contribution base within existing legal bounds which are legally determined each
year. The minimum and maximum basis from which the autonomous can choose depend
on some personal and occupational characteristics: age, marital status, contribution
history, gender, disability, etc. Starting from the legal minimum contribution base,
the autonomous have to pay a higher percentage of their income as social security
contributions depending on the level of protection they choose. For example, if an
autonomous decides to be insured against the risk of “cessation of activity” (analogous to
UI benefits in the General Scheme), she has to add 2.20% of her income to the minimum
contribution base. To be also insured against “professional contingencies” (protection in
case of inability to work due to work-related reasons like an accident), the autonomous
must pay between 1.3% and 6.8% of personal incomes to the social insurance.
As of 2019, the Spanish government uniformed the RETA scheme, obliging all
self-employed to pay all type of contingencies. De facto, the level of protection for
self-employed was equalized to that of employees. It is noteworthy that, before this
reform, only 19.7% of the self-employed had opted in to be covered for work accidents
and occupational diseases (Eurofound 2017).
II.4.5 Institutional Background - Relevant Aspects for this Chapter
For details on all the variables in the MCVL dataset and their transformation, we refer to
our data documentation, in particular to the Excel-document: MCVL_Variables.xlsx
For this chapter, it is relevant to note that we are able to see all self-employed
individuals as they have to contribute to the social security system. However, we can only
approximately infer the income of self-employed people by assuming that those making
more profits may have chosen to contribute more to the social security. In the future, the
reform of 2019 may allow researchers to better approximate self-employment income.
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II.4.6 Reforms
We present a brief overview of the main reforms affecting the Spanish labour market in
the recent years, along with the strategies we implement in order to address each one of
them throughout our empirical work.
Unemployment Insurance
• Introduction of the IPREM, July 2004. The Public Indicator of Multiple Effects
(IPREM) substitutes the minimum wage (SMI) as a reference for unemployment
benefits and other social aids.
→ In our analysis dataset, we only include individuals transitioning to UI from 1
January 2008 to 31 December 2014.
• Active Insertion Income, November 2006. State subsidy for workers with special
economic needs and difficulties to find a job (e.g. individuals older than 45).
→ Any person younger than 65 who fulfills the legal requirements may be eligible
for this subsidy (SEPE 2019).
• Labout Market Reform I, September 2010. New classification of fair dismissal
conditions, and in some cases reduction of severance payments from 45 to 20 days
per year of employment .
→ The largest sample that we use to perform our analysis includes individuals who
enter UI between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013.
• PREPARA, February 2011. New extraordinary subsidy as incentive to provide
long-term part-time contracts to unemployed individuals younger than 30, as long
as they commit to training programs.
→We present our main results for individuals older than 35, as the baseline age
restriction, as well as for individuals older than 20, as a robustness check.
• Labour Market Reform II, July 2012.
– Replacement rate reduction from 60% to 50% of the regulatory base after the
sixth month of UI benefits.
→ This is the policy change in the center of our causal analysis.
– UA benefits extension until retirement for workers older than 55.
→We exclude individuals older than 52 in our analysis.
• Budgetary Stability, December 2013. End of the public contributions to the
severance payments of dismissed workers in the case of objective reasons in solvent
firms.
→ Our main results are based on a sample that includes individuals who transition
into UI in December 2013 at the latest, so that this reform affects individuals mostly
beyond the samples used for this chapter.
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Self-employment Regulations
In general, our UI entry date and age restrictions account for all of these reforms, which
were mainly directed at younger individuals until 2015. Some reforms affected the whole
labor force in the same way, and thus do not potentially violate our regression methods.
• Self-employed Workers Statute, October 2007.
– Extension of social protection for temporary sick-leave to the self-employed.
– Definition of the role of economically-dependent self-employed workers
(TRADE).
• Cease-of-activity Benefits (CAB), August 2010. Introduction of CAB as a volun-
tary contingency linked to work accidents and professional illness contingencies.
CAB amounts are based on the principle of contribution-benefits.
• Incentives to Entrepreneurship and Job Creation, March 2013.
– Capitalization of UI benefits for young employed workers: payment of 100%
of the UI benefits to men younger than 30 and women younger than 35 who
want to become self-employed.
– Reactivation of outstanding UI benefit payments after being self-employed
with better conditions for workers under 30.
• Strategy of Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment, August 2013.
– Flat and reduced rate of social security contributions for young self-employed
workers (men under 30 and women under 35).
– Improvement of financing for young self-employed workers.
• Promotion of Self-employment, October 2015. Generalization of many advan-
tages of young self-employed workers to all individuals.
• Further Reforms, December 2018.
– All voluntary contingencies become compulsory (CAB and professional con-
tingencies).
– CAB duration is extended up to 24 months.
Chapter 3
Inequality of Educational Opportunities and the Role of
Learning Intensity
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3.1 Introduction
In modern societies, the general belief that by working and studying hard everyone has a
fair chance at climbing the social ladder has been central to maintaining social cohesion
and political stability. However, in an era of relatively high income and wealth inequality
compared to the post-war decades in most developed countries (Piketty & Zucman 2014),
an increase in the number of both citizens who fear that their children may be worse
off in the future (fear of downward mobility) and groups in society who believe that the
“game is rigged” (fear of a lack of upward mobility) may be crucial for explaining rising
political polarization. For these reasons, the reduction in social mobility1 is becoming an
increasingly important issue when it comes to understanding recent trends of inequality
within society. As education tends to be the main vehicle for upward mobility, thus, it is
of key policy interest to analyze educational systems in terms of equality, in particular
to detect drivers of Inequality of Opportunity (as Chetty et al. (2020) for US colleges).
Yet in times of public spending constraints, accelerating growth of scientific knowledge
and economic competition within OECD countries, educational policies have still shifted
their attention onto how to make a country’s educational system more efficient (Machin
2014). In fact, recent reforms have started to focus on compressing educational processes,
that is, on increasing learning intensity.
This third chapter of my doctoral thesis contributes to the issue of how the trend in
intensification of education may explain decreased social mobility by analyzing the ques-
tion of how increasing learning intensity affects Inequality of Educational Opportunity
(IEOp). Thus, I shift focus onto the distributional concerns and the potential unintended
consequences of compressing educational processes for social mobility. If, for instance,
higher intensity made it harder to learn the curriculum through schooling alone, edu-
cational opportunities could become more dependent on a student’s parental support
resources. In this context, I will adopt the concept explained by Roemer & Trannoy
(2015) which states that society has achieved Equality of Opportunity if what individuals
achieve with respect to a desirable objective is determined by their efforts (e.g. how hard
they study), instead of by circumstances that are beyond an individual’s control (e.g.
gender). IEOp2 is hence defined as inequality in the distribution of educational outcomes
that can only be attributed to circumstances through either their direct or indirect (via
changing efforts) impact on outcomes. It is a relative measure of educational mobility.
This chapter is among the first to provide an analysis of Inequality of Educational Oppor-
tunity (IEOp) in a quasi-experimental setting that is going beyond its pure measurement.
1For instance, Chetty et al. (2017) provide evidence for falling absolute income mobility. OECD (Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development) data from 2012 confirm low absolute educational mobility. In particular,
Germany reaches only below average social mobility rates in terms of the percentage of 25-64 year-old non-students
whose educational attainment is higher (upward mobility) or lower (downward mobility) than that of their parents (see
Graph A.4.3 in Boserup et al. (2018)).
2Inequality of Opportunity (IOp) and Equality of Opportunity (EOp) refer to the same concept, placing emphasis
on either the unfair or fair part within the distribution of opportunities. Thus, if opportunities depend less on factors
beyond an individual’s control but more on their efforts, EOp will increase and IOp will decrease. In line with Brunori
et al. (2012), instead of IOp in education, I use the expression IEOp; and instead of EOp in education, Equality of
Educational Opportunity (EEOp). In the following, I will only use IOp or IEOp for ease of interpretation.
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As Ramos & Van de gaer (2016) point out, the understanding of how institutions influence
IEOp is still limited. Therefore, my contribution to this issue consists in providing evi-
dence on the role of learning intensity as a relevant policy dimension that causally affects
IEOp. From a social welfare perspective, it is interesting to reveal the effects of increasing
learning intensity on both academic achievement and IEOp. Pareto-improvements may
be realized if more intense curricula proved to be an instrument to overcome the trade-off
between educational spending and schooling outcomes.
To identify the causal effect of (increased) learning intensity on IEOp, I analyze an
educational reform in Germany. During the last decade, Germany’s federal states short-
ened secondary school for the academic track (Gymnasium) from nine to eight years at
staggered time points between 2001 and 2008. The so called Gymnasium-8 reform (G-8
reform) reduced school duration by one year, but kept the curriculum unchanged for the
affected (treated) student cohorts. Due to the implementation of the reform, there were
two cohorts who would finish school together in the same year in which they received
their university access diploma. However, one cohort entered one year earlier than the
other, leading to differences in years of schooling (9 vs. 8 years). As both cohorts had to
take the same final exams in the same year, treated students had less time to learn the
same material, thus experiencing higher learning intensity. For that reason, the staggered
introduction of the reform across federal states generates quasi-experimental variation
that allows the application of a Difference-in-Differences estimation approach (DiD) to
derive the causal effect of the increase in learning intensity on IEOp by comparing the
respective treatment and control groups over time.
For the purpose of measuring IEOp, I use Program for International Student Assess-
ment (PISA) data to construct a representative sample of students in the ninth grade. They
include standardized test scores in reading, mathematics and science that are comparable
across time and federal states, in contrast to grading schemes that depend on year and
state. Moreover, these data contain a rich set of family background variables that allow
me to define relevant circumstances. I also apply a new machine learning approach
to cross-validate my theory-driven choice of variables. Ultimately, IEOp reflects the
coefficient of determination when regressing test scores on these circumstances variables.
The analysis yields three main findings. First, the estimated size of IEOp, 20 to 35
percent of the variance in cognitive test scores that can be only attributed to circumstances,
corresponds to the levels of common estimates for inequality of opportunity in income.
Second, the reform-induced increase in learning intensity led to a significant rise in IEOp,
by at least 10 percentage points of the explained test score variance, for affected (treated)
students. Given the initial size of IEOp and the fact that this chapter’s IEOp measures are
lower bound estimates, this corresponds to relative increases in IEOp of at least 25 percent.
Third, the results provide some evidence in favor of the existence of subject-dependent
curricular flexibilities. Skills in mathematics and science tend to be more inflexible,
i.e. more responsive to changes in curricular intensity, than reading competency, which
is less dependent on schooling and more often trained through its usage in everyday
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life. Finally, the results can be rationalized by differential compensation possibilities
for higher learning intensity depending on parental resources, especially the capacity to
provide additional tuition to support students with school work. This shows that there are
important distributional concerns with respect to providing equal opportunities (compare
e.g. Andreoli et al. (2018)) that must be taken into account when designing reforms
altering the intensity of educational processes.
This chapter of my dissertation offers several contributions to the existing literature.
First, I contribute to the strand of research on measuring Inequality of Opportunity (IOp)
with respect to educational outcomes by adding empirical evidence on how Inequality
of Educational Opportunity (IEOp) changed over time in a developed country. So far,
papers dealing with IOp have focused on measurement issues, using income as the
main outcome variable (e.g. Almås et al. (2011)). Concerning IOp in educational
outcomes, most studies focus on measuring IEOp for developing countries (e.g. Gamboa
& Waltenberg (2012)). The few papers on developed countries follow mostly a cross-
country comparison approach using PISA data to achieve comparability of educational
achievement measures over time and across countries (e.g. Ferreira & Gignoux (2013)).
Instead, my study estimates IEOp for Germany exploiting quasi-experimental within-
country variation (as Cantoni et al. (2017) for China). Such settings allow going beyond
measuring IEOp to actually estimate the causal effects of specific policies on IEOp.
For instance, some studies analyze IEOp in the context of reforms that changed tertiary
education systems (e.g. Brunori et al. (2012) on Italy). They find both expanding higher
education through opening more sites and reducing the length to get a first-level degree
to have a positive effect on Equality of Educational Opportunity (EEOp). However, only
a few studies investigate the impact of school reforms on IEOp (e.g. Edmark et al. (2014)
for Sweden). In this chapter, I add evidence on how IEOp changed over time in Germany
and focus on estimating the causal effect of increasing learning intensity on IEOp.
Second, this work contributes to a strand of literature analyzing educational policy
reforms to identify the role of different input factors in the human capital accumulation
process. Even though the G-8 reform shows that changing school intensity is an important
consideration in educational policy-making, research on such reforms is still limited.
To begin with, empirical work has analyzed the effects of variations in pure schooling
quantity without considering learning intensity. In that context, most studies focus
on reforms that increase educational participation, such as policies raising compulsory
minimum duration of schooling. They usually find the returns of additional schooling
on earnings to be positive (e.g. Angrist & Krueger (1991), Grenet (2013), Aakvik
et al. (2010)). Furthermore, the impact of differences in instructional time on academic
performance has been investigated. Relying on either cross-national or within-country
variation in instructional time, most studies find a positive impact of additional time
on standardized test scores (e.g. Aksoy & Link (2000), Marcotte (2007), Lavy (2015)).
However, only a few studies have analyzed the impact of variations in instructional time
when curricular content can be assumed to remain constant.
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In this context, reforms that shortened the duration of schooling while keeping
curricular content unchanged, allow for evaluating the impact of increasing learning
intensity. For instance, analyzing a similar school reform in parts of Canada, Krashinsky
(2014) finds only low long-term effects on wages. This suggests that increased learning
intensity might not affect earnings permanently.3 The results are in line with Pischke
(2007), who exploits a German reform in the 1960s that changed the start of the school
year to autumn by implementing two short school years. The reform led to a significant
increase in the number of students repeating a grade, but only small effects on earnings
persisted. Despite the resulting public controversy that has even led some federal states
to reverse the reform, only a few studies have evaluated the G-8 reform and its effects
on educational outcomes (e.g. Büttner & Thomsen (2015), Huebener & Marcus (2017)).
Those studies tend to find non-significant positive effects of the reform on a student’s
average cognitive test scores as well as on educational outcomes, such as final marks
for the university access diploma. However, the reform led to falling enrollment rates at
university (Marcus & Zambre 2019).4 Instead, my analysis shifts focus in the evaluation
of the G-8 reform onto distributional concerns. This is relevant in the debate surrounding
reforms to the secondary school system. In particular, it provides policy suggestions for
how to design curricula that take the effect of learning intensity on both cognitive skill
formation and on IEOp into account. For instance, implementing a whole-day school
system may limit the role of parents for students to deal with compressed schooling.
Thirdly, my work relates to the emerging literature on finding drivers of inequality in
educational outcomes that are key determinants of recent trends in lower social mobility
(e.g. Chetty et al. (2020), Philippis & Rossi (2019), Boneva & Rauh (2018), Rothstein
(2019)). I contribute to this strand of research by providing evidence that the so far
neglected factor of learning intensity might be a relevant policy channel for both the
effectiveness of (non-)cognitive skill formation and the importance of circumstances for
educational outcomes. Whereas my analysis mainly focuses on exploiting a school reform
to derive causal estimates on how intensified instruction affects IEOp, the interpretation
of my results in terms of potential mechanisms complements explanations delivered by
this strand of literature. Although a complete model of learning intensity, IEOp and its
connection to social mobility is beyond the scope of this study, I provide evidence on
which future research tackling this big picture question can base itself. This also supports
the integration of learning intensity as a key factor into the human capital literature.
The remainder of this third chapter of my dissertation is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 3.2 illustrates the institutional background and the G-8 reform on which the identifi-
cation strategy relies. Section 3.3 explains how IEOp is measured given the data in this
study. In Section 3.4, the empirical strategy is illustrated. Section 3.5 provides the results
with robustness checks and a discussion on the implications. Section 3.6 concludes.
3Whether this is true due to schooling working primarily as a signal or whether increased intensity may compensate
for less schooling and maintain the human capital accumulation process, is unclear.
4For related literature which evaluates other outcomes of the G-8 reform, please refer to Appendix III.1.3.
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3.2 Institutional Setting: the “G-8 Reform”
This section explains the institutional background and implementation of the G-8 reform
which can be exploited as a quasi-experiment to analyze the role of increased learning
intensity on IEOp.
3.2.1 Institutional Background: the German School System and Reform Debate
Like the United States, Germany has a federal structure. Education policy strictly
falls under the remit of the 16 federal states (Länder). That being said, most features
are comparable across states. School starts usually at the age of six, when students
enter primary school for a period of four years. Afterwards, students enter a tripartite
secondary school system, where the choice of track is determined by their previous
academic performance.5
Both the shortest track of secondary school, Hauptschule, and the intermediary track,
Realschule, allow graduates to pursue apprenticeship programs after a total of nine or
ten years of schooling. The academic track, Gymnasium, which this chapter focuses
on, leads to a diploma (Abitur) granting access to university. On average, the largest
share of all students in secondary school (about 40 percent of each cohort) attended
this track in the time period 2000 until 2012. Traditionally, the academic track used to
last for nine years (for a total of 13 years including primary school) in West Germany.
However, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) had a different school system:
All students were taught together for ten years, after which they could either follow
vocational training or complete two additional years of Gymnasium to obtain the Abitur.
Following reunification, most East German federal states adjusted to the West German
standard, the Gymnasium-9 model (G-9 model), but two states, Saxony and Thuringia,
maintained the Gymnasium-8 model (G-8 model).6
Then, in the early 2000s, the nine years were perceived as a competitive disadvantage
for the economy, because they contributed to the relatively advanced age at which Ger-
mans entered the labor market after school and/or university. Moreover, the long duration
of the academic track was criticized for hindering the creation of a more comparable,
harmonized framework for tertiary education in the European Higher Education Area
(EHEA). Thus, in order to adjust school duration to the average among OECD countries
of twelve years, federal states decided to shorten the Gymnasium to eight years without
reducing the curriculum, also known as the Gymnasium-8 reform (G-8 reform).7
5Primary schools issue recommendations for each student regarding which secondary school track the student
should enter (Dustmann et al. 2017). Based on a student’s performance in primary school, recommendations were
binding in federal states for the time period considered in this study. An overview of the regulations on the transition
from primary to secondary education for the period studied here is available on https://www.kmk.org/fileadmin/
Dateien/veroeffentlichungen_beschluesse/2006/2006_03_01-Uebergang-Grundschule-Sek1.pdf .
6In addition to the three different school tracks, federal states have recently started to provide a comprehensive
school (Integrierte Gesamtschule). In comprehensive schools, students are not channeled into specific academic paths
after primary school, but can graduate after 9, 10 or 13 years. However, this option played a negligible role for the
considered time period (2000-2012), because during this time the vast majority of students achieving Abitur still
attended Gymnasium. See Figure III·1 in Appendix III.1.1 for further details on the German education system.
7For further arguments discussed during the reform debate, please refer to Section III.1.3 in Appendix III.1.3.
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3.2.2 Implementation of the Reform: Increasing Learning Intensity
After 2001, all 14 federal states with a G-9 model shortened their academic secondary
school track from nine to eight years. With the graduation of a double cohort consisting
of both the first G-8 model and the last G-9 model student cohort that together had to
pass the same final exams (Abitur) in the same year, the reform process took eight years
to transform all grades of Gymnasium.
Figure 3·1: Implementation of the G-8 Reform across Federal States
2000
PISA
2001 2002 2003
PISA
2004 2005 2006
PISA
2007 2008 2009
PISA
2010 2011 2012
PISA
2013 2014 2015 2016
Schleswig-Holstein(c)
Rhineland-Palatinate(c)
Hesse(d)
North Rhine-Westphalia
Brandenburg(b)
Berlin(b)
Bremen
Baden-Württemberg
Lower Saxony(a)
Bavaria(a)
Hamburg
Saarland
Meckl.-West Pomerania(e)
Saxony-Anhalt(e)
Thuringia
Saxony
G9 Reform-Start G8/G9 parallel Double Cohort G8
Notes: This figure illustrates for each federal state whether the graduating cohort in each school year of the Gymnasium
was in a G-8 model, G-9 model, consisted of the double cohort or whether due to the reform implementation
process both models existed parallel with younger grades already in a G-8 and older ones still in a G-9 model.
Notes on some states:
a In Bavaria and Lower Saxony, the 5th and 6th grades were allocated into the G-8 model in the same school
year. However, the 9th graders in 2009 were affected by the reform from the 5th grade onward.
b Berlin and Brandenburg, where primary school lasts six years, introduced the reform for 7th grade onward.
c Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein planned to introduce the G-8 reform for school year 2008/09
to be completed by 2015/16. At the end, both kept the G-9 model for all grades and over all PISA waves
considered.
d Hesse introduced the reform over 3 years: the “main” double cohort covering 60% of schools is shown.
e Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt introduced the reform directly for the 9th grade onward.
Source: Based on facts as shown in Table 3.2 and the regulations explained in Table III.1 in Appendix III.1.2. This
figure corresponds to the geographical maps illustrating the implementation of the reform across time and space in
Figure III·2 in Appendix III.1.1.
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For the purpose of this chapter, two features of the reform are particularly important.
First, as shown in Figure 3·1 not all federal states started the reform process at the same
time. Some of them began in school year 2001/2002, whereas others waited until school
year 2008/2009, implying that the resulting double cohorts graduated between 2006/2007
and 2015/2016.
Second, although the academic track was reduced by one school year, the curricular
content remained at the original level. In fact, education ministers decided that standards
for the university access diploma (Abitur) were not to be lowered in response to the
reform. Thus, the minimum number of 265 instruction hours for the sum of weekly
lessons per school year over all grade levels was maintained, and students still had to
pass the same total number of lessons before they could graduate from the Gymnasium
(KMK 2016). This should ensure comparable nationwide standards for university access
diplomas, despite the differences in school duration. Adding more content to the last
two years of Gymnasium was perceived to be difficult, because the first G-8 model and
the last G-9 model cohort had to complete those grades together. Only marks during
the final two years and marks in the Abitur exam count towards the university access
GPA. Therefore, school authorities chose to focus the compression on the first years of
Gymnasium, squeezing the material originally taught in the seven years during grades
5 to 11 into the six years during grades 5 to 10. Thus, students in the G-8 model were
supposed to enter the final two years of Gymnasium as if they had completed the original
11th grade. To keep the required total minimum weekly lessons unchanged for the new
G-8 model, instructional time increased by about two hours a week per year during
grades 5-10 for G-8 model students compared to previous cohorts in the G-9 model.8
However, the total loss in time of one school year was not fully compensated by
additional instructional time per week: in order to limit the amount of afternoon schooling
in 5th and 6th grade, hours originally planned for revision (beyond the minimum required)
were dropped, and instead used to already teach new curricular content at an earlier
point in time compared to the G-9 model. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that total
curricular content was not reduced for the first student cohorts affected by the G-8 reform,
that are in the focus of this study, in any of the federal states. As curricular content in the
G-8 model began to change in the years after 2012 (cf. Table III.1 in Appendix III.1.2),
this assumption would not necessarily hold for later G-8 model cohorts. But by using
data of ninth graders tested in 2012 or before, I focus on the very first cohorts affected by
the reform. Thus, these later changes do not affect the analysis.
In conclusion, the G-8 reform exogenously led to a considerable increase in learning
intensity over the first few years of the Gymnasium, that is, the amount of material
covered per week increased for each grade level (excluding the final two grade levels).
8However, this is only an approximation for an average student; the exact changes depend on the federal state.
Huebener et al. (2017) have collected binding timetable regulations for each federal state and show the changes in the
distribution of average weekly instruction hours. This confirms the interpretation of the G-8 reform: on average hours
per grade increased by about 2 hours a week, i.e. by about 8-10% of weekly lessons per year during grades 5-10.
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3.3 Data and Measuring Inequality of Educational Opportunity
In this section, first, I focus on which specific PISA data are used for my analysis.9
Second, I explain how one can measure IEOp, the main outcome variable, based on
the related literature and the educational data available for the main test domains in
mathematics, reading and science. Third, I provide some descriptive analysis on the
circumstances variables defined for this chapter.
3.3.1 PISA Data
For Germany, two types of PISA test data are available, the version conducted for
international comparisons (PISA-I) and a national extension (PISA-E). The PISA-I data
result from students who take the test on the same day and are selected in a two-stage
sampling procedure. In the first stage, schools from the 16 federal states of Germany
are randomly selected. In the second stage, for each school, about 25 students of age
15 are randomly taken for the test (age-based sample); additionally, within selected
schools, two classes of ninth graders with a minimum of 25 students are randomly chosen
(grade-based sample). In total, the grade-based PISA-I sample consists of about 10,000
students from about 225 schools (Table III.2 in Appendix III.1.1). Thus, its sample size is
about twice as large as that of the age-based sample. While comparisons across countries
are best carried out at a given age, for the strategy pursued in this paper, a comparison
among ninth graders is more appropriate because the G-8 reform affected students based
on their grade level in a certain school year.
Moreover, national PISA extensions (PISA-E) were conducted for the years 2000,
2003 and 2006. Each of them consists of about 40,000 students. By oversampling
less populated federal states, these extensions allow for more robust comparisons of
educational performance between the German federal states.10 However, PISA-E was
discontinued in 2009 and replaced by the federal state comparison test which is conducted
by the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (IQB). This new comparison
test aims to assess national educational standards determined by the Standing Conference
of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (SC) of all federal states instead of by
the OECD. Since then, each extension of this comparison test covers only a particular
domain (reading in 2009, mathematics and science in 2012), which prohibits their use
for analyzing the entire period considered in this study (until 2012).
Nevertheless, Andrietti (2016) or Huebener & Marcus (2017) use data from the
national PISA extensions for the years 2000, 2003, and 2006. They complement them
with single waves of PISA-I, in the case of Andrietti (2016) only for the year 2009 and in
the case of Huebener & Marcus (2017) additionally for 2012.
9Some background information on the OECD’s PISA data, its advantages for measuring educational outcomes as
well as on the representativeness of these data across states, schools and over time is provided in Appendix III.1.4.
10For this purpose, one day after the students for the PISA-I samples had taken their test, additional students in
each federal state were randomly selected to undergo the same testing procedures for the PISA-E test in which they
had to answer an additional national questionnaire.
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Only grade-based PISA-I samples provide all three testing domains consistently for
each test year. Therefore, to have consistent comparability across the studies used, this
chapter of my doctoral thesis avoids mixing PISA-E and PISA-I datasets.11
As my thesis focuses on the academic track (Gymnasium), only schools of this type
are included in the sample. They make up more than one third of the grade-based PISA-I
sample which approximately corresponds to the real share of students in Gymnasium.
Finally, the analysis is restricted to variables derived from the questionnaire answered by
students and their parents (the student-dataset). Thus, this paper relies on the grade-based
PISA-I sample to construct a representative repeated cross-section of students in grade
nine of the Gymnasium. This allows me to analyze the increase in IEOp due to the G-8
reform by using variables based on PISA test scores and the tested students’ available
background characteristics.
Descriptive Statistics Regarding the main outcome variables, the PISA test scores
in the domains of reading, mathematics and science are above the German average when
focusing on students in the academic track of secondary school. A typical ninth grader in
Gymnasium achieves results that are about 60 points higher than for the average German
ninth grader. This difference corresponds to about an entire proficiency level, that is,
the value-added of one school year. With respect to the three testing areas, students
perform worst in reading literacy. They stagnated or even slightly deteriorated in their
reading skills between 2000 and 2012. This observation is in line with reports on German
PISA results for the 2000s which show that students perform better in mathematical
and scientific than reading tests (e.g. Klieme et al. (2011)). The average scores in
mathematics (about 580) exceed those in reading (about 570). Students perform best in
science, reaching up to 590 points (see Table III.3 in Appendix III.1.2).
Furthermore, in all three domains the median exceeds mean test scores. This in-
dicates that there appears to be more variation at the lower end of the performance
scale, with more students performing relatively badly, thus pushing the mean down. The
mean/median comparison and its development may be regarded as first sign for whether
IEOp changes over time. The data show that median and mean deviate only slightly
more after than before the reform. The same applies to the variance of test scores which
does not change significantly over time. Finally, the analysis dataset contains more than
60 schools per test year across all federal states and on average the number of students
increases with each test cycle (see Table III.3 in Appendix III.1.2 for an overview).
Moreover, Figure III·4 in Appendix III.1.1 provides a descriptive analysis based on
the used grade-based PISA-I dataset for different subgroups. For instance, students from
academic households achieve slightly higher scores than those from non-academic ones.
11In 2000, there was no specific grade-sample based PISA-I sample available from the IQB. However, PISA-2000
being the PISA-2000-E dataset is ninth grade-based (Baumert et al. 2002). Instead of the usual 80 replication weights,
only one weight is provided.
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3.3.2 Outcome Measure: Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp)
The idea that societies should distribute opportunities equally has a long tradition within
political philosophy. Following Rawls (1971) seminal contribution and its discussion
(e.g. Sen (1980)), the notion established that a prerequisite for measuring Inequality of
Opportunity (IOp) is distinguishing whether a form of inequality is acceptable or not
within a society.12 However, these ideas only started to capture the more widespread
attention of economists when scholars such as Roemer (1998) translated these philo-
sophical concepts into a more formal theoretical framework. Since then, an empirical
literature has emerged, proposing several methods on how to estimate IOp as shown in
recent survey articles by Ramos & Van de gaer (2016) and Roemer & Trannoy (2015).
In the following, I formulate a model regarding how to measure IEOp in line with
Ferreira & Gignoux (2011, 2013). To begin with, it is useful to define a set of concepts:
• An advantage denotes an individual achievement. Studies typically focus on
income; in this chapter, the achievement corresponds to educational outcomes as
measured by PISA test scores.
• The vector of efforts, E, denotes the set of variables that influence the outcome
variable (advantage) and over which the student has control (e.g. choice of time for
studying).
• The vector of circumstances, C, denotes the set of individual characteristics which
are beyond the student’s control, for which one cannot be held responsible, e.g.
your family household’s socio-economic status (SES), parental education, gender,
ethnicity or innate ability/talents.
Consider a sample of S students indexed by i ∈ {1, ...,S}. Each student i can be
described by a set of attributes {y,Cn,Em}, where y denotes an advantage (here test
scores), Cn is a vector of n discrete circumstances and Em denotes the vector of m discrete
efforts. Without loss of generality, this model could be extended to the case of having
continuous elements in the vectors of circumstances/efforts. Thus, we can represent the
population by a (n×m) matrix [Ynm] with a typical element (cell)
ynm = g(Cn,Em)|C ∈Ω,E ∈Θ,g : Ω×Θ=⇒ R
being the advantage that is a function of both circumstances and efforts. After selecting
the appropriate set of variables capturing circumstances characteristics relevant to educa-
tional achievement that constitute the n different vectors Ci for each student i, the sample
can be split into n distinct groups of students sharing the same circumstances (they are
of the same type). Similarly, the sample can be split into m distinct groups of students
exerting the same level of efforts, but having different circumstances (they belong to the
same tranche). Together types and tranches form the cells.
12There is strong experimental evidence that people distinguish acceptable (fair) and unacceptable (unfair) income
inequality (Cappelen et al. 2010, Almås et al. 2011). It tends to be acceptable if differences are due to individual
responsibilities (efforts), but not acceptable if these are due to luck (circumstances). Lefranc & Trannoy (2017) show
how luck can be incorporated as an intermediary category between circumstances and efforts.
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In the context of this chapter, when assuming talents to be distributed normally across
the whole population, the concept of Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp) can
be translated as follows. Students who work harder and put in greater efforts should be
rewarded by achieving good educational results regardless of their specific circumstances.
Hence, unfair IEOp corresponds to differences in educational achievement between
students who put in the same efforts but only differ in terms of their circumstances
(compensation principle). In contrast, disparities in test results driven by variation in
individual efforts are acceptable (reward principle). Thus, IEOp resembles differences
between students that can only be attributed to circumstances beyond their control.
Deriving a measure of IEOp involves two steps: an Estimation Phase to transform the
original distribution [Ynm] into a smoothed one [Y˜nm] reflecting only the unfair inequality
in [Ynm], and the Measurement Phase which thereon applies a measure of inequality.
Following the IOp literature, I apply an ex-ante, between-types inequality measurement
approach.13 As efforts are not directly observable, this is also in line with the indirect
methods to measure IOp, because the estimation is based solely on the observed marginal
distribution of advantages (test scores) given by the vector y = {y1, . . . ,yS} and on the
joint distribution of advantages and circumstances over the sample population {y,Cn}.
Therefore, I follow the measurement approach of Ferreira & Gignoux (2013) which has
fewer requirements for data availability than a non-parametric approach. The reason is
that the more precisely one tries to design the partition, the smaller cells become. Thus,
large datasets (best with panel structure) are necessary to conduct a useful non-parametric
within-tranche inequality decomposition (Checchi & Peragine 2010).
Consequently, this chapter adopts a parametric, ex-ante estimation approach to derive
IEOp measures. I model test scores (y) as a function of circumstances (C) and efforts (E),
as y = f (C,E). Efforts can also depend on circumstances, i.e. E = E(C) which implies
y = f (C,E(C)). Within this framework, for instance, innate ability is considered to be an
unobserved circumstance factor that may influence test scores directly through cognitive
skills, but also indirectly via its impact on work ethic and other characteristics associated
with efforts. However, efforts cannot vice versa change other relevant circumstances,
such as gender or parental education.14 Moreover, as PISA evaluates students in the
ninth grade, they are on average about 15 years old. Hufe et al. (2017) argue that choices
made before an age of maturity (16) are likely beyond an individual’s control. Thus, it is
plausible to assume that tested students are (if at all) only partially responsible for their
choices, and most unobserved factors would be circumstances.
13One distinguishes between an ex-ante and ex-post approach. This refers to how one evaluates IOp, thus, to which
normative welfare criterion is chosen. Before effort is realized (ex-ante), following van de Gaer’s “mins of means”
criterion, EOp is achieved equalizing mean outcomes across types. IOp is measured as between-types inequality
satisfying ex-ante compensation. After effort is realized (ex-post), following Roemer’s “means of min” criterion, EOp
is achieved eliminating inequality within tranches satisfying ex-post compensation. Fleurbaey & Peragine (2013)
show that ex-post and ex-ante compensation are incompatible. However, if efforts are distributed independently from
circumstances, ex-post will be equivalent to ex-ante EOp (Ramos & Van de gaer 2016, proposition II).
14See Appendix III.1.5 for a discussion of how the concept of ability is considered in the context of measuring
IEOp.
165
In summary, my model of measuring IEOp considers the role of circumstances, efforts
and their interplay. Following Ferreira & Gignoux (2013) a linear functional form is
used:
yi =C′iβ +E
′
iγ+ ei (3.1)
with Ei =C′iδ +ui (3.2)
Ci is a vector capturing circumstances variables and Ei is the unobserved vector of m
efforts per student i. However, the aim being to estimate the full effect of circumstances
on scores, i.e. both the direct and indirect effect on scores (via their impact on efforts), I
estimate the reduced form model:
yi = C′i(β + γδ )+(ei+u
′
iγ) (3.3)
i.e. : yi = C′iρ+ zi , where ρ = (β + γδ ) and zi = (ei+ γui) (3.4)
The residual, zi, includes both unobserved efforts and unobserved circumstances. But
at this point, the aim is to estimate the mean score outcome of each type conditional on
circumstances:
ŷi =C′i ρ̂ (3.5)
This will create a new, simulated distribution of scores, ŷ = {ŷ1, . . . , ŷS}. Thus, every stu-
dent is assigned the value of her opportunity set (which in a linear regression corresponds
to the expected score conditional on circumstances). This linear model can be estimated
using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression providing the vector of predicted test
scores (the smoothed distribution).
Having assigned each individual the value of their opportunity set, the second step,
the Measurement Phase, then involves calculating inequality in this new distribution,
using a particular inequality index, I(.). To estimate IEOp, one would estimate the
following ratio:
θ̂IEOp =
I(ŷi)
I(yi)
=
I(C′i ρ̂)
I(yi)
(3.6)
i.e. the ratio between inequality in circumstances (the simulated distribution) and total
inequality (actual distribution of scores). Thus, instead of using an absolute measure,
I use a relative measure of IEOp. This is also suited best to evaluate the reform effect
when comparing treatment and control groups over time, because the relative change is
of most interest and can be interpreted most intuitively.
Now, the remaining issue is what inequality index I(.) to use. The literature on IOp
in income has used the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) index due to its desirable properties
(e.g. path independence). However, Ferreira & Gignoux (2013) show that the MLD
is not appropriate for measuring inequality in PISA data. The reason is that it is not
ordinally invariant to the standardization of PISA test scores. Instead, the authors prove
that the variance is the most appropriate inequality index for measuring IEOp. Being an
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absolute measure of inequality itself, the variance is ordinally invariant in the test score
standardization and satisfies the most important axioms to be qualified as meaningful
inequality measure, i.e. (i) symmetry, (ii) continuity and (iii) the transfer principle.
Overall, the variance satisfies the requirements to be an appropriate inequality index
for the proposed Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp) measure which then can
be calculated as follows:
θ̂IEOp =
variance(ŷ)
variance(y)
(3.7)
This measure is attractive for various reasons. First, it is the coefficient of determination
(R2) of an OLS regression of test scores on circumstances C variables which eases
measurement procedures.15
Second, as shown in Ferreira & Gignoux (2011), the R2 results in a meaningful
summary statistic, the lower bound of the true IEOp. As the subject of concern is the total
joint effect of all circumstances on educational outcomes as measured by test scores, the
object of interest is to understand what percentage of the variation in scores, y, is causally
explained by the overall effect of circumstances (directly and indirectly via efforts).
With efforts being treated as generally unobserved omitted circumstances variables - if
we observed them, they would only lead to a finer partitioning of [Y inm], which would
further increase the IEOp measure. Therefore, the R2 measure, θ̂IEOp in Equation (3.7),
is a valid lower bound estimate of the joint effect of all circumstances on educational
achievement. In other words, it is the lower bound of the share of overall inequality
in educational achievement that can be explained by predetermined circumstances (a
lower-bound estimate of ex-ante IEOp).16
Third, θ̂IEOp is a relative measure of IEOp that is cardinally invariant to the standard-
ization of test scores. Moreover, one can decompose the IEOp measure into components
for each variable in the circumstances vector which corresponds to a Shapely-Shorrocks
decomposition.
3.3.3 Control Variables: Measuring Circumstances
Regarding the selection of relevant control variables, this study follows the most common
approaches in the literature (e.g. Ferreira & Gignoux (2013)). The control variables rep-
resent circumstances, factors which a student cannot influence, but which can determine
the dependent variable of interest, cognitive skills, as measured by test scores. Moreover,
applying new machine learning methods (Brunori et al. 2019), such as regression tree
and random forest algorithms, the data confirm that my choice of control variables is
appropriate with respect to detecting relevant groups of circumstances (see Appendix
III.1.5).
15The only caveat is that this model cannot estimate the effect of individual circumstances. As elements of ρˆ may
be biased due to omitted variables, one cannot interpret them as causal effect of certain circumstances on scores.
16Niehues & Peichl (2014) outline how an upper-bound can be estimated in order to find boundaries for IOp
estimates. But this method has not yet been widely applied, because of data requirements (e.g. it needs panel data).
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Control variables can be divided into, student-level circumstances, such as personal
characteristics, and socio-economic family background variables, such as parental house-
hold characteristics. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main control variables.
Students are on average 15.43 years old. The share of female students in the total tested
student population is slightly higher than the one of male students. This reflects the
fact that in recent years female participation in Gymnasium has been steadily increasing
(Prenzel et al. 2013). The variable migration background indicates that about 16.8%
of students have at least one foreign-born parent. But the variable language spoken at
home improves the extent to which one controls for the student’s migration background.
As depending on the level of parental integration, one can expect that not all students
with migration traits speak a language other than German at home. Less than half of
the number of students with foreign traits indicate that they speak a different language
(than German) when talking to family members. I classify all individual characteristics
(gender, age, migration background) as circumstances.
Another set of control variables involves socio-economic family background variables.
An important circumstance is a student’s parental education background which serves
as an indicator for potential support opportunities available to the student. To measure
parental education, I rely on the International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED) index. It serves to identify whether at least one parent has achieved an academic
degree, ISCED level 5 or 6, in which case they would constitute an academic household.
Table 3.1 shows that about 60% of students live in such households.
As indicators for the socio-economic status (SES) environment in which a student
grows up, I use first the number of books at home. This variable is generated in all PISA
studies and has been shown to be a good proxy for the family SES, because household
income is highly correlated with the amount of books in the household. It is plausible
to assume that, at the age of 15, students are still financially dependent on their parents.
Moreover, access to culture is mostly influenced by the opportunities offered in the
household in which a child grows up. Thus, it is generally accepted that for students
of age 15 the number of books variable represents circumstances that control for family
SES. I take the range of 101-500 books as a base category for this variable, because
approximately 50% of students in the sample live in such a household. Similarly, the
International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) can be taken as a
further control variable for socio-economic background. Higher ISEI scores correspond
to higher levels of parental occupational status on a scale from zero to 90.17
As a control for family structure characteristics, I consider whether a student lives in
a single parent household which serves as an indicator for whether a student has grown
up in a more stressful environment. About 13% of all students are raised under such
17The International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) can serve as an alternative for describing parental
SES. The construction of this index involves obtaining parents’ occupational data by asking open-ended questions,
the responses to which are coded into ISCO codes. But this is not available for all PISA datasets, in contrast to the
mapping of ISCO into ISEI indices. See Ganzeboom et al. (1992) for further details on this methodology.
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circumstances. In addition, I also consider employment status dummies for both mother
and father. By controlling for parental time availability and family structure, aspects that
influence the environment in which a student can study are taken into account. In the
sample, the vast majority of fathers work full-time (FT), whereas the largest share of all
mothers is part-time employed (PT) (about 44%). This is consistent with the predominant
family model in Germany during the 2000s consisting of the father as main bread-winner
and a part-time working mother mainly in charge of child care.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables for Circumstances
Time Period (2003-2012) Mean SD Min-Max Missings (SD)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.5289 0.4989 [0-1] 0
Age in years 15.43 0.49 [13,75-17,25] 0
Language spoken at home (Base: German) 0.0552 0.2285 [0-1] 0.0060 (0.0774)
Migration background (Base: German) 0.1679 0.3738 [0-1] 0.0060 (0.0774)
Parental Characteristics
Parental Education:
(highest ISCED level)
# ISCED-level (5-6): 0.6285 0.4832 [0-1]
0.0371 (0.1890)# ISCED-level (3-4) (Base cat.): 0.2812 0.4495 [0-1]
# ISCED-level (1-2): 0.0532 0.2244 [0-1]
Socio-Economic Status
Number of books in a household:
# more than 500: 0.2029 0.4022 [0-1]
0.0497 (0.2174)
# 101-500 (Base cat.): 0.4703 0.4991 [0-1]
# 11-100: 0.2579 0.4375 [0-1]
# max. 10: 0.0193 0.1375 [0-1]
Highest-ISEI-level of a job in the family 57.1536 17.2042 [0-90] 0.0177 (0.1317)
Family Characteristics
Single parent households (Base cat.: No) 0.1317 0.3382 [0-1] 0.0808 (0.2726)
Father - employment status
# full-time (FT) (Base cat.): 0.8120 0.3907 [0-1]
0.0728 (0.2598)
# part-time (PT) : 0.0584 0.2345 [0-1]
# unemployed (UE) : 0.0251 0.1564 [0-1]
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.0318 0.1753 [0-1]
Mother - employment status
# full-time (FT) (Base cat.): 0.2972 0.4570 [0-1]
0.0603 (0.2381)
# part-time (PT) : 0.4379 0.4961 [0-1]
# unemployed (UE) : 0.0452 0.2078 [0-1]
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.1593 0.3660 [0-1]
Number of students 13,756 G-8 reform dummy: 0.4573 (0.4982)
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample of ninth graders in Gymnasium pooling the data for
main period studied (PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012) and is weighted by the sampling weights provided in
the PISA dataset (compare Appendix III.1.4). In the comments column, the amount of missing observations
is provided and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. For categorical control variables, the base
category is indicated by italics. Finally, the number of observations and the G-8 reform dummy share is
provided.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, appropriate measures of IEOp need to be
estimated given the available outcome and control variables in the data. Second, the
quasi-experimental variation of the G-8 reform allows to identify the causal effect of
increased learning intensity on IEOp, by using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) strategy
based on forming reasonable treatment and control groups.
3.4.1 Estimating Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp)
In a first step, IEOp will be measured using θ̂IOP, as defined in Equation (3.7) in
Section 3.3.2. This measure requires estimating the coefficient of determination (R2)
from an OLS regression of PISA test scores on the different circumstances variables
that are listed in the previous section. Thus, the following regression model is estimated
separately, by federal states that form the respective treatment or control groups, and by
PISA test wave:
Yist = β0+β1(Individual Characteristics)ist +β2(Parental Characteristics)ist
+β3(Socio−Economic Status)ist +β4(Family Characteristics)ist
+FE(school)ist + εist (3.8)
where Yist = {std pvreadist ;std pvmathist ;std pvscieist} are test scores of student i in state
s at time t in one of three PISA domains. To ease the interpretation of β coefficients,
I standardize scores for the effects to be measured as percentages of an international
standard deviation in the PISA test.18
This baseline regression model needs to be adjusted to take the following two issues
into account. First, to allow for the extrapolation of findings to Germany’s entire high
school student population, the notion of external validity has to be considered (Meyer
1995, Bertrand et al. 2004). This requires the data sample to be as representative as
possible with respect to the student population in the ninth grade of Gymnasium in the
time period under investigation (mainly 2003 to 2012). Thus, the model is estimated using
a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression with the population weights provided in the
data.19 Second, the sampling strategy may induce some correlation among observations
of the same unit (state/school). Therefore, I adjust regressions by calculating standard
errors based on available replication weights in the PISA data and allow for clustering at
the level of federal states, the level at which the reform has been implemented. Following
the OECD guidelines, in Appendix III.1.5, I explain how to estimate standard errors for
the PISA data used in this study.
18Appendix III.1.4 provides details on the test metric. Note that in my notation until Section 3.5.2, I focus on
the time period (2003-2012) with the general reform time set to take effect between 2006 and 2009, as defined in
Section 3.4.2 (see also Appendix III.1.5). Moreover, the regression model can also be estimated separately by treatment
and control groups only twice for the pooled pre-reform ((2000-)2003-2006) and post-reform (2009-2012) samples.
19Baumert & Prenzel (2008) discuss the PISA sampling strategy and the generation of population weights. They
argue that for the PISA-E data certain student groups might have been over- or underrepresented, and that provided
weights can be used to correct for this. These arguments also apply to the PISA-I data.
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As explained in Section 3.3.3, the control variables that measure circumstances
in Equation (3.8) fall into four categories: Individual Characteristics (IC), Parental
Characteristics (PC), Socio-Economic Status (SES) and Family Characteristics (FC) (for
an overview, see Appendix III.1.5). Individual Characteristics include the circumstances
variables: age, gender and migration background. As students were sampled based on
attending the ninth grade, by controlling for age, differences in school entrance age (e.g.
due to maturity) are taken into account. Controlling for gender considers the existence
of any subject-specific differences in academic test score performance between male
and female students (Niederle & Vesterlund 2010). Migration background has also been
shown to be important in explaining the academic achievements of students in Germany
(Klieme et al. 2011). On average, having a migration background is negatively correlated
with performance due to its implications on non-cognitive skills, such as self-esteem.
Socio-Economic family background control variables include: Parental Characteris-
tics such as parental education levels, socio-economic status (SES) indicators such as
the number of books in the household, and Family Characteristics such as family struc-
ture. A more academically stimulating environment tends to have a positive impact on
cognitive skill formation. In that regard, parental education can be assumed to constitute
circumstances that capture investments into a student’s early childhood. Similarly, a
favorable SES, as measured by higher ISEI index values and/or more books available in
a household, should have a positive impact on a student’s test scores. Higher SES of the
family in which a student grows up could be an indicator for better and easier access to
support for dealing with school-related work. Otherwise, growing up with a single parent
or with unemployed parents might have a negative effect on test scores, because such
family conditions are more likely to be associated with adverse factors for skill formation
or limited access to out of school support opportunities.
In addition to control variables at the level of student i, the model in Equation (3.8)
includes fixed effects (FEs) at the school level. First, adding school fixed effects allows
me to capture quality differences among schools that can also exist within a federal state,
and to control for other school-level circumstances. Second, applying school fixed effects
allows to control for characteristics both on the school and state level, because federal
states are in charge of school policy. Moreover, as the PISA test is not conducted in
the same schools over the years, school fixed effects are wave-specific. Thus, they also
capture year fixed effects when pooling before and after reform periods.
As a robustness check, a pooled version of Equation (3.8) is conducted, using only
fixed effects (FEs) at the state level. Then, state FEs consider time-invariant differences
in the outcome variables between federal states due to, for instance, distinct political
preferences for school policies neglecting differences between schools. The federal state
in which a student attends secondary school represents a circumstance variable beyond a
student’s control, because parents decide on where to reside. Though in theory students
may have some influence over which school they attend, their control is likely very
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limited at age 10. In fact, estimation results do not change much using either only federal
state or only school FEs (which shows concerns on potential sorting at the school level
not to be relevant). Consequently, it is sufficient to control only for school FEs in the
main estimation specifications.
3.4.2 Definition of Treatment and Control Groups
The G-8 reform and its implementation at different points in time at the federal state
level can be exploited as a quasi-experiment to identify the effect of increased learning
intensity on a measure of IEOp. This requires categorizing the 16 federal states into
treatment and control groups for each PISA test wave. Table 3.2 shows how useful
treatment and control groups can be formed, based on the implementation of the reform
and the timing of this process across federal states.
For seven out of fourteen states in which a reform took place, the introduction of
the G-8 reform occurs between 2006 and 2009. Therefore, PISA 2009 is the first post-
treatment wave of ninth graders tested in these states, and regression models including
the 2012 wave capture the “medium-term” effect. Therefore, I define the model covering
period 2003 to 2012 as the Model Base.20
Baseline Model The reform takes effect in between 2006 and 2009. Table 3.2 shows
that seven federal states can be classified as treatment group, because tested ninth graders
were only in the G-8 model from 2009 onwards. Treatment Group T2 includes Baden-
Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Lower Saxony (LS), Bremen (BR), Hamburg (HB),
Berlin (BE), and Brandenburg (BB). However, the East German federal states are still
likely to be different from the West German states. For instance, many teachers in East
Germany were still educated in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Hence,
for the main results I focus on West Germany only, which means that the main Treatment
Group T consists of BW, BV, LS, BR and HB. Finally, excluding the city states of HB
and BR, the most homogeneous Treatment Group T1 consists of the three territorial West
German states BW, BV and LS. Together with T2, T1 is used for robustness checks.
The control group in the main specification, Control Group C, consists of two other
territorial states in West Germany: Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) and Schleswig-Holstein
(SH). These two states did not move to a G-8 model over the considered time period,
that is, they always maintained a G-9 model. A second control group is made up of the
two East German states of Saxony (SN) and Thuringia (TH). These two states had been
following a G-8 model since 1949, when the former GDR was founded, and chose to
maintain their secondary school system after reunification. They form a hypothetical
Control Group Ch that could be interpreted as the counter-factual of a permanent G-8
model. Finally, one can form a Never-Takers Control Group C-NT consisting of the four
states that never changed the length of Gymnasium: RP, SH, SN and TH.
20For an overview, see Appendix III.1.5.
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Table 3.2: “G-8 reform” Treatment/Control Group Allocation of PISA Cohorts per State
Federal State ReformEnaction
Double
Cohort
Treated
grade
PISA cohorts affected (if) Treatment cohort/grade affected
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2006 2009 2012
Bavaria (BV)
2004/2005 2010/2011 6 first cohort treated in 6th grade was not in 9th grade in a PISA test year
2004/2005 2011/2012 5 C C C T(1) T(1) - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Lower Saxony (LS) 2004/2005 2010/2012 6 first cohort treated in 6
th grade was not in 9th grade in a PISA test year
2004/2005 2011/2013 5 C C C T(1) T(1) - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Baden-Württemberg
(BW) 2004/2005 2011/2012 5 C C C T(1) T(1) - 1
st cohort 4th cohort
Hamburg (HB) 2002/2003 2009/2010 5 C C C T T - 3rd cohort 6th cohort
Bremen (BR) 2004/2005 2011/2012 5 C C C T T - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Berlin (BE) 2006/2007 2011/2012 7 C C C T2 T2 - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Brandenburg (BB) 2006/2007 2011/2012 7 C C C T2 T2 - 1st cohort 4th cohort
Rhineland-Palatinate
(RP) 2008/2009 2015/2016 5 C C C C C - - -
Schleswig-Holstein
(SH) 2008/2009 2015/2016 5 C C C C C - - -
North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) 2005/2006 2012/2013 5 C1 C1 C1 C1 T - - 3
rd cohort
Saxony (SN) since 1949 5 Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch hypoth. control-group: always treated
Thuringia (TH) since 1949 5 Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch hypoth. control-group: always treated
Saarland (SL) 2001/2002 2009/2010 5 C C T T T 1st cohort 4th cohort 7th cohort
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 2003/2004
2006/2007 9
2007/2008 8 1st cohort
2008/2009 7 - - T - - 7th graders
2009/2010 6 2nd cohort 5th cohort
2010/2011 5 C C - T T 5th graders 5th graders
Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania (MWP) 2004/2005
2007/2008 9
2008/2009 8 - - T - - 1st cohort
2009/2010 7 8th graders
2010/2011 6 1st cohort 4th cohort
2011/2012 5 C C - T T 5th graders 5th graders
Hesse (H)a
2004/05 2011/2012 5 C C C T T - (≤ 10%) 4th cohort
2005/06 2012/2013 5 C C C C T - 1st cohort 3rd cohort
2006/07 2013/2014 5 C C C C T - - 2nd cohort
a Hesse (H) introduced the reform gradually across three school years (Figure 3·1 and Table III.1), thus is
neither treatment nor control group.
Notes: In this table, the Treatment/Control Groups are highlighted by rectangular boxes.
For Model Base and Model Robust:
• Treatment T ≡ red box; T1 ≡ magenta (inner) box and T2 ≡ red + violet box
• Control Group (C) ≡ blue rectangle; C1 ≡ blue + green rectangle.
• Moreover, TH and S form a hypothetical Control Group (Ch) (always G-8 model). Ch and C form the
never-taker Control Group (C-NT).
Note: An overview of treatment/control groups is given in Appendix III.1.5.
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The most comparable setting for the baseline model consists of the Treatment Group
T and Control Group C, because it focuses on West German federal states that are very
similar in relevant characteristics. Thereby, this setting still accounts for 40 out of 80.6
million people and thus for 50% of the German population. Hence, it will serve as the
main specification for the Model Base.21
Focusing on a treatment that affects students in grade nine from 2009 onwards, five
federal states belong neither to treatment nor control groups. In the first West German
state that implemented the reform, Saarland (SL), ninth graders were already in a G-8
model by 2006. The same is true for the two East German states of Saxony-Anhalt (ST)
and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MWP). Moreover, in both states the reform affected
students from ninth grade onward, whereas in most other states students were affected
from fifth grade onward. In Hesse (H)22 and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), ninth
graders were only taught in a G-8 model since 2010, after the 2006-2009 window.
Robustness Model The Model Robust covers the time period 2003 to 2009 and thus
considers the effect in response to the reform that is visible in 2009. This effect will be
denoted the “short-term” effect of the reform. The treatment groups remain identical to
those in the medium-term models (T/T1/T2), because only the year 2012 will be dropped
in the short-term models with the reform time still set between 2006 and 2009. This also
applies to the Control Group C consisting of RP and SH and to the Never-Takers Control
Group C-NT including additionally SN and TH. Now, North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
as federal state with the largest population in Germany can be added to the Control Group
C: in the Model Robust, ninth graders in NRW were taught in a G-9 model over the
whole time period (2000)/2003 until 2009. This creates Control Group C1 consisting of
RP, SH, and NRW. The most comparable setting for the robustness models consists of
the Treatment Group T and Control Groups C or C1. With the latter group I account for
57.6 out of 80.6 million people, thus for 70% of the German population. Hence, there
are two main control groups for the Model Robust.
3.4.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimation Strategy
The second step of the empirical strategy in this third chapter of my dissertation is a
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation. The gradual implementation of the G-8
reform across federal states allows estimating the reform-induced effect of increased
learning intensity on IEOp by exploiting the differences between comparable treatment
and control groups. For example, in the main specification of Model Base, there are five
states in the treatment group (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Bremen,
Hamburg) and two states in the control group (Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein).
21However, in Section 3.5.3, I also conduct robustness checks using T1, T2 and C-NT (Figure III·3 in Appendix
III.1.1).
22Hesse (H) is the only federal state that did not implement the reform uniformly for Gymnasium at the start of
one school year, but successively over three years as shown in Table 3.2. Thus, it is not possible to classify Hesse (H)
either as treatment or control state in 2009 (without further assumptions) and it has to be excluded from estimations.
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Moreover, the pre-reform years cover 2003-2006 (be f ore), and 2009-2012 are the post-
reform years (a f ter). Then, the DiD strategy is implemented via the regression model:
R2st = δ0+δ1(TreatG8st = a f tert×Treats)+ γt×a f tert +ξs×Treats
(+ αXst)+ εst (3.9)
where R2st = {R2(read)st ;R2(maths)st ;R2(science)st} is the estimated coefficient of de-
termination (R2) from Equation (3.8) associated with state s in test year t that measures
IEOp in the three PISA domains. Treat captures the Treatment Group-specific effect and
a f ter the time trend. δ1 is the coefficient of the interaction term, being 1 if a student
attends a Gymnasium in a treatment state after the implementation of the G-8 model:
it measures the causal reform effect of increased learning intensity on IEOp. δ0 is a
constant (before control mean), εst is the regression error term.
Xst is a vector of potential state-level variables. It can be used to address concerns
about differential implementation effects on the level of federal states imposing the reform
(e.g. due to school policies). For robustness checks, I adjust the regression by including
school fixed effects capturing any specific effects at the highest level of variation that is
not captured by the DiD group specific means in Equation (3.9). These fixed effects also
incorporate both federal state and year fixed effects, the latter as different schools are
randomly sampled for every PISA wave. However, when the DiD approach is internally
valid, results remain robust and the simple DiD specification (without Xst) is sufficient.
3.4.4 Selecting Appropriate Treatment/Control Group Settings
Internal Validity German federal states share a similar legislative, cultural, economic
framework and common qualification standards are coordinated by the SC. Thus, exploit-
ing variation in the implementation process of the reform across states is more effective
than relying on cross-national variation (Wössmann 2010).
Next, one should consider whether the reform effect is driven not only by the explana-
tory variable of interest (increased learning intensity), but by other non-random factors
in response to the reform. One concern with the DiD strategy might be that potentially
affected students move with their families to a state that has not yet implemented the G-8
reform. If such reactions had occurred in a treatment group before the reform had been
implemented, the population’s composition across treatment and control groups might
have changed in a way that would bias estimation results.
However, such anticipatory behavior is very unlikely. First, options for moving
between federal states to avoid the G-8 reform were limited. The implementation across
all federal states was fast: half of all reform states started the transition into shortened
duration of the Gymnasium within three school years (2003/2004 until 2005/2006). There
is no systematic pattern regarding the timing and implementation of the G-8 reform and
the geographical location of reforming federal states.23
23The geographical maps in Figure III·2 in Appendix III.1.1 reveal the quick spread of the treatment across states.
175
Second, direct and indirect moving costs, including bureaucratic hurdles, have been
shown to be reasons why only a few families with children of school-going age move to
another federal state in Germany (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2008). Families
tend to move more between municipalities than states.
Third, strategic considerations concerning the competition for access to study pro-
grams also support the assumption that bias due to movement between states is unlikely.
As a result of the reform, it was obvious that several double cohorts would graduate in be-
tween 2009 and 2016. This temporary increase in the number of applicants for university
studies could inversely affect the probability of students to quickly enter a study program
of their choice. Hence, G-8 model students could at least insure themselves against the
risk of having to take a gap year as their 14th year of education. Instead of spending 13
years in school and having to wait one additional year before entering the study program
of their choice, having 12 years of schooling before enrolling at a university means that
even after one gap year, G-8 model students could “save” one year compared to G-9
model students completing a gap year
By focusing on a setting in which treatment states implemented the reform in school
year 2004/2005, the quasi-experimental design is also unlikely to suffer from estimation
bias due to non-random political reasons for introducing the G-8 reform slightly earlier or
later among federal states. Appendix III.1.5 shows that treatment/control groups are not
different regarding the stability of state governments in charge of school policy: political
preferences remain stable over the analysis period. Moreover, no systematic change in
the transition flows between secondary school tracks is observed due to the G-8 reform
(Huebener & Marcus 2017).
Finally, the internal validity of a DiD estimation requires the common time trend
assumption to hold: without the reform, both treatment and control group would have
shown a parallel time trend. This can be confirmed by examining the pre-reform trends
in terms of the estimated IEOp measure for the main treatment and control groups in
Figure 3·2. Moreover, I conduct placebo tests (Bertrand et al. 2004) as robustness checks
in Section 3.5.3 that also confirm the validity of my strategy.
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Figure 3·2: Robustness - DiD Graphs of IEOp measure for Enlarged Treatment/Control Groups
(a) IEOp measure based on maths (b) IEOp measure based on reading (c) IEOp measure based on science
Notes: This figure shows the DiD graphs for IEOp measures based on all three test domains. It confirms that the
parallel trend assumption holds. Five (Treatment Group T) federal states are compared to the never-changing control
group (C-NT) consisting of four states. Compare also Figure III·6 and Figure III·7 for other specifications showing
that trends are not sensitive to alternative compositions of the treatment group and Figure III·5 in Appendix III.1.1. As
discussed in Section 3.3, the data used for the main regressions cover the time frame 2003 to 2012.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
Treatment/Control Group Comparison Due to the quasi-experimental design of
the G-8 reform, estimating the effect of the reform on IEOp should not be biased by any
selection of students based on pre-reform characteristics. As the identification strategy
relies on comparing the change in IEOp for ninth graders attending Gymnasium across
treatment and control groups before and after the reform, many significant observable
pre-reform differences in the control variable sets might weaken the empirical strategy.
Following Imbens & Wooldridge (2009), Table III.4 shows standardized means compari-
son tests for the control variable sets (Table 3.1) concerning all treatment groups and the
main control group C. For the baseline model, Model Base, the G-8 reform takes effect
between 2006 and 2009. Hence, PISA waves 2003 and 2006 constitute the pre-treatment
period. Table III.4 shows that treatment and control groups have similar characteristics in
terms of the main circumstances variables used for the analysis. Moreover, apart from
small differences in the level of circumstances variables, the pre-reform comparison of
groups T and C are robust. This supports the internal validity of the strategy, because
the main treatment and control groups consisting of West German states turn out to be
comparable. Using smaller or enlarged treatment groups, the pre-reform comparison
tests are still robust in combination with the standard control group (C).24
In summary, the pre-reform sample means comparison test for the main control vari-
able set (Table III.4) suggests that the DiD estimation approach outlined in Section 3.4.3
is internally valid. This is true at least for Model Base when comparing Treatment Groups
T/T1/T2 versus Control Group C; and for Model Robust when comparing Treatment
Group T versus Control Group C1 (see Table III.5).
24This supports the internal validity of the estimation strategy: see pre-trend graph in Figure III·7 in Appendix
III.1.1.
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3.5 Results and Discussion
When presenting the results for the outcome variables, PISA test scores in each of the
three domains, the respective five plausible values are standardized based on the distribu-
tion of test scores across the sample of students attending the ninth grade of Gymnasium
that are taken from the representative grade-based PISA data sets (Section 3.3.1).25
Section 3.5.1 explains the first-step, Section 3.5.2 the second-step results for the base-
line model specifications (Section 3.4.2). Section 3.5.3 provides robustness checks with
extended treatment and control group settings, while Section 3.5.4 rationalizes the results.
3.5.1 First-Step Result: Inequality of Educational Opportunity Measure
The first step of analyzing the distributional effects of increased learning intensity involves
deriving the main outcome variable, the measure of IEOp, as share in the standardized
PISA test score variance that can only be attributed to observed circumstances (Equa-
tion (3.8) in Section 3.4.1). All six sets of control variables that capture circumstances
are jointly used to derive this IEOp measure.26 Its standard errors are obtained by using
replication weights and clustering on the highest level on which the reform was imple-
mented (Bertrand et al. 2004), the federal state level. Finally, population weights take
into account the stratified data structure and representativeness of each observation.
When estimating IEOp, it is useful to check how circumstances variables directly
affect cognitive skills as measured by test scores. Detailed regression output per test
domain is provided for the main specification Model Base: T versus C (Table III.6, III.7,
III.8).27 The following patterns can be observed concerning how the circumstances
variables (as defined in Section 3.3.3) affect test scores. The only control variable
changing the direction of its effect on achievement scores depending on the test domain is
gender. Being female decreases a student’s achievement in the PISA mathematics test by
45-65% and in the science test by 30-50% in terms of an international standard deviation
(SD). The effect size slightly declines in the post-reform period across both treatment and
control group. However, female students increase their reading performance by up to 40%
in terms of one international SD. This is consistent with the literature on gender-specific
achievement differences in educational test outcomes (Niederle & Vesterlund 2010).
25For the remainder of this chapter, I restrict the presentation of first-step estimation results to test scores that
are standardized with respect to the pooled sample of all students in Gymnasium that are part of the representative
grade-based PISA test cohort in any of the test years that form the sample (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 in Model Base)
(stdpvsubject3): This allows me to interpret the coefficients relative to the average student performance over the sample
period.
26In Section 3.5.3 for robustness check purposes, for all main specifications and each test domain, all results are
shown adding step-by-step control variables (covering circumstances): from (i) and (ii) constituting control set (I) until
(VI) encompassing controls (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii). See Appendix III.1.5 for details on computing standard
errors.
27Table III.7 shows the first-step results for reading test scores, Table III.6 for mathematics test scores and Table III.8
provides the corresponding output for science test scores. In each table, the columns (1) and (2) refer to Control Group
C, the columns (3) and (4) to Treatment Group T. Within both Groups, the first column refers to the “Before” reform
period (2003-2006), the last one repeats regressions using only “After” reform (2009-2012) data.
178
All the other control variable estimates are fairly robust in their signs independent
of the test domain. As expected, the age effect is negative. Those, for instance, that
started school at an older age or that had to repeat a grade before entering the ninth
grade will be older compared to their peers due to factors correlated with below-average
performance in test scores. Similarly, having a migration background is associated with
performing lower in all three testing domains. Additionally controlling for whether a
foreign language is spoken at home, the negative effect shrinks as expected. Thus, the
degree to which a migrant student experiences integration to the host country’s standards
on a daily family life level, seems to be key for test scores, in particular for the domain
of reading.
Regarding the socio-economic status (SES) of the household in which a student grows
up, a higher amount of books than the base category (101-500) is positively correlated
with test scores. Likewise, the higher the ISEI index of a parental job in the family, the
higher is the positive effect on scores.28 Thus, the SES control variables tend to match
the literature suggesting that higher family SES correlates with beneficial conditions
for early childhood development. Parental education is also indicative for academic
support opportunities, and indeed a positive impact on test scores for both mathematics
and science can be found for the variable indicating that a student grew up in an academic
household (at least one parent with ISCED level 5-6). The effect is less important for
reading. As mathematics and science are subjects likely requiring more specific and
targeted knowledge from parents for them to be able to support their children, this may
explain the difference.29 But Parental Characteristics have less effect on scores once
individual circumstances are taken into account. Finally, family structure and employment
status show no clear patterns.
In summary, first-step regressions demonstrate that for the medium-term horizon most
of the circumstances variables affect the PISA test scores into the expected directions. The
fact that these patterns are consistent over varying time horizons and across PISA data sets
confirms that the chosen circumstances variables were appropriately selected (compare
also Appendix III.1.5). Furthermore, the explanatory power of these first-step regressions
remains in a range of about 15-35% across the different specifications. Thereby, IEOp
measures tend to be higher when measured with respect to mathematical and scientific
skills (20-35%) than with respect to reading literary (15-25%). Consequently, the level of
the IEOp measure found in this chapter can be categorized as a lower bound within the
range of the few available IEOp estimates for European countries. For instance, Ferreira
& Gignoux (2013) find that about 35% of test score variation in PISA-I 2006 can be
attributed to circumstances for the case of Germany, and Carneiro (2008) finds that IEOp
amounts to about 40% for the case of Portugal.
28With the average family’s highest job ISEI index being 58, an effect on test scores of 0.001 translates into 5.8%
of a PISA international test standard deviation. See also Section 3.3.3 and Appendix III.1.5 for further explanations.
29Furthermore, highly educated parents might be more aware of the greater importance of numeracy skills for labor
market outcomes. However, the effects of growing up in an academic household are rather insignificantly positive,
whereas those of growing up in less educated families are rather significantly negative for test scores.
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3.5.2 Main Results: The Effect of Increased Learning Intensity on IEOp
In this section, I switch to the second-step of the estimation approach, the DiD frame-
work. The IEOp measure that I just derived by the first-step regressions is the share
of total variance in test scores which is accounted for by the student’s predetermined
circumstances variables.
Baseline Model Results Starting with the main treatment and control group specification,
the Model Base results are shown in Table 3.3. The top panel outlines the DiD estimates
for reading, the middle panel for mathematics and the bottom panel for science test scores.
IEOp is calculated with school fixed effects.
Table 3.3: Main Results for T vs. C
Subject IEOp measured as R2 IEOp measured as R2 adj.
Reading C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before 0.242 0.180 -0.062 0.172 0.154 -0.018
(0.057) (0.031) (0.065) (0.062) (0.032) (0.070)
After 0.162 0.213 0.051 0.114 0.192 0.078
(0.034) (0.020) (0.039) (0.036) (0.021) (0.041)
Change in R2 -0.080 0.033 0.113 -0.058 0.037 0.096
(0.066) (0.037) (0.076) (0.072) (0.038) (0.081)
Mathematics C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before 0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.294 0.245 -0.049
(0.060) (0.033) (0.068) (0.065) (0.034) (0.073)
After 0.190 0.249 0.060 0.143 0.229 0.086
(0.040) (0.027) (0.048) (0.043) (0.027) (0.051)
Change in R2 -0.164 -0.018 0.146 -0.151 -0.015 0.136
(0.072) (0.042) (0.083) (0.078) (0.043) (0.089)
Science C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before 0.363 0.215 -0.148 0.304 0.190 -0.114
(0.052) (0.025) (0.058) (0.057) (0.026) (0.063)
After 0.173 0.210 0.037 0.125 0.188 0.063
(0.048) (0.023) (0.053) (0.051) (0.023) (0.056)
Change in R2 -0.190 -0.005 0.185 -0.179 -0.002 0.177
(0.071) (0.034) (0.079) (0.077) (0.035) (0.084)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (3.7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and
were calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix III.1.5, clustering at the
federal state level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (3.9) taking into account population weights.
Positive changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp or decreasing EEOp and vice versa for negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) Individual Characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) Individual Characteristics (IC) II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on par. birth place)
(iii) Parental Characteristics (PC): highest parents’ qualification (ISCED 1-2/ISCED 3-4/ISCED 5-6)
(iv) Socio-economic Status (SES) I: no. of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) Socio-economic Status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index [0-90] of job in the family
(vi) Family Characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) Family Characteristics (FC) II: mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) -
mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: The first-step regressions of the setting: treatment group T vs. control group C are provided in
Table III.7, Table III.6 and Table III.8 in Appendix III.1.2.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 (compare Section 3.3.1).
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The DiD table illustrates that the change in IEOp as measured by the R2 in the
first-step estimation exhibits a common pattern across all three test domains - IEOp
has increased due to the G-8 reform. That is, the share of inequality in test scores that
can be attributed to circumstances has risen. With the estimate being a lower bound
of the true IEOp, the results can be interpreted as follows. At least about 10% of the
variation in reading test scores can be additionally attributed to circumstances beyond
the control of a ninth grade student. For mathematics, at least about 14% and for
science at least about 18% of the test score variation can be additionally considered to
constitute IEOp. These results are statistically significant, with standard errors computed
as explained in Appendix III.1.5. Thus, given initial values of 20-30% in IEOp, DiD
estimates would correspond to a relative increase in IEOp of at least 25% in response to
the rise in learning intensity induced by the G-8 reform. Hence, the increase in IEOp is
economically significant. The effects are stronger when IEOp is measured with respect
to science or mathematics than with respect to reading test scores.
Zooming in, one can further note that IEOp seems to have considerably decreased in
the time period after the reform for Control Group C. Instead for the Treatment Group
T, the level of IEOp appears to have remained practically unchanged across all three
domains. In this setting, the increase in learning intensity appears to have maintained the
role of circumstances constant in treated states, whereas without shorter school duration
IEOp tends to have decreased. The Model Base takes a medium-term perspective as not
only the first affected cohorts are taken into account, but data up to 2012 are considered,
when the reform had already been fully enacted. By 2012, in most federal states the
double cohort had already graduated or was about to graduate (Figure 3·1).
Robustness Model Results To learn about the robustness of the effects, it is useful to
see how results change for the main treatment and control group specification when
conducting the same two-step estimation procedure for the Model Robust covering only
years 2003 until 2009. Therefore, the left-hand panels in Table III.9 in Appendix III.1.2
show the short-term effects of increased learning intensity on IEOp focusing mainly
on the first student cohorts treated by the G-8 reform for Treatment Group T versus
Control Group C. The DiD estimates remain positive across all test domains. However,
the increase in IEOp only reaches levels that rest within a range of about 5-10% of the
variance in educational test scores that can be additionally attributed to circumstances.
However, results are no longer statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, the relative
deterioration in IEOp is lower in the short term - if different from zero at all - compared
to its significant size in the medium term (Table 3.3). Otherwise, the underlying patterns
of the reform effect also remain robust in the short term. Educational acceleration tends
to inhibit students in the treatment group from experiencing any improvements in IEOp.
Instead, ninth graders in the control group experience less IEOp as circumstances lose
explanatory power for academic achievement.
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To understand how the G-8 reform changed educational opportunities in Gymnasium,
it is useful to expand the robustness model to consider treatment and control group
specifications that bear even more external validity for the German school system. With
C1 about 70% of the German high school student population can be considered in the
short-term reform analysis. DiD results for this extended treatment and control group
specification are shown in the right panel of Table III.9. There appears to be no effect
on IEOp across all three test domains in response to the G-8 reform. However, the
IEOp measures still range between 15 to 25%, their magnitude increasing from reading
to mathematics to science. Students in both treatment and control group experience a
similar rise in IEOp, such that in total the DiD effect is canceled out. The DiD estimation
findings on the effect of the G-8 reform are similar across T/C and T/C1 specifications:
there is no statistically significant short-term effect of the reform-induced increase in
learning intensity on IEOp.
In summary, the impact of the reform on IEOp is robust for the alternative specifica-
tion. Focusing on Model Robust (2003-2009), increased learning intensity does not affect
IEOp, that is, unfair inequality in terms of how much in the cognitive test score variation
can be explained by circumstances beyond a student’s control (right panel in Table III.9
in Appendix III.1.2). Narrowing the control group to include only federal states that
did not plan to shorten the duration of their G-9 model Gymnasium, a considerable
increase in IEOp of about 5-10% in terms of additional explanatory power is observable
also in Model Robust setting, but results are barely statistically significant (left panel
in Table III.9). However, taking a medium-term perspective on the G-8 reform (Model
Base (2003-2012)) shows that the reform-induced increase in learning intensity causally
increases the IEOp measures (Table 3.3). The observed rise in inequality of opportunity
is statistically significant and covers at least 25% of the general IEOp measure estimated
for students attending German secondary schools. Results reveal that for students in
Gymnasium the lower bound levels of IEOp correspond to about 17-35% of the variance
in educational outcomes that can be attributed to the role of circumstances only.30 Thus,
the main results show that increased learning intensity aggravates IEOp. The effects are
stronger when measured for mathematics and science than for reading.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
Placebo Test To evaluate the plausibility of the quasi-experimental identification strategy
that allows a causal interpretation of the effects of the G-8 reform-induced increase in
learning intensity on IEOp, it is important to conduct placebo tests (Bertrand et al. 2004).
Setting the reform to artificially take effect between 2003 and 2006, no statistically
significant effects can be detected for any of the main treatment and control group
30To investigate whether this increase in IEOp is long-lasting, one would ideally need to consider longer time
periods, that are not yet available. However, once shifting attention to student cohorts that are far away from the first
treated ones, potential new curricular reforms undertaken in response to the initial G-8 reform (Table III.1) should be
taken into account. Instead, it is plausible to assume that medium-term effects on IEOp as defined in this chapter are
long-lasting given the literature on the persistence of education on lifetime outcomes (Deming 2009).
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specifications (T vs. C in Table III.10 in Appendix III.1.2). In addition to the pre-reform
comparison test (Section 3.4.4), this finding supports the internal validity of the estimation
strategy, in particular that the common time trend assumption holds. This can also be
seen from examining the pre-reform trends in terms of the estimated IEOp measure for
the main treatment and control groups in Figure 3·2 in Section 3.4.4. Thus, placebo tests
confirm the plausibility for interpreting the main estimation results as causal effects of
the reform on IEOp.
Moreover, multi-level regressions confirm that school level circumstances are indeed
already considered by school fixed effects. Moreover, using school fixed effects or
only federal state effects to measure IEOp does not change DiD results (Table III.11 in
Appendix III.1.2). This indicates that sorting based on schools is not a concern, which
also supports the internal validity of the empirical strategy taken.
To further investigate the robustness of my main results, I focus on three margins
of interest. First, I analyze how findings change depending on which of the available
six control variable sets are included in the first-step regression for deriving the IEOp
measure. Second, I focus on how DiD results change when extending or reducing the
treatment group. Third, I show how results change for enlarged control groups consisting
of states that never changed their academic track.31
Varying the Control Set of Circumstances Variables To understand how robust
DiD results remain when changing the amount of control variables chosen to cover
predetermined circumstances, I analyze how in particular adjusted R2 measures of IEOp
behave. The adjusted R2 can help to detect which Control set32 combination appears to
have most explanatory power among the available circumstances variables (Table 3.1).
Looking across the DiD result tables, including as circumstances variables Individual
Characteristics (IC), Parental Characteristics (PC) and Socio-Economic Status (SES) may
be optimal among the six control variable sets. However, the analysis across different sets
reveals that for each test domain the final reform estimate of increased learning intensity
on IEOp does not change much across Control sets 3 to 6 (see Table III.12).This also
provides support for the empirical strategy taken to derive the main results: using all
six variable sets in the first-step regression. In fact, this approach renders estimates that
correspond to the highest adjusted R2 generating Control set combination. Moreover,
regression patterns stay robust in size and direction independent of which set is used
to derive IEOp. This is evidence for the quasi-experimental design assumption that
assignment to treatment occurred without selection on observables, but randomly.
31The main output tables for robustness checks are shown in Appendix III.1.2: Table III.12 to III.13. All of these
tables are structured in the same way to provide an overview of DiD estimation results of increased learning intensity
as induced by the G-8 reform on IEOp.
32Control set 1 provides results based on deriving the IEOp measure including only Individual Characteristics (IC)
as control variables (that is (i) and (ii) in Section III.1.5). Then, subsequently additional control variables are added,
until in set 6 all available circumstances are applied together in the first-step regression.
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Extending Treatment Groups Next, it is useful to repeat the estimations with
extended treatment groups to investigate the potential external validity of the main
results. Therefore, all main regressions (Section 3.5.2) are rerun with Treatment Group
T1 excluding the two West German city states Hamburg and Bremen, and for Treatment
Group T2, which is T plus Berlin and Brandenburg. When the treatment group gets
larger, the DiD reform effects become smaller, for instance, in the regression settings with
Control Group C (Table III.12) in Model Base, the increasing effect on IEOp declines as
we move from T to T2 consistently within each test domain and across all Control sets.
In summary, despite their increasingly heterogeneous composition, the main results in
terms of direction and size are reconfirmed. This supports the potential external validity
of the results based on the carefully chosen T/C Group specification in the previous
section. Thus, focusing on the Treatment Group T does not mean that results do not carry
implications which are likely to be valid for the entire German secondary school system.
Extending Control Groups As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, one could also compare
treatment groups with federal states that always maintained the same length for the
Gymnasium. When using Never-Taker Control Group C-NT, the DiD results in all
specifications show a smaller increase in IEOp. The results for this specification can be
seen in Table III.13 in Appendix III.1.2. This may be due to the fact, that if one takes the
complementary part of C-NT, the hypothetical control group consisting of Saxony and
Thuringia, the effects are rather slightly negative, but not significant.
3.5.4 Discussion and Interpretation of Results - Potential Mechanisms
To begin with, the key concept of IEOp in this chapter is closely related to the issue of
social mobility. Estimating θ̂IEOp can be regarded as isomorphic to measuring intergen-
erational persistence of IEOp. For the latter, following Galton, one usually regresses a
child’s (yit) on parental outcomes (yi,t−1):
yit = βyi,t−1+ εit , (3.10)
with β as measure of persistence. If one used family background variables instead
of parental outcome variables for (yi,t−1), then the R2 measure of immobility (Equa-
tion (3.10)) would be similar to θ̂IOP (Equation (3.7) in Section 3.3.2) as long as the
circumstances vector contains mostly family background variables. In this regard, θ̂IEOp
can be connected to measures of intergenerational educational immobility, which can
be used to measure social (im)mobility (such as β Equation (3.10)). In analogy, this is
also related to the findings that childhood wealth can serve as a proxy for circumstances
explaining future wealth inequality (Boserup et al. 2018). Moreover, intergenerational
income elasticity and the Gini coefficient of income have been shown to be highly corre-
lated (Great Gatsby Curve) which points to a link between IEOp and intergenerational
social mobility (Black & Devereux 2011). The connection between both concepts can be
characterized by two adjoint forces, upward and downward social mobility.
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A decrease in IEOp would be indicative for improved upward mobility, as it means
that circumstances, such as the SES of the family in which one grows up, became less
important for a student’s academic performance. Therefore, if lower IEOp translates
into providing more equalizing learning conditions such that ability, but in particular
efforts are rewarded, extending EEOp would be welfare enhancing in a society with
meritocratic preferences. While decreasing IEOp may lead to social upward mobility for
high-performing students from disadvantaged backgrounds, it may also lead to social
downward mobility for students with beneficial circumstances who lack talent and/or
efforts to maintain their position as soon as circumstances were less important for a
student’s educational outcome.
Table 3.4: Score-DiD with Interaction Terms
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Subject Basic SES Median SES Quartiles Academic
Reading
Treated*post -0.174 -0.214 -0.137 -0.198
(0.290) (0.291) (0.319) (0.288)
Treated*post*SES - 0.072*** 0.157*** -
(0.0274) (0.0389)
Treated*post*academic - - - 0.0335*
(0.0195)
R2 0.130 0.131 0.148 0.132
Mathematics
Treated*post -0.300 -0.382+ -0.322 -0.393+
(0.262) (0.264) (0.398) (0.261)
Treated*post*SES - 0.148*** 0.284*** -
(0.0315) (0.0386)
Treated*post*academic - - - 0.127***
(0.0218)
R2 0.167 0.172 0.199 0.173
Science
Treated*post -0.309 -0.384* -0.382* -0.402*
(0.230) (0.231) (0.220) (0.228)
Treated*post*SES - 0.135*** 0.261*** -
(0.0306) (0.0414)
Treated*post*academic - - 0.127***
(0.0214)
R2 0.138 0.142 0.162 0.143
Observations 6,649 6,630 3,208 6,483
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10% + 15%. Table entries show the results of a DiD on all three test domain scores. Columns
(ii-iv) show the results of a DiD, as well as its interaction with background variables. Column (ii) shows
a distinction between high and low SES using the median of the highest ISEI in the familiy, whereas
column (iii) displays results where the first quartile according to ISEI is assigned low SES and the fourth
quartile is assigned high SES. Column (iv) displays interaction results for academic, a dummy variable
taking value 1 if mother or father achieved a university degree and 0 else. All regressions have been
conducted with school fixed effects and using control set 6= [(i)+(ii)+(iii)+(iv)+(v)+(vi)+(vii)].
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Table 3.4 presents the results for a DiD based on standardized scores for the main
setting 2003-2012. Compliant with existing literature (Huebener et al. 2017) I find no or
only a slightly positive effect of the reform on scores. Again the effects for mathematics
and science are stronger than for reading. The DiD with SES interaction terms delivers
highly significant positive coefficients which are indicative of students from a higher
social background having improved more, hinting to an increase in IEOp. Intuitively the
more extreme distinction between low and high socio-economic status based on the first
compared to the fourth quartile instead of using the median as cutoff leads to stronger
results (column (ii) vs. (iii) in Table 3.4). It is worth noting that socio-economic status
seems to be more important than growing up in an academic household. As with the DiD
on IEOp (measured by R2 or ad justed R2), results are weakest for reading, stronger for
science and most striking for mathematics. Consequently, these results confirm the main
findings of Section 3.5.2.
Table 3.5 depicts the same DiD regression as above but now using tuition as the
dependent variable. The graphs presented in Figure III·8 in Appendix III.1.1 justify
the assumption of common pre-trends for private tuition, thus giving leverage to this
regression. Whereas the basic DiD delivers a slightly negative though insignificant effect
of the reform on private tuition, the interaction-term coefficients all carry a positive
sign. Admittedly, only the interaction with SES based on highest and lowest quartile is
significant at the ten p-value percentage level. Nonetheless all of them point into the same
direction: families of higher socio-economic background react to the reform by actively
providing their children with more extra tuition. This is further suggestive evidence that
disparities in private tuition between different social backgrounds are among the main
drivers of the rise in IEOp induced by increasing learning intensity due to the G-8 reform.
Table 3.5: Tuition DiD-Results
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Basic SES Median SES Quartiles Academic
Treated*post -0.103 -0.113 -0.0715 -0.114
(0.121) (0.122) (0.192) (0.122)
Treated*post*SES - 0.0172 0.0454* -
(0.0175) (0.0261)
Treated*post*academic - - - 0.0149
(0.0182)
Observations 5,852 5,843 2,821 5,781
R-squared 0.269 0.269 0.297 0.272
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10% + 15%. Table entries show the results of a DiD on private tuition. Columns (ii-iv)
show the results of a DiD and its interaction with background variables. Column (ii) shows a distinction
between high and low SES using the median of the highest ISEI in the familiy, whereas column(iii)
displays results where the first quartile according to ISEI is assigned low SES and the fourth high SES.
Column (iv) displays interaction results for academic, a dummy variable taking value 1 if mother or
father achieved a university degree and 0 else. All regressions have been conducted with school fixed
effects and using control set 6 = [(i)+(ii)+(iii)+(iv)+(v)+(vi)+(vii)].
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Returning to the G-8 reform, one can provide the following explanation for the
observed findings. First, the fact that increased learning intensity had only a limited
impact on IEOp in the short run may be indicative for the reform heterogeneously
promoting both downward mobility among students with advantageous circumstances and
upward mobility among those with disadvantaged circumstances who having managed
to enter the Gymnasium may have already undergone a harder selection process.33
As the implementation process of the reform suggests, the reform-induced increase
in learning intensity affected students and their parents by surprise in a manner that they
could not adapt to immediately. For instance, being the first one confronted with the
newly intensified system, it is harder to adapt as one cannot easily rely on the experiences
of older students as was the case for later cohorts in the new G-8 model. This may explain
why IEOp increased only moderately or not at all in the short term. Thus, in the initial
reform period, the lag with which favorable circumstances adapt to help a student implies
that downward rather than upward mobility forces may have been more relevant for the
first affected student cohorts.
Second, in the medium term, after favorable circumstances had time to adapt and
provide support to the associated students, both upward and downward mobility would
be lessened. For instance, parents are more likely to be aware and prepared to deal with
the increased requirements of a G-8 model and new forms of additional professional
tuition services may become available in response to the reform, based on the experiences
of the first affected cohorts. Consequently, favorable circumstances may then allow
students quicker, easier and better access to a support system helping them to deal with
the higher learning intensity. Then, increased IEOp associated with lower upward rather
than higher downward mobility may be expected in the medium term after the G-8
reform was enacted. Descriptive evidence on the evolution of additional, paid tuition
for students attending a Gymnasium available from PISA questionnaires supports the
explanation given above (cf. Figure III·8 in Appendix III.1.1). There has been a rise
in extra tuition following the reform, with this effect being stronger in the treatment
compared to the control group. Moreover, the increase in extra tuition has been more
pronounced for students from more privileged family environments (circumstances), such
as those living in academic households (Table 3.4). This trend is confirmed by Klemm &
Hollenbach-Biele (2016) who analyzed the evolution of private tuition in the same time
period using representative survey data for Germany.
Moreover, looking across the medium-term effect evidence (Table 3.3), DiD estimates
of the effect of increased learning intensity on IEOp reveal some subject-related patterns.
The level of IEOp is consistently higher for both mathematics and science compared
to reading across all treatment and control group specifications. This observation can
be interpreted as evidence in favor of the existence of heterogeneous subject-dependent
curricular flexibilities.
33The high correlation of parental education and a student’s probability of entering the Gymnasium has been shown
(e.g. Klieme et al. (2011)) to be persistent in the German school system at least over the last two decades.
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In fact, reading skills comprise more general competencies that are not only learnt in
language-related courses at school, but also indirectly in other school courses as well as in
everyday life - reading being often a necessary prerequisite to simply comprehend, learn
or interact with other people. Consequently, variations in learning intensity might have
less influence on reading skills. In contrast, mathematics and science can be regarded
as requiring more specific skills which are mainly accumulated through taught courses
at school and less likely to be learnt indirectly through other courses at school or in
everyday life. Thus, for the complementary skill set required by mathematics science, it
seems to be plausible that positive circumstances, such as growing up in an academic
household, are relatively more important than for reading. In that context, the fact that
the impact of the reform with respect to reading skills is less pronounced, could be
interesting for another reason. On the one hand, it might raise the question of whether
in order to improve reading skills, current curricula and teaching methods need to be
adjusted. On the other hand, it could also only indicate that the reading practice from
additional teaching only balances out the negative impact of increased intensity on the
actual learning process - which would be another potential part of the explanation for
why IEOp levels for the domain of reading may be less pronounced than in the other test
domains.
However, given the broad definition of learning intensity this may still be compatible
with findings that the G-8 reform itself had small positive effects on mathematics and
science test scores in contrast to reading test scores (Camarero Garcia 2012, Andrietti
2016, Huebener et al. 2017, Büttner & Thomsen 2015). Furthermore, Dahmann (2017)
shows that cognitive skills measured by IQ proxies did not causally change due to the
reform, but only gender-specific differences were reinforced. The fact, that there appear to
be no SES-specific differences in IQs supports my findings: the observed overall increase
in IEOp seems to be mainly driven by heterogeneous parental support opportunities
to deal with the higher learning intensity and cannot be simply explained by potential
differences in ability. Finally, as the reform did not adjust teaching-related quality factors
for the first affected cohorts, the findings might be regarded to be merely a lower bound
for the effects of increased learning intensity on performance, in particular as the variance
of test scores did not change much.
In summary, even though it is beyond the scope of this third chapter of my dissertation
to precisely detect all underlying mechanisms explaining how IEOp may be changed and
all implications for its translation into both upward and downward mobility, this chapter
reveals one mechanism of how IEOp can be causally changed through an educational
reform, that is, by increasing learning intensity.
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3.6 Conclusion
The goal of this third chapter of my doctoral thesis has been to shed light onto how
Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp) may be shaped by the recent trend of
accelerating and intensifying the educational process. This is important to understand the
role of learning intensity as one policy channel influencing educational opportunities and
thus social mobility. Beyond that, the understanding of how institutions affect IEOp is
still limited (Ramos & Van de gaer 2016). To approach an answer to these questions, I
focus on the academic track of the German secondary school system, the Gymnasium.
Hereby, I exploit the shortening of school duration from nine to eight years as a quasi-
experiment that exogenously increased learning intensity. This paper is among the first
to combine an evaluation of the G-8 reform with PISA data, that are comparable across
federal states and over time, to analyze how increased learning intensity causally affects
IEOp in Germany. Therefore, I contributes to the still limited literature on measuring
IOp with respect to educational outcomes by adding new evidence.
The first step of the analysis involves measuring IEOp as share in the variance of
standardized PISA test scores that can be only attributed to circumstances beyond an
individual’s control. Interestingly, the estimated IEOp measures correspond to the levels
of estimates for inequality of opportunity in income, pointing to the link between IEOp
and (intergenerational) social immobility. The innovative approach of employing a
machine learning algorithm to evaluate which circumstances variables are relevant can
provide us with a second layer of data-driven evidence for the credibility of my IEOp
measure (Appendix III.1.5). As a second step, I conduct a DiD estimation strategy
to derive causal estimates, with treatment and control groups chosen according to the
implementation of the G-8 reform across federal states. The results reveal that the reform-
induced increase in learning intensity did not affect IEOp in the short term. Instead, in the
medium term IEOp significantly increases for affected student cohorts. These findings
can be rationalized by differential compensation possibilities for higher learning intensity
depending on parental resources in terms of the capacity to pay for additional tuition,
which may also explain the increased use of private tutoring as documented by Hille et al.
(2016). This interpretation is also supported by the outcomes of a DiD estimation with
interaction terms on PISA-scores which allows distinguishing the effects by the students’
socio-economic background (Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). Moreover, results point to the
existence of subject-dependent curricular flexibilities, with mathematics/science being
more inflexible, that is, more responsive to changes in curricular intensity than reading.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on evaluating this German school reform
which is still controversially debated. It shifts attention in the evaluation of the G-8
reform onto distributional concerns. I show that the G-8 reform can be considered to be a
selective reform that at least maintains test results, but at the same time increases IEOp,
and not to be an inclusive reform that at least maintains test results while reducing IEOp
(Checchi & van de Werfhorst 2018).
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To lower IEOp despite higher learning intensity, whole-day schooling and methods
reducing the dependence of educational support on circumstances may be a solution
(Deckers et al. 2019). Alternatively, to maintain equality of opportunity, when reducing
school duration without adjusting the support schemes at school, the curriculum may
need to be reduced accordingly.
Beyond the narrow context of the G-8 reform, there are two broader issues this
chapter touches on. First, the interaction of IEOp and social mobility is likely to be
very important for understanding phenomena such as the high persistence in the ob-
served intergenerational transmission of educational achievement. Generally, it would
be interesting to evaluate social mobility in regard of upward and downward mobility.
This component seems to be still neglected, in the sense that the focus appears to have
shifted onto improving upward mobility, while ignoring that this cannot be discussed
independently from removing rigidities that potentially limit downward mobility. Thus,
understanding the effects of compressing education on IEOp, and its implications for
social mobility are highly relevant.34 Second, the factor of time compression in the
context of education appears to have been largely neglected so far and more research on
this topic is needed. Politicians consider changes on the margin of educational intensity,
but as the G-8 reform shows, this may involve unintended and underestimated welfare
costs. A better understanding of the relationship between schooling duration, intensity,
and IEOp would also be important in the context of evaluating the conditions of welfare
benefits and cost of investments into the educational system. As the costs associated
with the misallocation of talents due to a lack of social (educational) mobility may be
considerable (Philippis & Rossi 2019, Boneva & Rauh 2019), it is economically desirable
to achieve more equality of educational opportunities. Therefore, this chapter shows
that the implementation of an appropriate level of educational intensity, should not only
depend on efficiency considerations, but also take into account the effects on equal access
to resources.
Taking stock of this discussion, the third chapter of my dissertation shows that cir-
cumstances matter at school with an emphasis on the relevance of variation in learning
intensity on IEOp. Future research should aim at understanding further potential mech-
anisms and channels shaping IEOp (Rothstein 2019). Furthermore, additional work is
needed to establish how IEOp translates into social mobility. This in turn may then permit
us to assess the welfare effects of IEOp with respect to its impact on future income and
wealth inequality. Finally, the outcomes of this research agenda would allow for the
evaluation of new policy recommendations aimed at improving equality of opportunity
in order to tackle challenges surrounding high levels of inequality.
34Thereby, a new theory of how learning (duration and intensity) and IEOp as well as how IEOp and social mobility
are linked together could allow quantifying precisely the role of learning intensity for absolute educational mobility,
thus social mobility.
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III.1 Appendix
III.1.1 Supplementary Figures
Figure III·1: Structure of the German Educational System
Notes: This figure illustrates the basic structure of the German education system. For more details,
see Standing Conference of Education Ministers (2009).
Source: Figure taken from Standing Conference of Education Ministers (2009): Basic Structure
of the Education System in the Federal Republic of Germany.
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Figure III·2: Overview of G-8 Reform across Federal States for Students Tested in PISA (2003-
2012)
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Notes: This figure illustrates whether 9th graders attending a Gymnasium tested in a PISA test
year (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012) were still taught in a G-9 model (grey/blue) or were already in a
reformed G-8 model (dark grey/red).
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Figure III·3: Overview of the Treatment/Control Group Setting
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Notes: The top-left figure shows the main Treat-
ment Group T consisting of Lower-Saxony (LS),
Baden-Württemberg (BW) and Bavaria (BV),
Hamburg (HB) and Bremen (BR) versus the
main Control Group C that consists of Schleswig-
Holstein (SH) and Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) for
the medium-term (2003-2012).
The top-right figure displays all specifications
of the Treatment Group T/T1/T2 vs the main Con-
trol Group C. Please note that T1 is a reduced
Treatment Group consisting of Lower-Saxony
(LS), Baden-Württemberg (BW) and Bavaria
(BV), thus, lacking Hamburg (HB) and Bremen
(BR) that form part of Treatment Group T which
consists of 5 federal states; whereas Treatment
Group T2 is Treatment Group T enlarged by the
states of Berlin (BE) and Brandenburg (BB).
The figure in the bottom panel displays the
main Treatment Group T vs Control Groups
C/C1/C-NT. Here, Control Group C1 is formed
by adding the state of North Rhine-Westphalia
(NRW) to the main Control Group C that con-
sists of Schleswig-Holstein (SH) and Rhineland-
Palatinate (RP), and Control Group C-NT is
formed by adding Thuringia (TH) and Saxony
(SN) to the main Control Group C.
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Figure III·4: Descriptive Analysis: Mean Test Score by Main Groups
Notes: This figure shows the mean scores for all three PISA test domains. Focusing on students in Gymna-
sium, the scores are above the average of 500 points. On overall, students perform best in science, then
mathematics and relatively worst in reading. The grouping into academic vs. non-academic background is
based on the binary variable indicating whether at least one parent has a college degree. To distinguish
between high and low SES, students have been assigned to quartiles of their highest parental job’s ISEI.
Being in the first quartile translates into low SES, whereas the fourth quartile into high SES. Students
from academic households achieve slightly higher scores than those from non-academic ones. A similar
picture derives when distinguishing between high and low SES. Finally, the main Treatment-Group T and
Control-Group C-NT (Never-Takers), as defined in Section 3.4.2, have similar test score levels.
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Figure III·5: IEOp Measure for Treatment/Control Groups Over Time (2000-2012)
Notes: This figure shows the IEOp measure (R2ad justed) with 90% confidence intervals over the whole time
period. Standard errors to construct confidence intervals are calculated according to Appendix III.1.5.
Standard errors for the year 2003 are particularly large due to idiosyncratic weights for that year.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Figure III·6: DiD Graphs of IEOp Measure for Main Treatment/Control Groups
(a) IEOp Measure Based on Maths (b) IEOp Measure Based on Science (c) IEOp Measure Based on Reading
Notes: This figure shows the DiD graphs for all three test domains confirming the parallel trend assumption
to hold. Treatment is the main treatment group T, Control is the main control group C, Control-NT is the
never-changing control group.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
Figure III·7: Robustness - DiD Graphs of IEOp Measure for Enlarged Treatment/Control Groups
(a) IEOp Measure Based on Maths (b) IEOp measure based on science (c) IEOp Measure Based on Reading
Notes: This figure shows the DiD graphs for all three test domains confirming the parallel trend assumption
to hold and not being sensitive to alternative compositions of the treatment group. Treatment is the main
treatment group T consisting of five federal states, Treatment 1 is the T1 Group consisting of three federal
states, and Treatment 2 is the extension Group consisting of seven federal states compared to Control which
is the main control group C.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Figure III·8: Potential Mechanism: Extra Tuition
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of tested students indicating that they took extra classes beyond
official school lessons. This mostly includes paid extra tuition. The dark blue bars correspond to students
growing up in non-academic households, whereas the light blue bars show results for students from
academic households, i.e. growing up with at least one parent who has a university diploma (ISCED-level
is greater than 5 or 6). The first panel shows that there was an upward trend in the demand for extra
classes/tuition between 2003 and 2012 across all federal states. The second panel shows that in treatment
states, the increase in extra tuition has been stronger for students from academic than non-academic
households in the post-reform period from 2009 to 2012. This indicates that this differential adjustment
with respect to extra-tuition depending on a student’s parental educational background may explain the
observed patterns in the main results. As in control groups, no such differential response in years 2009 and
2012 can be observed. Data are based on responses in the student questionnaires.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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III.1.2 Supplementary Tables
Table III.1: Overview of "G-8 reform" Across Federal States by Year of Double Cohort
Federal state
Type of Federal State Reform Timeline Gymnasium Reversalb
West/East City/Terr. Populationa Begins Ends Type Grade yes/no
Saxony (SN) East territorial 4,0 mio - - 5-12 - no reformc
Thuringia (TH) East territorial 2,2 mio - - 5-12 - no reformc
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) East territorial 2,3 mio 2003/2004 2006/2007 5-12 9th no
Mecklenburg-West
East territorial 1,6 mio 2004/2005 2007/2008 7-12 9th no
Pomerania (MWP)
Saarland (SL) West territorial 1,0 mio 2001/2002 2008/2009 5-12 5th nod
Hamburg (HB) West city state 1,7 mio 2002/2003 2009/2010 5-12 5th noe
Bavaria (BV)f West territorial 12,5 mio 2004/2005 2010/2011 5-12 5th,6th yesg
Lower Saxony (LS)f West territorial 7,8 mio 2004/2005 2010/2011 5-12 5th,6th yesh
Baden-
West territorial 10,5 mio 2004/2005 2011/2012 5-12 5th noi
Württemberg (BW)
Bremen (BR) West city state 0,7 mio 2004/2005 2011/2012 5-12 5th noj
Berlin (BE) West city state 3,4 mio 2006/2007 2011/2012 7-12 7th nok
Brandenburg (BB) East territorial 2,5 mio 2006/2007 2011/2012 7-12 7th nok
North Rhine-
West territorial 17,6 mio 2005/2006 2012/2013 5-12 5th nol
Westphalia (NRW)
Hesse (H) West territorial 6,0 mio variesm variesm 5-12 5th yesn
Rhineland-
West territorial 4,0 mio 2008/2009 2015/2016 5-13 5th yeso
Palatinate (RP)
Schleswig-
West territorial 2,8 mio 2008/2009 2015/2016 5-13 5th yesp
Holstein (SH)
a Numbers taken from the most recent census in 2011 are valid for the considered time period from 2003 to 2012
(German Federal Statistical Office, 2014, Area and population).
b See Secretariat of Standing Conference of Ministers of Education:
https://www.kmk.org/themen/allgemeinbildende-schulen/bildungswege-und-abschluesse/
sekundarstufe-ii-gymnasiale-oberstufe-und-abitur.html
c Since 1949, these states have implemented a G-8 model in the GDR and never had a G-9 model.
d Gymnasium remains in G-8 model, but in a comprehensive school G-13 model is possible.
e Gymnasium remains in G-8 model, whereas the Stadtschule as a comprehensive school offers a G-13 model.
f In Bavaria (BV) and Lower Saxony (LS), the 6th and 5th grade were allocated to the G-8 model in the same year,
suggesting that educational intensity was stronger for then 6th graders who had to learn the curriculum over 7 instead
of 8 years than (for then) 5th graders. Yet, tested 9th graders in 2009 were affected by the reform right from grade 5.
g General revision to G-9 model starting with school year 2019/2020 as announced in April 2017
h General revision to G-9 model starting with school year 2015/16, but with a voluntary option for the G-8 model
i But: since 2012/2013 a state-wide pilot project allows 44 model schools to offer a G-9 model.
j But: the so-called Oberschule as comprehensive school offers a G-13 model.
k But: integrated comprehensive schools are allowed to offer G-9 (G-13) model.
l But: in 2011/2012 there was a pilot project with 13/630 Gymnasien offering a G-9 model.
m Successive introduction of the reform in # % of all normal Gymnasium (5-12) 2004/2005: 10%; 2005/2006: 60%;
2006/2007: 30% with double cohorts graduating respectively in 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014.
n Since 2013/2014: students allowed to choose between G-12 or G-13 model from 5th grade onward.
o Always maintained schools with G-9 model (G-13 model): but since 2008/2009 a G-8 model is offered at 19
Gymnasien.
p Since 2011/12 schools are allowed by state law to offer a G-9 model (11 of 99 schools), G-8 model or both (4 of 99).
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Table III.2: Available Grade-sample based PISA-I Datasets
Before Reform After Reform
Dataset PISA-2000 a PISA-2003-I PISA-2006-I PISA-2009-I PISA-2012-I
Student-dataset:
# of variables 914 1,292 1,095 1,231 1,215
# of studentsb 34,754 8,559 9,577 9,460 9,998
test scoresc reading mathematics science reading mathematics
School-dataset:
# of variables 470 572 565 534 502
# of schools 1,342 216 226 226 230
Teacher-dataset:d
# of variables - 653 - 639 257
# of teachers - 1939 - 2,201 2,084
a For the year 2000, there was no specific grade-based PISA-I-sample available from the IQB. However,
PISA-2000 (being the PISA-2000-E data) is ninth grade-based (Baumert et al. 2002). It has a lower
number of variables, but more observations than the other datasets.
b The number of observations for students as included in the PISA datasets (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012):
the data is provided by the IQB and consists of the grade-based sample (see also Appendix III.1.4). Note,
that here the student-dataset includes both the original students’ questionnaire answers and their parental
responses.
c These test score domains have been in focus for the respective PISA test cycle.
d For 2000 and 2006, the teacher-dataset was not part of the Germany-specific PISA data, as provided by
the IQB.
Table III.3: Descriptive Statistics: Outcome Variables and Sample Size
Before Reform After Reform
Test Scores
PISA-2000 PISA-2003-I PISA-2006-I PISA-2009-I PISA-2012-Iof Students
in Gymnasium
Reading Mean 577.92 570.77 568.20 562.65 565.42
Reading SD 55.86 51.98 56.97 55.25 52.81
Reading Median 578.83 572.14 571.50 566.23 567.06
Mathematics Mean 573.65 583.66 571.39 578.53 575.73
Mathematics SD 62.18 57.85 58.48 56.59 58.52
Mathematics Median 572.68 584.70 571.19 580.47 576.19
Science Mean 575.14 591.15 585.01 590.48 580.44
Science SD 67.43 60.20 61.47 58.88 58.61
Science Median 576.35 594.80 587.12 594.68 581.07
# of federal states 16 16 16 16 16
# of schools 409 62 67 68 78
# of students 10,276 3,017 3,356 3,473 3,910
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample of ninth graders attending a Gymnasium and is
weighted by the sample weights provided in the PISA dataset from the IQB. Note that the average across
plausible values can be taken as a metric of individual-level performance (further information on test scores
and the weighting procedure is provided in Appendix III.1.4 and OECD (2012). Mean, standard deviations
and median of the test scores across all federal states and for all academic track schools that are in the German
PISA dataset are provided for each test cycle (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012) as shown in Table III.2.
199
Table III.4: Pre-Reform Treatment/Control Group Comparison of Control Variable Sets
T C ∆ (T-C) T1 ∆ (T1-C) T2 ∆ (T2-C)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.533 0.501 0.031 0.537 0.036 0.535 0.033
Age in years 15.495 15.475 0.020 15.491 0.016 15.478 0.003
Language at home not German 0.056 0.043 0.013 0.054 0.010 0.057 0.013
Migration Background 0.190 0.145 0.045** 0.184 0.039* 0.186 0.041*
Parental Characteristics
Parental Education:
(highest ISCED level)
# ISCED-level (5-6): 0.664 0.644 0.019 0.666 0.021 0.670 0.025
# ISCED-level (3-4): 0.290 0.329 -0.040 0.290 -0.039 0.285 -0.045*
# ISCED-level (1-2): 0.046 0.026 0.02* 0.044 0.018 0.045 0.019*
Socio-Economic Status
Number of books in household:
# + 500: 0.233 0.235 -0.003 0.228 -0.008 0.223 -0.012
# 101-500: 0.509 0.520 -0.011 0.513 -0.007 0.504 -0.016
# 11-100: 0.204 0.189 0.015 0.206 0.017 0.215 0.026
# max. 10: 0.054 0.055 -0.001 0.052 -0.003 0.058 0.002
Highest ISEI of parental job 59.427 57.072 2.355*** 59.322 2.25** 59.109 2.037**
Family Characteristics
Single Parent (Base cat.: No) 0.140 0.141 -0.001 0.137 -0.004 0.168 0.027
Father employment status
# full-time (FT): 0.875 0.866 0.008 0.875 0.008 0.864 -0.002
# part-time (PT): 0.067 0.065 0.002 0.066 0.001 0.067 0.002
# unemployed (UE): 0.026 0.033 -0.007 0.025 -0.008 0.036 0.003
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.032 0.036 -0.003 0.034 -0.002 0.033 -0.003
Mother employment status
# full-time (FT): 0.220 0.218 0.002 0.220 0.002 0.303 0.084***
# part-time (PT): 0.521 0.513 0.007 0.522 0.008 0.457 -0.057**
# unemployed (UE): 0.061 0.077 -0.016 0.061 -0.015 0.068 -0.008
# out-of-labor force (OLF): 0.198 0.192 0.006 0.197 0.005 0.172 -0.019
Number of students 2,365 347 - 2,175 - 2,999 -
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%,
* 10%. This table shows a two-sample t-test for comparing the main control variables in the pre-reform period of
the main specification between Treatment and Control Group (see Section 3.3.3 and Section 3.4.1). This is for
PISA-I the respective pooled average of control variables for 2003 and 2006.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003 and 2006.
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Table III.5: Robust Model: Pre-Reform Treatment/Control Group Comparison of Control Vari-
ables
T C1 ∆ (T-C1) T1 ∆ (T1-C1) T2 ∆ (T2-C1)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.533 0.549 -0.016 0.537 -0.011 0.535 -0.014
Age in years 15.495 15.468 0.028* 15.491 0.024 15.478 0.011
Language at home not German 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.054 -0.002 0.057 0.001
Migration Background 0.190 0.178 0.012 0.184 0.006 0.186 0.008
Parental Characteristics
Parental Education:
(highest ISCED level)
# ISCED-level (5-6): 0.664 0.666 -0.003 0.666 -0.001 0.670 0.003
# ISCED-level (3-4): 0.290 0.296 -0.007 0.290 -0.006 0.285 -0.012
# ISCED-level (1-2): 0.046 0.037 0.009 0.044 0.007 0.045 0.008
Socio-Economic Status
Number of books in household:
# + 500: 0.233 0.253 -0.021 0.228 -0.026* 0.223 -0.030**
# 101-500: 0.509 0.496 0.013 0.513 0.018 0.504 0.008
# 11-100: 0.204 0.197 0.007 0.206 0.009 0.215 0.018
# max. 10: 0.054 0.054 0.000 0.052 -0.001 0.058 0.004
Highest ISEI of parental job 59.427 58.818 0.609 59.322 0.503 59.109 0.291
Family Characteristics
Single Parent (Base cat.: No) 0.140 0.150 -0.010 0.137 -0.013 0.168 0.018
Father employment status
# full-time (FT): 0.875 0.878 -0.004 0.875 -0.004 0.864 -0.014
# part-time (PT): 0.067 0.061 0.007 0.066 0.006 0.067 0.007
# unemployed (UE): 0.026 0.027 -0.001 0.025 -0.002 0.036 0.009*
# out-of-labor force (OLF) : 0.032 0.034 -0.002 0.034 0.000 0.033 -0.002
Mother employment status
# full-time (FT): 0.220 0.239 -0.018 0.220 -0.019 0.303 0.064***
# part-time (PT): 0.521 0.489 0.032** 0.522 0.033** 0.457 -0.032**
# unemployed (UE): 0.061 0.065 -0.004 0.061 -0.003 0.068 0.004
# out-of-labor force (OLF): 0.198 0.208 -0.010 0.197 -0.011 0.172 -0.035***
Number of students 2,365 1854 - 2,175 - 2,999 -
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%,
* 10% + 15%. This table shows a two-sample t-test for comparing the main control variables in the pre-reform
period between Treatment Groups and Control Group C1 (see Section 3.3.3 and Section 3.4.1). This is for PISA-I
the respective pooled average of control variables for 2003 and 2006.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003 and 2006.
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Table III.6: Main Results for Model Base: 1st step to Derive IEOp Measure for Mathematics
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
Mathematics Test Scores in PISA Before After Before After
(STDPVMATH3) (2003-2006) (2009-2012) (2003-2006) (2009-2012)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
Female -0.662*** -0.533*** -0.464*** -0.450***
(0.116) (0.066) (0.044) (0.046)
Age in years -0.110 -0.313*** -0.209*** -0.220***
(0.112) (0.072) (0.045) (0.037)
ii)
Migration Background -0.084 -0.127 -0.128* -0.162***
(0.185) (0.135) (0.071) (0.048)
NO German spoken at home -0.373 -0.170 -0.082 -0.198***
(0.337) (0.191) (0.104) (0.077)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# at most lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.454* 0.133 -0.169** -0.092
(0.275) (0.152) (0.080) (0.069)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.230** 0.057 0.020 -0.001
(0.101) (0.148) (0.045) (0.037)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500]
# max 10 books 0.342 -0.411 -0.398** -0.316***
(0.243) (0.305) (0.155) (0.103)
# 11-100 books -0.120 -0.078 -0.253*** -0.134***
(0.078) (0.129) (0.061) (0.046)
# more than 500 books 0.234 0.185 0.074 0.116***
(0.149) (0.120) (0.056) (0.037)
v)
Highest ISEI-level of Parental Jobs 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.004***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
Family Structure [Base: No]
single parent household 0.058 0.195* 0.046 0.112**
(0.176) (0.103) (0.054) (0.052)
vii)
Father: Employment [Base: Full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.238 -0.413* 0.007 -0.117*
(0.278) (0.218) (0.085) (0.061)
# unemployed (UE) 0.075 0.100 -0.210 0.109
(0.353) (0.428) (0.138) (0.139)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.044 -0.174 -0.026 -0.028
(0.308) (0.146) (0.143) (0.106)
Mother: Employment [Base: Full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) 0.096 0.025 -0.001 0.045
(0.068) (0.125) (0.065) (0.052)
# unemployed (UE) 0.212 0.143 -0.003 0.232**
(0.161) (0.597) (0.080) (0.092)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.072 0.203 -0.037 0.082
(0.154) (0.125) (0.083) (0.072)
Constant 1.824 4.853*** 3.581*** 3.539***
(1.755) (1.121) (0.711) (0.583)
School FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 346 608 2356 3329
R2 0.353*** 0.189*** 0.267*** 0.248***
(0.060) (0.041) (0.033) (0.026)
R2−ad justed 0.294*** 0.144*** 0.244*** 0.228***
(0.065) (0.043) (0.034) (0.027)
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% + 15%. This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the
DiD estimation approach, with the results shown in the second sub-panel in Table III.11. The dependent variable is
std pvmath3, i.e. standardized PISA mathematics test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium
that are part of the representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base period
(2003-2012) (Footnote 25). Columns (1) to (2) showing the results for Control Group (C) provide first-step regressions
for the Before-reform period (2003-2006) in column 1 and After-reform period (2009-2012) in column 2. Columns (3)
to (4) provide first-step regression results for Treatment Group (T) with Before-reform period (2003-2006) results in
column 3 and After-reform period (2009-2012) results in column 4. Background variables used to derive R2 are explained
in Section 3.3.3 and listed in four groups with a total of seven subgroups (compare Appendix III.1.5). Observations
are weighted according to the provided population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and
inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores (compare Appendix III.1.5 on their computation).
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Table III.7: Main Results for Model Base: 1st step to Derive IEOp Measure for Reading
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
Reading Test Scores in PISA Before After Before After
(STDPVREAD3) (2003-2006) (2009-2012) (2003-2006) (2009-2012)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
Female 0.066 0.393*** 0.288*** 0.412***
(0.105) (0.086) (0.040) (0.038)
Age in years -0.059 -0.248** -0.167** -0.159***
(0.183) (0.119) (0.065) (0.040)
ii)
Migration Background -0.234 -0.167* -0.074 -0.105*
(0.241) (0.090) (0.073) (0.055)
NO German spoken at home -0.494 -0.153 -0.303*** -0.168**
(0.530) (0.201) (0.113) (0.071)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# at most lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.486** 0.107 -0.303*** -0.005
(0.225) (0.199) (0.100) (0.055)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.159 0.134 -0.009 -0.048
(0.156) (0.109) (0.057) (0.048)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500]
# max 10 books 0.169 -0.441 -0.522** -0.441***
(0.395) (0.272) (0.225) (0.125)
# 11-100 books -0.126 -0.079 -0.303*** -0.138***
(0.214) (0.120) (0.053) (0.043)
# more than 500 books 0.204* 0.077 0.079 0.087*
(0.117) (0.069) (0.060) (0.051)
v)
Highest ISEI-level of Parental Jobs 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.003***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
Family Structure [Base: No]
Single Parent Household 0.079 0.268** 0.066 0.127**
(0.261) (0.122) (0.066) (0.057)
vii)
Father: Employment [Base: Full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.300 -0.233 -0.089 -0.096
(0.208) (0.280) (0.095) (0.074)
# unemployed (UE) 0.382 0.320 -0.023 0.106
(0.441) (0.373) (0.187) (0.154)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) 0.014 -0.079 0.082 0.125
(0.271) (0.182) (0.150) (0.097)
Mother: Employment [Base: Full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.013 -0.058 0.005 0.004
(0.120) (0.107) (0.058) (0.045)
# unemployed (UE) 0.267 0.257 -0.062 0.136
(0.240) (0.490) (0.127) (0.097)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.165 0.101 -0.053 -0.023
(0.150) (0.120) (0.079) (0.058)
Constant 0.754 3.348* 2.611** 2.141***
(2.969) (1.874) (1.054) (0.638)
School FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 346 608 2356 3329
R2 0.242*** 0.162*** 0.180*** 0.213***
(0.057) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020)
R2−ad justed 0.172*** 0.114*** 0.154*** 0.192***
(0.062) (0.036) -0.032 (0.021)
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% + 15%. This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD
estimation approach, with the results shown in the first sub-panel in Table III.11. The dependent variable is std pvread3,
i.e. standardized PISA reading test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium that are part of the
representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base period (2003-2012) (Footnote 25).
Columns (1) to (2) showing the results for Control Group (C) provide first-step regressions for the Before-reform period
(2003-2006) in column 1 and After-reform period (2009-2012) in column 2. Columns (3) to (4) provide first-step
regression results for Treatment Group (T) with Before-reform period (2003-2006) results in column 3 and After-reform
period (2009-2012) results in column 4. Background variables used to derive R2 are explained in Section 3.3.3 and
listed in four groups with a total of seven subgroups (compare Appendix III.1.5). Observations are weighted according
to the provided population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated
measurement error in test scores (compare Appendix III.1.5 on their computation).
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Table III.8: Main Results for Model Base: 1st step to Derive IEOp Measure for Science Scores
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Control Group (C) Treatment Group (T)
Science Test Scores in PISA Before After Before After
(STDPVSCIE3) (2003-2006) (2009-2012) (2003-2006) (2009-2012)
CONTROL: Individual Characteristics (IC)
i)
Female -0.509*** -0.340*** -0.354*** -0.287***
(0.113) (0.064) (0.037) (0.040)
Age in years -0.093 -0.252*** -0.163*** -0.160***
(0.118) (0.082) (0.062) (0.053)
ii)
Migration Background -0.297* -0.287*** -0.087 -0.202***
(0.163) (0.096) (0.082) (0.054)
NO German spoken at home -0.347 -0.158 -0.222** -0.195***
(0.403) (0.221) (0.092) (0.067)
CONTROL: Parental Characteristics (PC)
iii)
Parental Education: [Base: ISCED-level (3-4)]
# at most lower sec. educ. (ISCED-level (1-2)) -0.529** 0.076 -0.259*** -0.047
(0.243) (0.184) (0.092) (0.061)
# tertiary educ. (ISCED-level (5-6)) -0.153 0.116 0.030 0.005
(0.123) (0.126) (0.055) (0.040)
CONTROL: Socio-Economic Status (SES)
iv)
No. of books in household [Base: 101-500]
# max 10 books 0.101 -0.397 -0.306** -0.525***
(0.413) (0.281) (0.149) (0.068)
# 11-100 books -0.122 -0.114 -0.282*** -0.200***
(0.106) (0.112) (0.067) (0.045)
# more than 500 books 0.175 0.120 0.149** 0.163***
(0.147) (0.111) (0.060) (0.038)
v)
Highest ISEI-level of Parental Jobs 0.009** 0.003 0.003* 0.003**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
CONTROL: Family Characteristics (FC)
vi)
Family Structure [Base: No]
Single Parent Household 0.051 0.207** 0.008 0.122*
(0.241) (0.084) (0.076) (0.063)
vii)
Father: Employment [Base: Full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.162 -0.223 -0.054 -0.141*
(0.207) (0.190) (0.116) (0.074)
# unemployed (UE) 0.192 0.161 -0.022 0.091
(0.426) (0.378) (0.125) (0.166)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) 0.036 -0.021 0.019 0.068
(0.290) (0.238) (0.129) (0.098)
Mother: Employment [Base: Full-time (FT)]
# part-time (PT) -0.083 -0.059 -0.016 0.011
(0.097) (0.098) (0.064) (0.046)
# unemployed (UE) 0.184 0.101 -0.021 0.195*
(0.156) (0.307) (0.101) (0.102)
# out-of-labor force (OLF) -0.218 0.087 -0.089 0.006
(0.139) (0.113) (0.067) (0.059)
Constant 1.593 3.933*** 2.784*** 2.614***
(1.918) (1.287) (1.006) (0.803)
School FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 346 608 2356 3329
R2 0.363*** 0.173*** 0.214*** 0.209***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.025) (0.023)
R2−ad justed 0.304*** 0.125** 0.190*** 0.188***
(0.057) (0.051) (0.026) (0.023)
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and significance levels are indicated by: *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% + 15%. This table shows the first stage OLS regressions to derive the R2 as IEOp measure for conducting the DiD
estimation approach, with the results shown in the third sub-panel in Table III.11. The dependent variable is std pvscie3,
i.e. standardized PISA science test scores for each test year with respect to students in Gymnasium that are part of the
representative grade-based German PISA test cohort across the respective Model Base period (2003-2012) (Footnote 25).
Columns (1) to (2) showing the results for Control Group (C) provide first-step regressions for the Before-reform period
(2003-2006) in column 1 and After-reform period (2009-2012) in column 2. Columns (3) to (4) provide first-step regression
results for Treatment Group (T) with Before-reform period (2003-2006) results in column 3 and After-reform period
(2009-2012) results in column 4. Background variables used to derive R2 are explained in Section 3.3.3 and listed in four
groups with a total of seven subgroups (compare Appendix III.1.5). Observations are weighted according to the provided
population weights. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level, and inflated by the estimated measurement error
in test scores (compare Appendix III.1.5 on their computation).
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Table III.9: Robust Model for T vs. C and C1
Subject Main Control Group C Extended Control Group C1
Reading C T ∆ (T-C) C1 T ∆ (T-C1)
Before 0.242 0.180 -0.062 0.163 0.180 0.016
(0.057) (0.031) (0.065) (0.032) (0.031) (0.044)
After 0.161 0.195 0.035 0.183 0.195 0.012
(0.060) (0.034) (0.069) (0.030) (0.034) (0.046)
Change in R2 -0.081 0.016 0.097 0.020 0.016 -0.004
(0.083) (0.046) (0.095) (0.044) (0.046) (0.064)
Mathematics C T ∆ (T-C) C1 T ∆ (T-C1)
Before 0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.216 0.267 0.052
(0.060) (0.033) (0.068) (0.029) (0.033) (0.044)
After 0.270 0.227 -0.043 0.233 0.227 -0.006
(0.073) (0.037) (0.082) (0.033) (0.037) (0.050)
Change in R2 -0.084 -0.040 0.043 0.017 -0.040 -0.057
(0.094) (0.049) (0.107) (0.044) (0.049) (0.066)
Science C T ∆ (T-C) C1 T ∆ (T-C1)
Before 0.363 0.215 -0.148 0.205 0.215 0.010
(0.052) (0.025) (0.058) (0.024) (0.025) (0.035)
After 0.257 0.201 -0.056 0.215 0.201 -0.014
(0.067) (0.034) (0.075) (0.039) (0.034) (0.051)
Change in R2 -0.106 -0.014 0.092 0.010 -0.014 -0.024
(0.085) (0.042) (0.095) (0.046) (0.042) (0.062)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (3.7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were
calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix III.1.5, clustering at the federal
state level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (3.9) taking into account population weights. Positive
changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp or decreasing EEOp and vice versa for negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) Individual Characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) Individual Characteristics (IC) II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on par. birth place)
(iii) Parental Characteristics (PC): highest parents’ qualification (ISCED-level 1-2/ISCED 3-4/ISCED 5-6)
(iv) Socio-economic Status (SES) I: no. of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) Socio-economic Status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index [0-90] of job in the family
(vi) Family Characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) Family Characteristics (FC) II: mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) -
mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: The first-step regressions of the setting: treatment group T vs. control group C are provided in Table III.7,
Table III.6 and Table III.8 in Appendix III.1.2.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006 and 2009 (compare Section 3.3.1).
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Table III.10: Robustness Checks: Placebo Tests (2003-2006) T vs. C
Subject With R2 Measure With R2ad justed Measure
Reading C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before (2003) 0.288 0.139 -0.149 0.173 0.101 -0.071
(0.115) (0.047) (0.125) (0.134) (0.049) (0.143)
After (2006) 0.284 0.229 -0.055 0.178 0.199 0.022
(0.072) (0.039) (0.082) (0.083) (0.041) (0.092)
Change in R2 -0.004 0.090 0.094 0.005 0.098 0.093
(0.136) (0.061) (0.149) (0.158) (0.064) (0.170)
Mathematics C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before (2003) 0.353 0.235 -0.118 0.249 0.202 -0.047
(0.109) (0.047) (0.119) (0.127) (0.049) (0.136)
After (2006) 0.362 0.293 -0.069 0.267 0.266 -0.001
(0.054) (0.048) (0.072) (0.062) (0.050) (0.079)
Change in R2 0.009 0.058 0.049 0.018 0.064 0.046
(0.122) (0.067) (0.139) (0.141) (0.070) (0.157)
Science C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before (2003) 0.384 0.186 -0.198 0.285 0.151 -0.134
(0.080) (0.037) (0.088) (0.093) (0.038) (0.100)
After (2006) 0.383 0.251 -0.132 0.291 0.222 -0.069
(0.074) (0.037) (0.083) (0.085) (0.039) (0.093)
Change in R2 -0.002 0.064 0.066 0.006 0.071 0.065
(0.109) (0.052) (0.121) (0.126) (0.054) (0.137)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (3.7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were
calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix III.1.5, clustering at the federal
state level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (3.9) taking into account population weights and the
indicated school fixed effects. Positive changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp or decreasing EEOp and vice versa
for negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) Individual Characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) Individual Characteristics (IC) II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on par. birth place)
(iii) Parental Characteristics (PC): highest parents’ qualification (ISCED-level 1-2/ISCED 3-4/ISCED 5-6)
(iv) Socio-economic Status (SES) I: no. of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) Socio-economic Status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index[0-90] of job in the family
(vi) Family Characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) Family Characteristics (FC) II: mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) -
mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: Due to space constraints first-step regressions for T vs. C/C1/C2 have been omitted, but they are available
upon request from the author.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003 and 2006.
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Table III.11: Robustness Check of Main Results: Testing Potential Sorting across Schools
Subject
Model Base (2003-2012) - T vs. C — (Figure III·3)
Main: School Fixed Effects Robustness: State Fixed Effects
Reading C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before 0.242 0.180 -0.062 0.180 0.121 -0.059
(0.057) (0.031) (0.065) (0.054) (0.025) (0.060)
After 0.162 0.213 0.051 0.131 0.140 0.009
(0.034) (0.020) (0.039) (0.034) (0.019) (0.039)
Change in R2 -0.080 0.033 0.113 -0.049 0.019 0.068
(0.066) (0.037) (0.076) (0.064) (0.032) (0.071)
Mathematics C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before 0.353 0.267 -0.086 0.300 0.172 -0.128
(0.060) (0.033) (0.068) (0.059) (0.026) (0.064)
After 0.190 0.249 0.060 0.160 0.190 0.030
(0.040) (0.027) (0.048) (0.040) (0.025) (0.047)
Change in R2 -0.164 -0.018 0.146 -0.140 0.018 0.158
(0.072) (0.042) (0.083) (0.071) (0.036) (0.080)
Science C T ∆ (T-C) C T ∆ (T-C)
Before 0.363 0.215 -0.148 0.295 0.148 -0.147
(0.052) (0.025) (0.058) (0.055) (0.022) (0.059)
After 0.173 0.210 0.037 0.128 0.142 0.013
(0.048) (0.023) (0.053) (0.038) (0.019) (0.042)
Change in R2 -0.190 -0.005 0.185 -0.166 -0.006 0.160
(0.071) (0.034) (0.079) (0.066) (0.029) (0.073)
Notes: Table entries are R2 measures of IEOp (Equation (3.7)). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and were
calculated using replication weights following the method as explained in Appendix III.1.5, clustering at the federal
state level. DiD results are estimated according to Equation (3.9) taking into account population weights and the
indicated fixed effects. Positive changes in R2 indicate increasing IEOp or decreasing EEOp and vice versa for
negative changes.
Background variables used to derive R2:
(i) Individual Characteristics (IC) I: age and gender
(ii) Individual Characteristics (IC) II: language spoken at home; migration background (based on parental birth place)
(iii) Parental Characteristics (PC): highest parents’ qualification (ISCED-level 1-2/ISCED-level 3-4/ISCED-level 5-6)
(iv) Socio-economic Status (SES) I: no. of books in household (max. 11, 11-100, 101-500, more than 500)
(v) Socio-economic Status (SES) II : highest ISEI-level-index[0-90] of job in the family
(vi) Family Characteristics (FC) I: family structure - growing up in single parent household?
(vii) Family Characteristics (FC) II: mother/father working part-time (PT) - mother/father unemployed (UE) -
mother/father out of labor force (OLF)
Compare: Due to space constraints first-step regressions for T vs. C/C1/C2 have been omitted, but they are available
upon request from the author.
Source: Author’s calculations based on PISA 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
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Table III.12: Difference-in-Differences Results: Overview Control Group C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Treatment Control Control set R2 adj. R2
reading T C 1 0.060 0.063
reading T C 2 0.073 0.078
reading T C 3 0.081 0.090
reading T C 4 0.086 0.095
reading T C 5 0.076 0.087
reading T C 6 0.096 0.113
reading T1 C 1 0.058 0.062
reading T1 C 2 0.072 0.078
reading T1 C 3 0.080 0.089
reading T1 C 4 0.085 0.095
reading T1 C 5 0.075 0.086
reading T1 C 6 0.095 0.112
reading T2 C 1 0.036 0.041
reading T2 C 2 0.044 0.051
reading T2 C 3 0.051 0.062
reading T2 C 4 0.056 0.067
reading T2 C 5 0.046 0.059
reading T2 C 6 0.067 0.087
mathematics T C 1 0.109 0.110
mathematics T C 2 0.121 0.124
mathematics T C 3 0.127 0.131
mathematics T C 4 0.134 0.139
mathematics T C 5 0.134 0.140
mathematics T C 6 0.136 0.146
mathematics T1 C 1 0.101 0.102
mathematics T1 C 2 0.114 0.117
mathematics T1 C 3 0.120 0.125
mathematics T1 C 4 0.128 0.133
mathematics T1 C 5 0.127 0.133
mathematics T1 C 6 0.129 0.139
mathematics T2 C 1 0.097 0.099
mathematics T2 C 2 0.106 0.110
mathematics T2 C 3 0.109 0.115
mathematics T2 C 4 0.117 0.123
mathematics T2 C 5 0.116 0.123
mathematics T2 C 6 0.120 0.132
science T C 1 0.153 0.153
science T C 2 0.156 0.158
science T C 3 0.160 0.164
science T C 4 0.169 0.172
science T C 5 0.162 0.166
science T C 6 0.177 0.185
science T1 C 1 0.156 0.155
science T1 C 2 0.159 0.160
science T1 C 3 0.164 0.167
science T1 C 4 0.173 0.176
science T1 C 5 0.165 0.169
science T1 C 6 0.182 0.189
science T2 C 1 0.135 0.136
science T2 C 2 0.135 0.137
science T2 C 3 0.137 0.142
science T2 C 4 0.144 0.149
science T2 C 5 0.136 0.143
science T2 C 6 0.155 0.164
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C for all 3 test score domains with school fixed effects and
for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i)+(ii)] until 6 = [(i)+(ii)+(iii)+(iv)+
(v)+ (vi)+ (vii)]. Note that columns (5), (7) show the DiD results using R2, columns (6),(8)
show the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure.
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Table III.13: Difference-in-Differences Results: Overview Control Group C-NT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Treatment Control Control set R2 adj. R2
reading T C-NT 1 0.027 0.025
reading T C-NT 2 0.030 0.028
reading T C-NT 3 0.021 0.019
reading T C-NT 4 0.025 0.023
reading T C-NT 5 0.023 0.021
reading T C-NT 6 0.028 0.025
reading T1 C-NT 1 0.025 0.023
reading T1 C-NT 2 0.030 0.027
reading T1 C-NT 3 0.021 0.018
reading T1 C-NT 4 0.024 0.022
reading T1 C-NT 5 0.022 0.019
reading T1 C-NT 6 0.028 0.024
reading T2 C-NT 1 0.003 0.002
reading T2 C-NT 2 0.002 0.001
reading T2 C-NT 3 -0.008 -0.010
reading T2 C-NT 4 -0.006 -0.006
reading T2 C-NT 5 -0.007 -0.007
reading T2 C-NT 6 0.000 -0.002
mathematics T C-NT 1 -0.005 -0.006
mathematics T C-NT 2 -0.001 -0.003
mathematics T C-NT 3 -0.009 -0.010
mathematics T C-NT 4 0.000 -0.002
mathematics T C-NT 5 0.016 0.014
mathematics T C-NT 6 0.022 0.018
mathematics T1 C-NT 1 -0.013 -0.014
mathematics T1 C-NT 2 -0.008 -0.010
mathematics T1 C-NT 3 -0.015 -0.017
mathematics T1 C-NT 4 -0.006 -0.008
mathematics T1 C-NT 5 0.009 0.007
mathematics T1 C-NT 6 0.015 0.011
mathematics T2 C-NT 1 -0.017 -0.017
mathematics T2 C-NT 2 -0.016 -0.016
mathematics T2 C-NT 3 -0.026 -0.027
mathematics T2 C-NT 4 -0.018 -0.018
mathematics T2 C-NT 5 -0.002 -0.003
mathematics T2 C-NT 6 0.006 0.003
science T C-NT 1 0.040 0.038
science T C-NT 2 0.039 0.036
science T C-NT 3 0.026 0.023
science T C-NT 4 0.034 0.031
science T C-NT 5 0.038 0.034
science T C-NT 6 0.052 0.047
science T1 C-NT 1 0.042 0.040
science T1 C-NT 2 0.041 0.039
science T1 C-NT 3 0.030 0.026
science T1 C-NT 4 0.038 0.035
science T1 C-NT 5 0.041 0.038
science T1 C-NT 6 0.057 0.051
science T2 C-NT 1 0.022 0.021
science T2 C-NT 2 0.017 0.016
science T2 C-NT 3 0.003 0.001
science T2 C-NT 4 0.009 0.008
science T2 C-NT 5 0.013 0.011
science T2 C-NT 6 0.030 0.026
Notes: This table shows T/T1/T2 vs. C-NT Never-Takers for all 3 test score domains with
school fixed effects and for each version adding all 6 control sets from 1 = [(i)+ (ii)] until
6 = [(i)+(ii)+(iii)+(iv)+(v)+(vi)+(vii)]. Note that columns (5), (7) show the DiD results
using R2, columns (6),(8) show the same but using adjusted R2 as IEOp measure.
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III.1.3 Further Details on the G-8 Reform
Related Literature on the Reform
Despite the public controversy over the G-8 reform that has even induced some federal
states to reverse it (last column in Table III.1 in Appendix III.1.2), few studies have
evaluated the G-8 reform and its effects on outcomes such as educational achievement.
To begin with, studies have analyzed the reform by comparing G-8 model and G-9 model
cohorts within one federal state.
In most federal states the respective statistical offices have conducted studies com-
paring students’ results in central exit examinations (Abitur) in the double cohort, that
is the year when both the last G-9 model and the first G-8 model cohorts graduated
from the Gymnasium (Figure 3·1). Generally, these statistical evaluations have found
no systematic performance difference in central exit exams between students with eight
or nine years of schooling. However, as grades in final exams are a useful performance
indicator only within the same student cohort, comparisons over years based on marks
have limitations. In fact, school exams are usually graded on the basis of a relative
performance distribution in the respective year. Thus, using grades as outcomes may be
of limited value for learning about the reform’s impact on cognitive skills, in contrast to
standardized test scores.
Furthermore, for the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt (ST), a small series of papers has
analyzed different aspects of the G-8 reform (Thiel et al. 2014, Büttner & Thomsen 2015,
Meyer & Thomsen 2016). In summary, they examine the reform’s effects on academic
achievement in central exit examinations 2007, when the double cohort graduated in
ST (Table III.1). Findings show that - due to more intense schooling - exam results
significantly deteriorated for mathematics, but remained unaffected for German literature.
This suggests that learning intensity ratios differ across subjects. Moreover, no significant
negative effects on students’ soft skills are detected; opposing claims that increased
learning intensity and accordingly reduced time for non-school related activities may
have adversely affected non-cognitive skill formation. In line with this result, Quis &
Reif (2017) show that the more intense schooling experience had only limited impact
on students’ health. However, due to reduced leisure time, G-8 model students were
less able to relax and slightly more stressed compared to their peers in the G-9 model.
Finally, Meyer & Thomsen (2016) find no negative effects of the G-8 reform on the
ability, motivation and likelihood of students’ entering university education.35
Conducting a similar analysis for all German federal states, Marcus & Zambre (2019)
show that the G-8 reform reduced enrollment rates at university and increased the
likelihood of affected students to switch their major degree.
35But the reform influenced post-secondary school decisions. For instance, they find significant delays in the
starting dates for a first university degree for female students who graduated from a G-8 model school. Instead, they
were more likely to first complete a type of vocational education. Moreover, Meyer & Thomsen (2016) reveal that
despite the G-8 reform, students continue to pursue their hobbies. However, they tend to work less outside of school.
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Recently, a few papers have started to use more representative data that are more
independent from school system related characteristics or relative performance measure-
ment issues arising with marks at school (e.g. PISA data). Moreover, identifying the G-8
reform effect by exploiting the variation in its implementation across states and over time,
this approach allows overcoming the shortcomings of previous studies. For instance,
two papers related to this project exploit the reform setting using standardized PISA test
scores for academic-track students as educational outcome variable.36
Andrietti (2016) uses this representative dataset in order to exploit the G-8 reform
for conducting a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation. He finds that the average
treatment effect of the reform is significant and positive in all three educational outcomes
(mathematics, reading and science). Treated students in a G-8 model experience an
improvement of about 0.095 to 0.145 standard deviations in PISA test scores. In contrast
to Huebener & Marcus (2017), Andrietti (2016) finds no evidence for an increase in
general grade retention rates. Instead, his results suggest that grade repetition only
slightly increased for boys and students with a migration background. This may indicate
that the G-8 reform caused distributional changes in educational outcomes and thus may
have affected IEOp. However, Andrietti (2016) does not address distributional outcomes.
Huebener et al. (2017) use state regulations of timetables for secondary school to
show that, due to the G-8 reform, weekly instruction hours for the average treated student
increased by about 6.5 percent over a period of five years. They suggest that increased
instruction time improved the average student performance in all three PISA test domains.
However, the effect size is small, with about six percentage points of a standard deviation
in scores. Moreover, the effects are insignificant for low-performing students, whereas
their high-performing peers experience significant, but small positive effects. This sug-
gests that the performance gap among students in Gymnasium widened. In that regard,
Huebener et al. (2017) focus on the increased instruction time effect, whereas Andrietti
(2016) puts more emphasis on the increased learning intensity aspect of the reform.
In Chapter 3, I use similar data as Huebener et al. (2017) with PISA test scores
from 2000 to 2012. However, my focus is on analyzing the effects of increased learning
intensity on educational outcomes in response to the G-8 reform (interpreting the reform
similar to Andrietti (2016)). While these studies estimate the direct reform effect on test
scores, they do not tackle the question whether increasing learning intensity may have
changed Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEOp). In Chapter 3, I shift focus in
the analysis of the G-8 reform onto distributional concerns, that is its consequences on
IEOp. In other words, I answer the question of whether the G-8 reform is selective, i.e.
a reform that at least maintains test score results, but at the same time increases IEOp;
or whether it is inclusive, i.e. a reform that at least maintains test score results while
decreasing IEOp (Checchi & van de Werfhorst 2018).
36Back in 2012, Camarero Garcia (2012) appears to have been the first to combine the usage of PISA test scores as
an outcome variable to analyze the effects of the G-8 reform on cognitive skills in a Difference-in-Differences (DiD)
estimation framework, finding a positive effect of about 0.15 standard deviations in test scores, with stronger effects
for students with a migration background similar to the later results by Andrietti (2016).
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Thus, I am among the first evaluating the G-8 reform based on Germany specific
PISA data in order to analyze its impact on IEOp.
The Reform Debate
The first PISA-study in 2000 received broad public attention in Germany, because it
revealed that German students achieved weak test scores which were below the average of
OECD countries (the so-called “PISA-shock”). Debates over how to improve the German
school system ensued (e.g. Davoli & Entorf (2018)). Among the reform proposals,
shortening the academic secondary school track (Gymnasium) from nine to eight years,
the G-8 reform, remains controversial to this day. The last column in Appendix Table III.1
gives an overview on the status quo of the reform as of school year 2015/16.
Mainly three reasons were given for introducing the G-8 reform. First, it was
intended to reduce the relatively high age of university graduates in Germany. This was
said to increase their competitiveness on the labor market compared to the (on average)
younger graduates in other OECD countries (OECD 2005a). Furthermore, with students
entering the job market one year earlier, working lifetime would be extended. Thus, the
reform was said to contribute to stabilizing the social security system of a society facing
demographic change. For instance, younger university graduates would start paying
social security contributions earlier and over a longer time span. Second, as the most
successful countries in the PISA test ranking, such as Finland, had a school system of
twelve years, reduced schooling appeared to be both successful and efficient. Third,
the G-8 reform was seen as a necessary adjustment of secondary school with regards to
harmonizing tertiary education across Europe. As Büttner & Thomsen (2015) illustrate,
the reform of shortening secondary school duration was also enacted in the context
of the Bologna Process. This initiative aims to create a European Higher Education
Area (EHEA) providing a more comparable, flexible European framework for tertiary
education. Therefore, adjusting secondary school duration towards the average among
other European nations was regarded to be sensible. Finally, one argument said that
the reform would serve as an incentive for then younger school graduates to strive for
obtaining a university degree; which would, thus, increase Germany’s below average rate
of university graduates per birth cohort in comparison to other OECD countries.
However, opponents of the reform claimed that the intensified educational experience
may worsen the human capital skill formation for affected students. Furthermore, parental
complaints about increased stress for students (due to less free time) revealed further
concerns. In fact, many parents said that compressed and intensified schooling may have
negative impacts for their children, on both academic performance and the development
of non-cognitive skills which are typically formed by non-academic recreational activities
(Thiel et al. 2014). However, the majority of East Germans support shortened duration of
the academic track, whereas the opposite is true across West German federal states that
only recently adopted the G-8 model (Wössmann et al. 2015).
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III.1.4 Further Details on the Data used
Background Information on the PISA Data
Since 2000, the OECD conducts every three years the PISA study in order to measure the
performance of 15 year-old students with respect to three basic competencies (Life skills),
namely reading, mathematical and scientific literacy. These skills are regarded to be of
special importance for a person’s future success and are tested when students approach
the end of compulsory schooling age (cf. OECD (2010); OECD (2013a)). The idea of
PISA is to evaluate the ability to apply knowledge, as acquired through the curriculum
at school in the three tested domains, for solving real-world problems. This means to
test the level of skills that students achieve until compulsory schooling ends and that are
essential for participating in modern society (OECD 2001).37 Apart from cognitive test
scores, PISA collects rich information on family and school characteristics. This is based
on questionnaires that students, their parents, teachers and school’s principals fill out.
Concerning the PISA procedure, for each test cycle, the OECD chooses an interna-
tional contractor who is responsible for the test’s design and comparability: both across
countries (e.g. that test questions are robust to cultural bias) and over time (making trend
analysis possible (OECD 2009b)). On the country level, a PISA National Project Man-
ager is chosen to make sure that the test is conducted according to the strict OECD quality
guidelines. The test procedure itself resembles a two-stage stratified randomized survey
test design. First, as a primary sampling unit, schools with eligible students are randomly
selected (with a minimum of 150 schools in each country) to get a representative sample
of all school types across all regions within a country. Then, as second-step sampling
units, eligible students (15-year-olds)38 are randomly selected within the sampled schools
to reach a minimum of 4500 observations. Each student within a school receives distinct
combinations of approved test questions on all three PISA domains.39
The level and scope of the test is identical for each student independent of the sec-
ondary school type attended. The paper-based test takes two hours, with additional 30
minutes dedicated for students to complete the questionnaire on their socio-economic
background, school and on their attitude, motivation or aspiration. After the test has been
evaluated on the national level (supervised by the international contractor), the OECD
publishes a cross-country comparison of official test scores.
37The underlying question of PISA is “What is important for citizens to know and be able to do?”. More generally,
in PISA the concept of “literacy” refers to “students’ capacity to apply knowledge and skills in key subjects, and to
analyze, reason and communicate effectively as they identify, interpret and solve problems in a variety of situations”.
For specific definitions of each tested domain, I refer to OECD (2004) and in particular to chapter 1 of OECD (2009b).
38This includes students who were aged between 15 years and 3 months and 16 years and 2 months at the beginning
of the assessment period (plus/minus 1 month), who were enrolled in an educational institution (grade 7 or higher)
(OECD 2013b).
39For details on the international PISA test procedure, I refer to section 2 in Lavy (2015) and to publications on the
PISA Assessment Framework or to one of the Technical Reports on the test, e.g. OECD (2013a) and OECD (2012).
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To have comparable measures of latent ability in each PISA domain across and within
countries, the raw answers to test questions, items, undergo some processing (cf. OECD
(2005b), OECD (2009a), OECD (2012)). The so-called Item Response theory (IRT) is
used to back out the distribution of the latent variable, cognitive skills (as measured by
test scores), from individual item responses, taking into account the particular difficulty of
an item. However, to address the issue of small-sample measurement error, for instance,
because not all students answer all items, Plausible Values of test results are provided for
each student.
First, the marginal distribution of the latent variable conditional on the item responses
and a set of observables is estimated. Thus, for each student a probability distribution of
test scores based on their answers is estimated. Second, M draws from this distribution
are taken to become the Plausible Values of a student’s test score. For PISA, in each
test cycle, five Plausible Values are provided for each student in all three test domains
(M = 5). Conducting estimations with PISA test scores, the OECD (2010) suggests
estimating any statistic s by using each of M Plausible Values datasets separately (getting
sˆm) and then averaging them over M to get a final estimate sˆ.
After this IRT-adjustment, the plausible test scores are standardized, as follows:
yi j = µˆ+
σˆ
σ
(xi j−µ) (11)
where, xi j is the post-IRT, pre-standardized score for student i, in country j; µ (σ ) are
original mean (standard deviation) across all countries in the sample of the respective test
year, and µˆ (σˆ ) denote the estimated mean (standard deviation) for a country-specific
sample based on the Plausible Values. This generates the normalized distribution of test
scores with a mean value of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 test score points.40
The PISA test scores have neither maximum nor minimum values and there are no
thresholds for passing the test, as it is designed to provide a relative measure that allows
us to compare skills in the three domains across students and over time. The interpretation
of test scores is eased when one compares them to a standard, such as proficiency levels.
For instance, in mathematics, a proficiency level is supposed to consist of about 70 points.
This corresponds to about two years of schooling in the average OECD country (OECD
2013b) .41
40This means that across all OECD countries, the typical student scored 500 points in mathematics and about
two-thirds of students in OECD countries between 400 and 600 points. Thus, 100 points constitute a huge difference
in skills. To deal with difficulties in constructing meaningful measures of IEOp based on these standardized test scores,
the variance is a useful index as explained by Ferreira & Gignoux (2013).
41For instance, in PISA-I-2012 the average difference in mathematics test scores between top and bottom quarters of
students in OECD countries is 128 score points. However, most differences related to socio-demographic characteristics
are smaller than an entire proficiency level. For example, across all OECD members in PISA-I-2012, on average boys
outscore girls in mathematics by 11 points and native students score about 34 points higher than their peers with a
migration background. Socio-economically advantaged students (in the top quarter of SES) score an average of 90
points higher than their disadvantaged peers (bottom quarter) (see Table II.2.4a in OECD (2013b)) .
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In contrast to GPA or final exam marks in school, which are only valid relative
measures of performance in the respective school, PISA test scores have the important
advantage to be a representative measure of cognitive skills for tested student cohorts
across schools. Thus, PISA test scores make it possible to compare student cohorts both
over time and across or within countries (federal states). However, three doubts on the
validity of PISA test scores should be considered. First, if the student population from
which the test participants are selected is not complete, as some students are excluded,
this would threaten representativeness. However, the sampling standards of PISA require
that participating countries cannot exclude more than 5% of students from the eligible
population. Permissible reasons include only special cases, such as serious illnesses or
lack of language skills due to recent immigration (e.g. asylum seekers). For Germany,
with at least 97% of students in the eligible age (or in the ninth grade, see Section 3.3.1)
being part of the initial student population, exclusion is not a concern for the validity of
PISA data (OECD 2010); (OECD 2013a).
Second, one may be concerned that the actual participation rate of randomly se-
lected students may be low, such that systematic selection may affect representativeness.
However, for most developed countries the rate of compliers is above 80% for selected
students and 85% for selected schools, surpassing OECD quality thresholds for the
sampling process. In Germany, the participation rate of selected students is well above
80% (on average 92%), for schools, it has usually been even 100%. Moreover, there is
no evidence for selection on observables for those selected who do actually not take the
test (Klieme et al. 2011).
Third, another concern is that schools or more specifically teachers may bias compa-
rability of scores, if they systematically train or motivate students for the test. However,
based on student information about their motivation for the test and based on the informa-
tion about how teachers prepared students for the test, as provided in the questionnaires
of PISA test studies 2000-2012, such concerns are unwarranted (Klieme et al. 2011).
The majority of teachers report that they tried to make students familiar with general
testing strategies, but did not train them specifically for the test. In fact, affected students
and teachers are only informed about their participation in the PISA test around two
months before the test takes place. Moreover, given the general low probability of being
selected for the test and as there are no incentives for neither teachers nor students to
prepare for it, potential preparation could have only very limited effects on results.42
Moreover, Klieme et al. (2011) show that the correlation between test motivation and
scores is zero (on average 0.05) and did not change as more tested students were taught
in the G-8 model. Thus, test results in Germany are not systematically influenced by any
preparation behaviour or test motivation (Wössmann 2010).
42Only half of the teachers indicated that they had talked with their students about PISA and those who did started
not earlier than one month before the test. Vice versa, only 25% of participating students indicate to have prepared for
the reading part, only 13% for mathematics, and only 8% for the science section in the test.
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In conclusion, the advantages of using PISA data as measure of cognitive skills
dominate any potential caveats, which is the reason why I decided to use them - in line
with the studies mentioned in Appendix III.1.3. For the purpose of analyzing the effect of
increased learning intensity (due to the G-8 reform) on IEOp, I use the Germany-specific
versions of the PISA as explained in Section 3.3.1.
Data Sources
For more information on the Germany-specific PISA data of each test cycle and
the availability of these datasets, the reader is recommended to refer to the Institut zur
Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (Institute for Educational Quality Improvement)
(IQB).
• PISA-2000:
Artelt, C., Klieme, E., Neubrand, M., Prenzel, M., Schiefele, U., Schneider, W.,
Tillmann, K.-J., & Weiß, M. (2009). Program for International Student Assessment
2000 (PISA 2000). Version: 1. IQB – Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bil-
dungswesen. Datensatz [Dataset]. http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2000_
v1
• PISA-2003:
Prenzel, M., Baumert, J., Blum, W., Lehmann, R., Leutner, D., Neubrand, M.,
Pekrun, R., Rolff, H.-G., Rost, J., & Schiefele, U. (2007): Program for In-
ternational Student Assessment 2003 (PISA 2003). Version: 1. IQB – Insti-
tut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. Datensatz [Dataset]. http:
//doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2003_v1
• PISA-2006:
Artelt, C., Baumert, J., Blum, W., Hammann, M., Klieme, E., & Pekrun, R. (2010):
Program for International Student Assessment 2006 (PISA 2006). Version: 1.
IQB – Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. Datensatz [Dataset].
http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2006_v1
• PISA-2009:
Artelt, C., Hartig, J., Jude, N., Köller, O., Prenzel, M., Schneider, W., & Stanat, P.
(2013): Program for International Student Assessment 2009 (PISA 2009). Version:
1. IQB – Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen. Datensatz [Dataset].
http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2009_v1
• PISA-2012:
Sälzer, C., Klieme, E., Köller, O., Mang, J., Heine, J.-H., Schiepe-Tiska, A., &
Müller, K. (2015): Program for International Student Assessment 2012 (PISA
2012). Version: 2. IQB – Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen.
Datensatz [Dataset]. http://doi.org/10.5159/IQB_PISA_2012_v2
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III.1.5 Empirical Strategy and Robustness
On the Computation of Standard Errors including replication weights
Throughout the paper, for both steps of the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) regressions
(Section 3.4), the standard errors are computed in a way to take into account that student
performance is reported in Plausible Values (PVs) of PISA test scores. Although, taking
the average of five PVs as a measure of individual performance guarantees that estimates
of group level means and regression coefficients remain unbiased, measures of dispersion
should consider the within-student variability in PVs.
As explained by the OECD (2009b), standard errors are computed by regressing five
times on the dependent variable, individual test scores, thereby using all Plausible Values
(PVs) in turn. For each regression, the sampling variance (SV ) estimate is clustered at the
federal state level. The final SV is given by the average of sampling variances obtained
with the five PVs. In addition, standard errors are inflated by the imputation variance
(IV ), because test scores measure latent cognitive skills with error. The IV is estimated as
the average squared deviation between the estimates obtained with each Plausible Value
and the final estimate (using the average of PVs), with the appropriate degree of freedom
adjustment (IV =
1
4
∑
(
θˆi− θˆ
)2
where θˆi is the estimate for each of the five PVs and θˆ
is the final estimate). Then, as shown by OECD (2009b), the final error variance TV can
be obtained by combining the sampling and imputation variance as follows:
TV = SV +(1+
1
K
)∗ IV = SV +1.2∗ IV (12)
where K = 5 is the number of Plausible Values for each student. The final standard
errors are given by the squared roots of the final error variances. To estimate SV , one
can apply Fay’s variant of the Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) method, which
directly takes into account the two-stage stratified sampling design of the PISA test. For
this method, each regression is iterated over the 80 sets of replication weights provided
in the PISA dataset. Then, the SV estimate is given by the average squared deviation
between the replicated estimates and the estimate obtained with final weights, with a
degree of freedom correction depending on the Fay coefficient (a parameter that governs
the variability between different sets of replication weights, set at 0.5 in the PISA study).
Standard errors in all first-step and second-step regressions are based on this method.
For computational convenience and similar to Philippis & Rossi (2019), I use the “un-
biased shortcut” procedure described in OECD (2009b). It relies on only one set of
Plausible Values (PVs) for estimating the sampling variance (whereas the imputation is
estimated using all five sets). Andrietti (2016) relies on clustering standard errors on the
state level and argues that a wild t-bootstrap procedure produces similar results. Huebener
et al. (2017) also focus on clustering methods. However, given the sampling strategy
used to generate PISA scores, estimating standard errors considering both replication
weights and PVs is more reliable.
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Detecting Important Circumstances Variables with Machine Learning
Machine Learning (ML) can be helpful to identify a model specification, based on its
advantages of being a data-driven, transparent, theory-agnostic, non-parametric approach.
I apply the ML method of conditional inference regression trees, in order to test the
importance of my chosen circumstances in Section 3.3.3. This exercise confirms that
the selected circumstances are indeed relevant for explaining differences in cognitive
skills as measured by PISA tests. My ML algorithm follows the approach of Brunori
et al. (2019) and I refer to their paper for more details on the technicalities. In summary,
the tree algorithm splits the dataset into groups if the null hypothesis of Equality of
Educational Opportunity (EEOp) is rejected. This is best illustrated in the figure at the
bottom of this page: it depicts an opportunity tree which is calculated for the standardized
PISA mathematics score as outcome variable and is based on the PISA-I dataset. The
tree shows that, for instance, students living in households that own less than 100 books
achieve significantly worse results in mathematics compared to those from households
with more books. Generally, the tree reveals that there are groups of certain circumstances
along the lines of socioeconomic status, parental education, and migration background.
Number_of_books
p < 0.001
≤ 1 > 1
Migration_background
p < 0.001
≤ 0 > 0
Highest_ISCED_level
p < 0.001
≤ 1 > 1
11,7%
 y = −0.214
11,9%
 y = −0.067
Father_employment_status
p < 0.001
0 {1, 2, 3}
5,5%
y = −0.463
1,6%
y = −0.737
Highest_ISEI_level
p < 0.001
≤ 65.42 > 65.42
Migration_background
p < 0.001
≤ 0 > 0
32,5%
 y = 0.078
5,9%
y = −0.201
Highest_ISCED_level
p < 0.001
≤ 1 > 1
3,3%
y = 0.027
27,7%
 y = 0.29
Note: This is an Opportunity Tree for students in Gymnasium considering PISA-I waves 2003, 2006,
2009 and 2012: Variables inside the white circles depict the circumstances on which the algorithm has
chosen to split on. The splitting criterion value is shown on the tree-branches and is based on the p-value
(at the one percent level) of the difference in test scores between the circumstances groups. Terminal nodes
are depicted by grey boxes: The first number shows the respective group’s percentage share of the total
weighted sample size, the second number shows the group’s predicted standardized mathematics score.
The tree algorithm splits the dataset into groups, if the null hypothesis of EEOp is rejected. For illustrative
reasons, the three depicted considers a maximum depth of 3. To more clearly identify all drivers of IEOp,
gender, as main driver of differences in test scores, was kept out.
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To check if the results obtained by the tree are stable, I further conduct a conditional
inference regression forest machine learning procedure. The method is similar to the
regression tree, however, forests calculate many trees and then average the obtained effect
over the identified subgroups. Therefore, only a variable importance plot can be depicted
(see the figure above). The importance is calculated by the permutation principle of the
mean decrease in accuracy whereby the variable importance is adjusted to depict relative
terms. Hereby, the circumstance variable with greatest importance equals 1. Like in the
tree algorithm, the number of books seems to be an important factor influencing PISA
test scores of students in Germany. Moreover, migration background, the highest ISEI
and ISCED level of the household in which a student grows up, turn out to be relevant
circumstances. Thus, the machine learning algorithm confirms to include the depicted
variables as controls, which is in line with the arguments provided in Section 3.3.3.
Furthermore, one can use the importance of different circumstances (as revealed by
the plot graph) to derive refined interaction terms in order to detect heterogeneity in the
causal reform effect on IEOp. In that regard, for instance, the regression forest exercise
indicates that both the number of books in a household and the highest parental jobs’
ISEI level should be used as important circumstances variables to control for social status.
Family_structure
Mother_employment_status
Father_employment_status
Highest_ISCED_level
Highest_ISEI_level
Migration_background
Number_of_books
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Circumstance Importance Plot
Circumstance importance (1 = max)
Note: This figure depicts the Circumstance Importance Plot for students considering PISA-I waves
2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012: The plot indicates the importance of the listed circumstances with respect to
the standardized PISA mathematics scores of students in Gymnasium. The importance is calculated by
the permutation principle of the mean decrease in accuracy whereby the variable importance is adjusted
to depict relative terms. Note that qualitatively similar results can be obtained using PISA test scores in
reading or science as outcome variable, instead of only mathematics scores. Due to space constraints, the
respective graphs for reading and science are only available upon request from the author.
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Results in Section 3.5.4 show that these circumstances explain heterogeneity in the effect
of higher learning intensity on test scores, which is in line with the estimated increase in
IEOp.
List of Circumstances Variables
1. Individual Characteristics (IC):
• (I) gender [Base: male] and age (in years)
• (II) migration background [Base: German] and language spoken at home
[Base: German]
2. Parental Characteristics (PC)
• (III) education: highest ISCED-index level in 3 categories [Base: ISCED-level
(3-4)]
3. Socio-Economic Status (SES)
• (IV) number of books in household [Base: 101-500]
• (V) highest ISEI-index level [scale: 0-90]
4. Family Characteristics (FC)
• (VI) single parent household [Base: none]
• (VII) mother/father employment status [Base: FT]
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Overview of Definitions and T/C-Groups
1. Concerning the time periods possible, one can define the following models:
- Baseline Model: medium-term perspective (Base): covers time period (2003-
2012)
- Robustness Model: short-term perspective (Robust): covers time period (2003-
2009)
2. Concerning Treatment and Control Groups, the following groups can be formed
(Table 3.2)
• Treatment Group (T): Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Lower Sax-
ony (LS), Bremen (BR), Hamburg (HB)
• Treatment Group (T1): Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Lower Sax-
ony (LS)
• Treatment Group (T2): BW, BV, LS, BR, HB, Berlin (BE), Brandenburg
(BB)
• Control Group (C): Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Schleswig-Holstein (SH)
• for Model Robust short-term models Control Group (C1): RP, SH, North
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
• hypothetical Control Group (Ch): Saxony (SN), Thuringia (TH)
• Never-Takers Control Group (C-NT): RP, SH, SN, TH
3. Neither Treatment nor Control Group:
• Saarland (SL), Saxony-Anhalt (ST), Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MWP),
Hesse (H)
Further Aspects on the Internal Validity of Empirical Strategy
There were no specific changes in the political parties forming the government of federal
states that form my main treatment and control group settings in both the Model Base
(2003-2012) or Model Robust (2003-2009). Moreover, by conducting a Difference-in-
Differences estimation (DiD) and controlling for federal states, general differences in
the political parties in charge of implementing the reform are taken into account. The
fact that there have not been systematic changes in governments across treatment and
control groups around the respective reform time is supportive evidence, that for the
period considered, it is plausible to assume a comparability in the stability of each federal
state’s educational policies.
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• Treatment Groups (T/T1)
– BW: Conservatives (CDU) led the government for decades until 2011, fol-
lowed by (2011-2016) a coalition government of the Green Party/Social-
Democrats (SPD): the reform was implemented by the CDU and it is plausible
to assume that, due to the time lag for new government policy to take effect,
educational policy up until year 2012/2013 was made by the same party.
– BV: Conservatives (CSU) led the government over the whole analysis period
(2003-2012), thus, it is plausible to assume that school policy was conducted
by the same party.
– LS: Conservatives (CDU) led the government over the whole analysis period
(2003-2012); afterwards/beforehand the government was led by the SPD. It
is plausible to assume that for the whole analysis period, school policy was
made by the same party.
– BR: Social-Democrats (SPD) led the government over the analysis period
(2003-2012), and thus, it is plausible to assume that school policy was made
by the same party.
– HB: Social-Democrats (SPD) led the government for decades (until 2001,
since 2011). In between Conservatives governed and thus it is plausible to
assume that for the analysis period (2003-2012), school policy was mainly
conducted by the same party.
• Control Groups (C/C1)
– RP: Social-Democrats (SPD) led the government over the analysis period
(2003-2012), thus, it is plausible to assume that school policy was conducted
by the same party.
– SH: Social-Democrats (SPD) led the government for decades (1988-2005,
2012-2017). In between (2005-2012), the government was led by Conser-
vatives, from 2010-2012 in a grand coalition with the SPD. School policy
remained similar during the analysis period.
– NRW: Social-Democrats (SPD) led the government for decades (until 2005,
2010-2017). They had already enacted the reform, when for five years the
government changed to the Conservatives (CDU) who continued the imple-
mentation of the reform. School policy remained similar, in particular, when
taking NRW as control for the period 2003-2009.
Thus, by focusing on the analysis period (2003-2012) that covers only the first affected
cohorts, the main DiD assumptions appear to hold. However, as some federal states
decided to reverse the reform in recent years, a similar evaluation may be less plausible
for the time period after 2012. The reform has become a debated topic in most federal
states since the early 2010s (cf. last column in Table III.1). But for the very first affected
cohorts, there are no systematic changes in governments when comparing treatment and
control group states over the time period (2003-2012).
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On Ability in the context of Measuring IEOp and within the DiD framework
Even though, one may have concerns about differences in ability (or talents) when it
comes to measure IEOp, one should consider the following. First, the IEOp measurement
framework takes any time-invariant features of cognitive skills into account, as part of
the unobserved component of circumstances. Second, recent literature in the field of
neuroscience suggests that in the spirit of the Human Capital Theory, cognitive skills
appear to be malleable, in particular during early childhood, through epigenetic processes.
This may explain why, for instance, Boca et al. (2017) find that attending childcare
institutions can significantly improve children’s cognitive skills, in particular those from
disadvantaged SES. Thus, the IEOp measurement framework fully takes the role of
ability into account, both as unobserved circumstance and effort. Consequently, it is
a lower bound measure. Moreover, skills are defined as mixture of circumstances and
efforts.
Concerning the Differences-in-Differences estimation approach (DiD), the only
assumption that I make is that, in general, the distribution in cognitive abilities of students
between 2003 and 2012 did not systematically change across German federal states.
Given the fact that moving behavior between federal states is unlikely to have occurred
(Section 3.4), this means we assume that cognitive skills did not suddenly change across
states during the analyzed time period for any other reason than the reform treatment.
Moreover, even if general systematic differences in ability across federal states existed,
the DiD framework would control for any general level differences in ability.
Therefore, given the short time period and the controls enacted via the DiD framework,
it is hard to find plausible reasons why there should have been any significant changes
in cognitive abilities that differ among federal states and could bias results. In any case,
these thoughts should be of less concern in this quasi-experimental setting than in the
settings of other research papers that measure IEOp across countries. Moreover, as
the reform only affects students from age 10 onward, and treatment merely involves
more intense instruction, but not different contents, I claim that these concerns - which
can neither be addressed by empirical methods nor available data (eg. there are no
representative data on IQs in Germany) - are of second order importance and comparable
to those in other studies estimating returns to schooling.
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